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ABSTRACT

Historical writing invariably is handicapped by the time
and place in which it is written as well as by the pre
dispositions of the writer. Histories of Presidential
foreign policy decision-making often reflect political and
temporal bias or over-dramatize minor events.
Early studies of President Eisenhower's foreign policy
were largely written by historians with a bent for the
Democratic party at a time when a Democrat occupied the
White House. They depicted Eisenhower as a do-nothing weak
sycophant of his Secretary of State. Scholarship of the
late eighties, written in view of declassified materials,
has redressed this balance. Although often decried as
revisionist--a pejorative term connoting naive apologias-the works so based show Eisenhower as a sound thinker
immersed in the questions of his day.
This thesis has sought to walk the line between the
scylla of partisan politics and the charybdis of over
dramatization .
In the policy crisis ocassioned by the deteriorating
French position during the siege at Dien Bien Phu in 1954,
the Eisenhower Administration analysts entertained a wide
range of possible American actions as a team, ultimately
deciding upon a course chosen by the President himself. In
making a well thought out decision not to intervene in the
Indochina War, Eisenhower followed precepts of international
law including the principle of respect for sovereignty and
respect for a system of collective security.
The process by which Eisenhower made this decision
reflects a sophisticated division of labor. Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles was the Administration "tough"
whose duty it was to present a strident, almost bellicose,
anti-Communism. Eisenhower, as the constitutionally
prescribed holder of ultimate authority, represented the
calming influence who could override his Secretary's remarks
should those remarks induce adversaries to prepare for war
or induce allied differences which the Soviets could
effectively manipulate. Although Dulles' actions may have
represented the maxim si vis pacem para bellunu amiable Ike,
by playing golf, let the American public know that all was
fine.

vi

THE QUIET DIPLOMACY
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER AND DIEN BIEN PHU

Chapter One : Introduction
Eisenhower As Foreign Policy Decision-Maker

Ten years before the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, the
National Security Council issued a report that contemplated
sending 275,000 American troops into French Indochina.

The

day before their report, on April 4, 1954, France had
petitioned Washington, asking for limited United States
military intervention in Indochina.

In what was to become

known as Operation Vulture, the French Government requested
United States bombing raids to lift the North Vietnamese
siege of the beleaguered French garrison at Dien Bien Phu.
The French request did not come as a surprise to Washington,
but, rather, was a result of a previous American offer.
Washington considered such intervention a golden opportunity
to check the sweep of international Communism.

The

diplomacy behind President Eisenhower's ultimate decision
not to intervene offers a unique chance to analyze Cold War
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decision making as well as Eisenhower's leadership and
control over foreign policy formulation.
By asking for American air support, the French hoped to
strengthen their diplomatic hand at the Geneva Conference
scheduled to begin on April 26, 1954.

The purpose of this

conference was to negotiate an end to war in Korea and
Indochina.

The French had tied their international prestige

to their ability to defend the fortress outpost at Dien Bien
Phu.

Should Dien Bien Phu collapse, the apparent

deterioration of France's military status most likely would
result in an unfavorable denouement at Geneva.

In that

event, France feared a further loss of prestige and
legitimacy in her North African colonies, as well as the
certainty of toppling the Laniel Government.1 Operation
Vulture could also benefit Washington by helping to secure
Southeast Asia as a source of raw materials enhancing the
economic well-being of Japan.

Japan was important in

American strategy not only as a strong Pacific ally, but
also as a buffer to American territorial interests.2 While
Operation Vulture appeared to benefit both Paris and
Washington, President Eisenhower's foreign policy was
informed by many considerations.
Following World War II, America could not return to
isolationism.

Many Americans believed that America had a
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duty to the civilized world to intervene in the internal
affairs of those states where Communist aggression
threatened.

The Soviet Union already had imposed its will

on the countries of Eastern Europe and now appeared bent on
a course of world domination.

Mindful of Munich and the

failure of appeasement, American foreign policy makers
responded to continued Soviet aggression with the
"containment" policy.

Containment meant that the Soviet

challenge would be met with some form of American response.
But, unlike Hitler, Stalin did not have a timetable for
aggression.

Each presidential administration from Truman

on, therefore, developed its own strategy to meet Communism
within the containment context.

President Eisenhower's

strategy in the spring of 1954 was United Action.
/

United Action was a comprehensive policy capable of
meeting Soviet advances as well as solidifying American
leadership of the free world.

From an American perspective

the post-war balance of power had split world allegiances
into the Communist sphere of influence and the sphere of
those nations vowed to stop Communist encroachments on
sovereignty.

To harness world allegiances, both the United

States and the Soviet Union sought to maximize their
influence in nations within their respective spheres.

For

both, freedom of action to pursue national goals was in

5

direct proportion to their credibility.

American

intervention in world affairs depended both on high
credibility at home— in the form of electoral support and
favorable popular opinion— and credibility abroad in the
form of allied and neutral support.

Soviet leadership in

the Communist world depended on both retaining control of
the overrun countries and the success of Communist
insurrections in the non-Communist world.

To be credible,

American intervention had to follow a request for support or
be otherwise within the principles of the United Nations
Charter.

The Soviet Union did not measure credibility in

terms of adherence to principles of international law, but
in terms of successful policy.

A successful insurrection

meant the Soviets could ignore principles of state
sovereignty.

Thus, the Soviet Union could exhibit a

confusing picture as either a traditional nation state
acting within the community of nations or as an
ideologically motivated force heedless of the principles of
that community.

Because of this duality, each American

Presidential Administration had to decide whether Soviet
action was motivated by ideological or nationalistic goals.
This determination defined the nature of American response.
The decision was not whether to act, but whether Soviet
intentions and capabilities necessitated one course of
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action or another.

Each administration developed its own

sliding scale of means to thwart Communist expansion.
John Lewis Gaddis, in Strategies of Containment, has
noted five components in President Eisenhower's containment
strategy.3 The five components were nuclear weapons,
alliances, psychological warfare, covert action, and
negotiations.4 In one way or another, the need to maintain
America's credibility at home and abroad influenced all five
components.

While nuclear weapons were used as a threat in

Eisenhower's formula of containment, an effort to project
America's image as an agent for rather than a destroyer of
world peace may have led to their actual non-use.
Eisenhower sought alliances and psychological warfare to
obtain world support for American positions.

Eisenhower

used covert action to further American positions in ways
that, in order to maintain a positive world image, were best
kept hidden.

Eisenhower pursued negotiations to facilitate

the administration's other components.

The most important

element in Eisenhower's quest to further credibility and
facilitate American goals was the element of alliances. To
wit: United Action.
The term "United Action" was first used by Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles in a speech before the Overseas
Press Club on March 29, 1954.5 Shortly thereafter,

Eisenhower defined Dulles' use of that phrase in the same
news conference at which he mentioned the "domino theory."6
For Eisenhower— perhaps consciously bringing a combination
of the Metternician and Bismarckian systems into the
twentieth century— a concert of opinion and a concert of
readiness would maintain the world balance of power.

The

lynch-pin of this system was United Action which demanded
strong alliances.

America would undertake action only with

the support of allies.
Eisenhower's desire for alliances was formulated with
an awareness of the world balance of power and American
credibility.

On March 25, 1955, Eisenhower wrote Winston

Churchill, noting that:

We have come to the point where every
additional backward step must be deemed
a defeat for the western world. In
fact, it is a triple defeat. First, we
lose a potential ally. Next, we give to
an implacable enemy another recruit.
Beyond this, every such retreat creates
in the minds of neutrals the fear that
we do not mean what we say when we
pledge our support to people who want to
remain free.7
Eisenhower felt that America had a duty to the Western World
to contain Communism.

That duty was the defense of freedom.

In that defense, Eisenhower felt that America's reputation
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and credibility were on the line.

Eisenhower felt that

United Action was the vehicle to assure neutrals that
America meant what it said.

The Cold War was fought to win

the hearts and minds of men and women the world over.
Alliances, sought for their innate tactical strength, were
the strategic means to fulfill that duty.

President Eisenhower's foreign policy toward Indochina
during the Viet Minh siege of the fortress outpost at Dien
Bien Phu in the Spring of 1954 can be divided into three
stages.

First, from March 13 until March 29, American

policy makers gave serious credence to Operation Vulture.
From March 29 until April 24, American foreign policy
primarily was aimed at eliciting United Action.

From April

24 until May 7, American foreign policy sought to raise
French morale diplomatically by any means.

Although

American policy had devolved to giving the French moral
support in Indochina during the third stage, already
Washington had begun to transform the tactical response of
United Action into a strategic policy of collective security
which culminated in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
(SEATO) in 1955.
The diplomacy during each stage illustrates President
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Eisenhower's control over and his adroit use of the foreign
policy making establishment.

Indeed, Eisenhower's

leadership during the Dien Bien Phu siege is an example of
efficacious policy formulation and implementation during
crisis conditions.
Two articles have analyzed Eisenhower's control over
foreign policy.

In "Eisenhower and Dulles: Who Made the

Decisions?," Richard Immerman argues that President
Eisenhower may have had more control over foreign policy
than some observers have thought.8 Basing his work on
primary sources, Immerman relates that those in Eisenhower's
inner circle "almost unanimously support the hypothesis of
an activist president who was the central figure in
diplomatic decisions."9 Eisenhower operated behind the
scenes developing overall strategy while Dulles executed the
decisions.

The result was that "[t]he public would hear and

see the secretary of state, and not the president,"10 For
Eisenhower the emphasis was on teamwork where Eisenhower
delegated to each member a certain amount of responsibility.
Nevertheless, "[a]11 important matters were to be brought
directly to the president's attention."11
Fred Greenstein, in "Eisenhower as an Activist
President: A Look at New Evidence," also believes that
Eisenhower made all the decisions behind the scenes.12
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"Eisenhower," he argues, "consistently preferred results to
publicity."13 Eisenhower's "low-profile" nature of
leadership manifested itself in a variety of ways.
Eisenhower, for instance, would reserve comment on positions
taken at conferences until other participants had spoken.14
Like Immerman, Greenstein states that Eisenhower delegated
responsibility in purposeful fashion according to a
"division of labor."

Greenstein states that:

Dulles was assigned the "get tough" side of
foreign-policy enunciation, thus placating the
fervently anti-Communist wing of the Republican
party. Meanwhile, amiable Ike made gestures
toward peace and international humanitarianism—
for example, Atoms for Peace, Open Skies, and
summitry at Geneva.15
By such a division of labor, subordinates "protected the
president's ability to be perceived as being above the
fray," thereby giving Eisenhower considerable freedom of
action.16
From these two articles one can discern a style of
leadership where Eisenhower was the power behind the scenes,
content to let subordinates take public credit for policies.
Such a style might account for Dulles' occasional tendency
to engage in "bull-in-the-China-shop" diplomacy.

Dulles

might take strong positions, offensive to opponents, but
eventually Eisenhower was in a position to ameliorate
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harmful effects.

At Geneva in 1954, for instance, the

diplomatic slight occasioned by Dulles' refusal to shake
Chou En-Lai's proffered hand was mitigated by Eisenhower's
appointment of Walter Bedell Smith to head the United States
delegation.

What Dulles could not achieve by stridency,

Eisenhower, having cultivated an aura of amiability, might
achieve through public pronouncements of "common sense."
Such a division of labor could free Dulles to scare the
Communist Chinese with threats of massive retaliation, while
Eisenhower was equally free to calm allies denying United
States plans to put ground troops in Indochina.
Eisenhower made judicious use of the foreign policy
decision making apparatus.

Two additional articles attest

to Eisenhower's effective and responsible use of advisors.
In "Responsibilities of Presidents and Advisors: A Theory
and Case Study of Vietnam Decision Making," John P. Burke
states that Eisenhower used advisors to enhance his
"cognitive and decision-making capabilities," in forming his
decision not to bomb the Viet Minh at Dien Bien Phu.17
Starting with a National Security Council meeting that took
place before the actual siege, Burke noted that a number of
possible policy options were presented and discussed.

Burke

then noted that during the next few months alternative
policies were debated.

With particular reference to the
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Smith Committee, Burke noted that all Eisenhower committees
served "as independent channels for exploring and analyzing
policy alternatives."18 Burke stated that at these
committee meetings Eisenhower was not only an active
participant, but also encouraged his advisers to regard each
other "as equals in the advisory process:"

Beyond this,

"Eisenhower also took other steps that fostered a fair, open
process of advising," making the Smith Committee accountable
personally to him.19
Burke states that Eisenhower's use of committees was
only one facet of his use of the policy making apparatus.
The President also made good use of personalities and
Congress.

The role of General Robert Cutler, Eisenhower's

Special Assistant for National Security, states Burke, is
particularly instructive.

Cutler in a non-partisan and

detached manner would report to the President all views
expressed at meetings Eisenhower did not attend and
interrelate those views with prior policy analyses.20 As
far as Eisenhower's utilization of Congress, Burke posits
that contrary to conventional wisdom, Congressional demands
for British participation in a possible Indochina
intervention did not influence Eisenhower's decision.
Rather, "Eisenhower and his advisors...had determined
beforehand that an active role by Britain and other nations
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would be a necessary precondition to intervention."21 With
reference to united action, Burke states that extensive
American intervention had been planned as had alternative
modes of intervention.22
In "Military Force in the Foreign Policy of the
Eisenhower Presidency," Richard M. Saunders also remarks on
Eisenhower's judicious use of the foreign policy making
apparatus.23 Saunders states that President Eisenhower's
reluctance to use military force as an instrument of foreign
policy implementation resulted not from indecision but from
his world view "and a high level of skill at managing his
advisory structure."24 Saunders believed that Eisenhower's
military training taught him to realize organization as an
instrument to better handle exigencies of world events.

As

a result, Eisenhower was kept well informed by his advisors.
He "received an unbiased and unfiltered flow of
information," options presented to him were studied
adequately, and all relevant options were considered,
thereby ensuring the President's flexibility of action.25
Eisenhower accomplished these goals by instilling a sense of
teamwork and a need for continuous planning.

The President

sought all points of view and relied not on those advisors
promoting aggressive action but on "the doubters and
dissenters."26
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After putting foreign policy questions through such
rigorous analysis, Saunders believes that Eisenhower's world
view guided the final product.

Specifically, Eisenhower

placed foreign policy as the first priority of his
Presidency.27 Eisenhower believed in the importance of
allies because the United States was an active participant
in world events and was leader of the free world.

Allies

were needed to spread both the cost and responsibility of
containing Communism.28 In addition to a need for allies,
Eisenhower waf "influenced by a deep concern for world
opinion, by a desire to place U.S. actions within the
context of international law, and by a high regard for quiet
diplomacy."29 These aspects of Eisenhower's world view,
states Saunders, contributed to Eisenhower's decision to
pose prerequisites to United States intervention in
Indochina in 1954.

According to Saunders, "[t]he conditions

included legal sanction for the intervention under
international law and a favorable climate of free world
opinion."30 The requirement of obeying international law
precepts led Eisenhower to demand "formal requests for
assistance from the French and, more importantly, from the
local governments involved."31 Allied approval met the
requirement of favorable world public opinion.32 Further,
states Saunders, the President's decision was influenced by
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a belief that United States association with colonialism
would undermine favorable world opinion.33
Saunders believes that Eisenhower's adherence to
America's constitutional form of government compelled him to
seek

Congressional and public support prior to the use of

military force, even in situations where Eisenhower believed
in the correctness of intervention.34 In this regard,
allied support was required because allies could share the
costs as well as bolster support for the operation both at
home and abroad.

To this end, Eisenhower "devoted much

attention to ensuring that no permanent damage to allied
relations was done" by engaging United States forces.35

A theory of Eisenhower's handling of foreign policy can
be adduced from the conclusions of the foregoing four
articles.

Eisenhower possessed a strong degree of control

over foreign policy.

His world view, largely influenced by

his perception of America's post war idealism and
responsibility, led him to formulate policies consistent
with America's traditions and values.

In reaching foreign

policy decisions, Eisenhower judiciously used the policy
making apparatus so that each component was used to its best
advantage.

Eisenhower set-up a division of labor where he
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allowed all of his advisors to express a point of view no
matter how far that view might have differed from the norm.
According to that division of labor, John Foster Dulles was
the "point man" for administration policies.

By allowing

Dulles to be the "tough guy," Eisenhower reserved to himself
the opportunity to mollify any of Dulles' excesses.

If the

tough guy approach did not achieve goals consistent with
Eisenhower's policies, then Eisenhower could calm the airs
and present himself as a man of peace and sobriety.

If

Dulles' blunt pronouncements achieved Eisenhower's goals
then so much the better.
Eisenhower critics--perhaps influenced by desires of
political manipulation known only too well by the Kennedys-labeled Eisenhower as a do-nothing President happy to be
playing golf instead of immersed in the questions of his
day.

This criticism seemed to readily fit the facts

Eisenhower made public.

As part of his "quiet diplomacy,"

Eisenhower may have felt that Americans would feel that all
was well if the President took the time to play golf.
Because Eisenhower preferred results to publicity, he may
have preferred successful policies to an adoring posterity.
Eisenhower's decision with respect to United States
involvement in Indochina epitomizes his approach to foreign
policy decision making.
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Notes Chapter One
1.
Loss of prestige in her African colonies constituted a
significant dimension of French policy in Indochina.
Historically, the primary motivation behind French colonial
policy was a question of power politics; France sought to gain
great power status in Europe and in the community of nations
by the acquisition of colonies.
John Chipman, French Power
in Africa (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Basil Blackwell, 1989)
p. 17 & in passim. Having secured a colony territorially,
French policy makers sought to export the largess of French
civilization to the native population.
In the exercise of
this so-called mission civilisatrice, the hope was to secure
French power
ideologically.
Having
exported French
civilization, French leaders could then present France as a
world power to their fellow Europeans.
Such a presentation
would show the universal appeal of French values and
traditions. Id. pp. 17-22. Somewhat tautologically, French
leaders used the presentation of ideas and images as both
source and proof of French power. The operating premise was
that only nations that involve themselves with questions
beyond their own borders, are nations that possess world
power.
A "loss of influence overseas would [then] be
perceived [by Europeans] as immediately affecting French
status, prestige, and position in the international system."
Id. p . 5 .
A defeat in Indochina would encourage independence
agitation in Africa and the Maghreb, which in turn would
demote France as a world power in the eyes of the peoples of
Europe.
To French sensibilities, therefore,
Indochina
represented a vain attempt to hang-on to the lost grandeur of
empire. If France lost Indochina, Europe and the world would
see that French pre-occupation with internal and European
problems had created a secondary role for France and that
France had resigned herself to let world affairs pass to
others. Id. pp. 27-29. Noting decolonization, John Chipman
posits that French leaders today use France's status as an
independent nuclear power and France's seat as a permanent
member of the United Nations Security Council in the same way
as French leaders of yesterday used France's status as a
colonizer, i.e. to gain for France respect as a world power.
Id. pp. 29-30.
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2.
Japan became the main United States outpost in the
Pacific in the early postwar period because the Communist
threat required a countervailing force.
The idea was to
prevent a Communist takeover of the Pacific by creating a
sovereign Japan allied with the United States.
Following
World War II, the fundamental objective of American foreign
policy was to protect national security. According to George
Kennan, the man who articulated the intellectual origins of
"containment," there were five industrial power centers which
United States policy must attempt to keep free from Communist
influence.
These centers were the United States, Great
Britain, the Soviet Union, the Rhine valley with adjacent
industrial areas— central Europe, and Japan.
George F.
Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1967)
p. 359. The major United States goal was to prevent the re
establishment of hostile governments in central Europe and
Japan, otherwise World War II would prove a hollow victory.
Indeed, on May 8, 1947, Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson
called for "the reconstruction of those two great workshops
of Europe and Asia--Germany and Japan— upon which the ultimate
recovery of the two continents so largely depends."
Dean
Acheson, "The Requirements of Reconstruction" Department of
State Bulletin (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, May 18, 1947) p. 994.
Japan could become a strong power center in the Pacific if
it re-armed, joined some form of collective defense with the
United States or did both. In addressing this question, the
Eisenhower
Administration
was
sensitive
to
Japanese
sovereignty. Because Japan formally regained sovereignty in
April 1952, John Foster Dulles felt that a decision on
Japanese rearmament would have to come from the Japanese
people.
Nonetheless, Dulles felt that sovereignty implied
that Japan be able to defend herself.
H.W. Brands, "The
United States and the Reemergence of Independent Japan,"
Pacific Affairs (vol. 58 no. 3, Fall 1986) pp. 394-395. For
Eisenhower the problem was that in creating a strong defense
Japan might weaken her economy. Eisenhower's concern was that
of a funambulist walking the rope between a strong economy and
a strong defense; too much effort for one might enervate the
other. Id. p. 395.
A strong Japanese economy, furthermore, could serve as a
catalyst for Asian development. Michael Schaller, "Securing
the Great Crescent: Occupied Japan and the Origins of
Containment in Southeast Asia," Journal of American History
(vol. 69, September 1982) p. 395. Japanese trade with Asian
countries could foster independent governments, friendly
towards the United States and opposed to Communism, which also
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could provide a bulwark against Soviet encroachment. Id. p.
398. In this way, Schaller argues, the attempt to integrate
Japan into the Asian community led to containment in Southeast
Asia.
Id. pp. 392-393. The contemporary argument was that
" [a] secure Japan would help support Southeast Asia against
Chinese communism, and vice versa." Id. p. 393.
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Oxford University Press, 1982) pp. 147-148.
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Chapter Two
A

Stalinist

Blind

JLLley:

French Indochina and the Truman Administration, 1945-1953

The battle of Dien Bien Phu ended the First
Indochina War which lasted from 1946 to 1954.

The French, a

repressive colonial power, sought to draw the guerrilla
elements of Vietnamese Communist and nationalist forces into
a set-piece conventional battle at Dien Bien Phu, a small
valley outpost near the Laotian border in northwest Vietnam.
Instead the French lured close to 50, 000 Vietnamese troops
supported by heavy artillery to strong defensive positions
in the hills surrounding the French garrison of 10,000
soldiers.

The resulting siege, which lasted fifty-six days,

dealt a devastating blow to French morale and contributed to
the downfall of the French Fourth Republic.
To understand why the French and Vietnamese Communist
forces were at Dien Bien Phu necessitates a look at the
history of French Indochina during the previous eight years.
Prior to World War Two, Indochina had been a French colonial
possession.

During the Second World War the Japanese
23
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coopted the French (now allied with Germany) infrastructure
and turned Indochina into an agricultural reserve to help
feed the Japanese armed forces:

In the spring of 1945,

Japanese forces overran Indochina and imprisoned their
French Vichy ally.

Five months later the Japanese

surrendered following the atomic explosion at Hiroshima.
Vietnamese nationalist groups seized the opportunity created
by the departure of effective French and Japanese
stewardship and proclaimed their independence.

Undeterred

by this fait accompli, the French under Charles de Gaulle
attempted to reassert control.

When negotiations proved

futile the French and Vietnamese resorted to war in December
1946.
When Dwight D. Eisenhower entered office in January
1953, therefore, trouble had been brewing in Indochina for
over eight years. American response to that trouble
reflected the attitude of each presidential administration
toward legitimate governance and overarching concern for
European affairs.

The need for strong European allies led

Franklin Delano Roosevelt to abandon outward abhorrence for
colonial causes.

Harry S. Truman held a stronger tolerance

for colonialism than did Roosevelt, and readily discarded
ideas of self-determination in favor of neutralizing Soviet
power in Europe.

At first, under Truman, the United States
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only gave token assistance to their European ally in
Indochina because American domestic opinion would not
sanction supporting a colonial power.

But when Mao Tse-

tung founded the People's Republic of China on Indochina's
northern border in 194 9, the United States decided to
increase aid to France under the aegis of containing Asian
Communism.

At the end of the Truman Administration, the

United States had established economic and military aid
missions in each of the Associated States of Indochina, and
dispatched United States Air Force technicians to help the
French defend a garrison besieged at a place called Na San.
The course of American foreign policy in French Indochina
during the Truman years contrasted with the policy developed
during the Eisenhower Administration.

Even though

commitments made by Truman bound United States policy,
Eisenhower, interested in the legitimacy of the French
government in Indochina, forcefully urged the French to
recognize the aspirations of the Indochinese people and
ultimately refused to aid the French.
During the years of the Truman Administration, French
policy makers had put the future status of Indochina as a
French colony in doubt.

In a vain attempt to recapture the

glory of faded empire, French policy makers were unwilling
to grant needed political reforms gracefully.

While
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cognizant of the need for reform, American policy between
1945 and 1953 blithely supported French policy with men,
money, and material.

When the mistakes of French policy

came to a head during Eisenhower's Presidency, Eisenhower
faced a choice of continuing the policy of his predecessor
or developing a creative new approach:

Historical

constraints decreed that Eisenhower would continue Truman's
commitments, yet Eisenhower's conservatism ultimately
prevented the natural consequence of those commitments-— war
in Indochina.

From the Treaty of Tientsin in 1885 to World War II,
Indochina had been a French colony.

Because French rule had

been particularly oppressive, the period was marked by
Vietnamese resistance activity and guerrilla warfare.

When

Hitler overran France in May 1940, a Vichy regime under Vice
Admiral Jean Decoux established control in Indochina.

That

September, Admiral Decoux granted airfield rights in Tonkin
to the Japanese.

The Japanese quickly occupied all of

Indochina and "jointly" ruled the peninsula with Decoux.
Japanese occupation was as oppressive as French colonial
rule, further strengthening Vietnamese nationalist groups.
One such group, the League for the Independence of Vietnam,
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also known as the Viet Minh, became a dominant political
force.

Near the end of the war the Japanese, fearful of

Gaullist influences, disarmed their French allies on March
9, 1945.

The next day, the Japanese allowed Bao Dai, former

Emperor of Annam, to rule Vietnam as an independent entity
under Japanese protection.1 Bao Dai ruled for only five
months.

On August 18, three days after the Japanese

surrender, the Viet Minh rose up, proclaimed their
sovereignty and founded the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
(DRV) .2 Quoting from the United States Declaration of
Independence, Ho Chi Minh, Chairman of the Indochinese
Communist Party and President of the DRV, proclaimed the
independence of Vietnam on September 2, 1945.3
Meanwhile, at Potsdam in July 1945, Churchill, Truman,
and Stalin had decided to split Indochina in two following
Victory in the Pacific.

According to plan, Chinese

Nationalist troops entered Indochina north of the 16th
parallel and disarmed the Japanese.

The British under Lord

Louis Montbatten did the same to Japanese forces below the
16th parallel.

When Montbatten landed in Indochina on

September 12, 1945, he was under the impression that his
mission was to assist the French in resuming control.

The

Viet Minh decided to cooperate with the British occupation
forces following a proclamation by British Major-General
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D.D. Gracey, in which Gracey declared impartial treatment of
political and economic matters during the transition from
war to peace.

But, on September 23, French prisoners of war

released from Japanese camps by Gracey staged a successful
coup d'etat in Saigon, ousting the Viet Minh Executive
Committee.

Vietnamese, angered by French excesses, quickly

retaliated.

During the ensuing violence^ on September 26,

the first American— Lt. Col. A. Peter Dewey— was killed in
Vietnam.

Lt. Col. Dewey was the nephew of the Governor of

New York, Thomas Dewey.4
After the British ceded occupation rights to the French
on October 9, 1945, Ho Chi Minh tried to discuss the future
of Vietnam with the French, but negotiations during the
following year proved futile.

On September 14, 1946 the

French and Ho finally agreed in principle to a Modus Vivendi
establishing a committee to coordinate customs and foreign
trade.

Before this agreement was signed, however, the

French announced that they were going to take control of
imports and exports at the customs house at Haiphong Harbor
on October 15, 1946.

The French action incited Viet Minh

*

militiamen who took some French border patrolmen prisoner.
On November 20, the French tried to free the patrolmen by
force.

Although a temporary accord was reached, certain

French leaders in Paris wanted to use the Haiphong incident
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as a pretext to seize control of the whole city.

As a

consequence, French Premier Georges Bidault gave the
Commander of French forces in Indochina permission to launch
an attack.

On November 22, Colonel Debes, French Commander

at Haiphong, issued an ultimatum to the Viet Minh to abandon
certain parts of the city.

Debes demanded that the

Vietnamese accept his ultimatum by 9 A:M; November 23,
failing which Debes would "take any measure the situation
calls for."5 The Viet Minh called the French bluff.

In the

ensuing naval bombardment of Haiphong Harbor, up to 6,000
Vietnamese were killed.
To many Frenchmen the Haiphong incident provided the
perfect opportunity to go to war against the Viet Minh, and
reestablish Indochina as a source of French prestige.

To

have a colony in Indochina represented an opportunity to
reassert France's role as a major world power.

The rice

fields and rubber plantations were a source of economic
strength for individual French businesses and for the
general health of the post-war French economy as a whole.
Besides, these Frenchmen reasoned, inclusion of Indochina in
the French Union had brought and could continue to bring
economic and social benefit to the people of Indochina.
The attempt to use Indochina as a means to re-establish
France as a world power, however, was hampered by a lack of
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communication between Paris and Hanoi.

At this juncture,

French personnel in Indochina operated with a measure of
freedom, as France itself was without a government.

In

addition to poor communication, the French faced various
groups that wanted to rule Vietnam as a separate sovereign
state.

The Viet Minh, for example, wanted to eliminate the

French presence in Viet Nam including the removal of those
Vietnamese who had profited from French colonialism.
In addition, the French could not effectuate a strong
colonial policy and remain a viable power in Europe without
the assistance of the United States, and the United States
was at least nominally anti-colonial.

But American

attitudes toward Ho Chi Minh showed American willingness to
compromise long standing anti-colonial beliefs with the
newly emergent fear of Russian Communist expansion.

After

World War II, nonetheless, opposition to colonialism
continued to be a potent political issue in America.

The

ease with which Japan had conquered Western colonial
possessions in Asia and the Pacific in contrast to
resistance the Japanese faced by Filipinos, who were
promised independence, convinced many Americans that the age
of colonialism was at an end.6 American anti-colonialism
was reflected in the principles of the Atlantic Charter of
1941.

In Paragraph 3 of the Charter the United States and
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Great Britain declared that it was their policy that "they
respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of
government under which they will live."7
President Roosevelt, who had expressed both
anti-colonial and anti-French feelings^ faced a dilemma.8
At the Tehran Conference in 1943, Roosevelt had proposed an
international trusteeship system to administer the previous
French colony of Indochina.

Churchill, fearing outside

interference in Britain's control of India, noted his
disapproval.9 The United States Navy, anxious to establish
a system of Pacific island bases, also raised concerns over
Roosevelt's idea.

In response to this opposition, the

United States followed a policy acceptable to both Britain
and France.

At the Yalta Conference in February 1945,

Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin agreed that possible
trusteeship status depended upon voluntary admission.
Indochina would come under the trusteeship structure only if
the French volunteered.

American policy toward Indochina,

therefore, deferred the decision as to the legitimacy of the
French government in Indochina to the French.
Fear of Communist expansion ultimately silenced the
trusteeship issue and American anti-colonial attitudes.
Respect for state legitimacy gave way to a need to have
nations strong enough to resist Communist advances on their

32

own.

American policy toward the Soviet Union at this time,

however, was not animated by ideological anti-Communism as
much as it was formulated in response to questions of power
, politics.

The first concern of United States policy was to

formulate a balance of power to meet the challenge raised by
Russian expansionism in Europe.

Containment of Russian

expansion became "doctrine" as American policy makers
drummed-up domestic support for the newly created balance of
power in Europe.

In Asia, the time lag between decisions of

power politics and development of doctrine was longer than
the time between events and doctrine in Europe because the
perceived threat still resided in Europe.

In this respect,

Pacific island naval bases and strong alliances with the
"former" colonial powers of Europe— decisions of power
politics— took on added significance.

To protect strategic

interests in the Pacific and to assure British and French
cooperation after the war, United States policy compromised
traditional American antipathy toward colonialism.

Many

felt that to argue otherwise would threaten the passage of
the United Nations Treaty in the Senate, and that, in turn,
would threaten collective security.

Thus, three years

later, without serious opposition to the problem of
colonies, the Senate ratified the U.N. Treaty.

A

bi-partisan foreign policy, formed during the war years to
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confront Hitler with a united America, was reapplied to
confront Stalin.

The desideratum was to make the new United

Nations stronger than its predecessor.
In 1945, however, some American policy makers wanted to
effectuate an anti-colonial policy.

With respect to the

French colony of Indochina, analysts in the State Department
were split into two schools of thought: the Office of
European Affairs (EUR) and the Office of Far Eastern Affairs
(FE).10 The position of the EUR was to follow a hands off
policy which basically favored French reoccupation.

This

view held that the former colonial powers of Europe would
oppose any action by the United States that ran counter to
French wishes.

Such an event would undermine United States

efforts to strengthen France and Western Europe in a
European balance of power that checked Soviet aggression.11
The FE wanted a more vigorous anti-colonial position.-

They

noted that President Roosevelt "realized that dynamic forces
leading toward self-government are growing in Asia; that the
United States— as a great democracy— cannot and must not try
to retard this development but rather act in harmony with
it."12 They argued that acts undertaken by the United
States in furtherance of "self-rule in close, willing
association with major Western powers would not only be in
harmony with political trends in the area, but would appear
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to be the one practical solution which will assure peace and
stability in the Far East."13
Politics decreed that the EUR position would carry the
day.

On June 2, Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius

Jr., met with Bidault and the French Ambassador to the
United States, Henri Bonnet.

Stettinius "made it

clear...that the record was entirely innocent of any
official statement of this government questioning even by
implication, French sovereignty, over Indochina."14 On June
22, 1945 the State Department issued a paper which
summarized the United States position on colonial
questions.15 The paper noted the two contradictory aims of
the United States.

Specifically, the United States felt

that peace and security in the Far East required increased
political freedom for the inhabitants of colonial
territories.

Generally, however, the United States felt

that world peace and security necessitated cooperation with
the colonial powers.

In an effort to harmonize these two

contradictory goals, the ideal gave way to the real.

The

paper noted:
The United States Government may properly
continue to state the political principle which it
has frequently announced, that dependent peoples
should be given the opportunity...to achieve an
increased measure of self-government, but it
should avoid any course of action which would
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seriously impair the unity of the major United
Nations .16
Perhaps mindful of possible criticism for abandoning
traditional American ideals, the paper paid lip service to
self-government in its conclusion.
The United States recognizes French
sovereignty over Indochina. It Is; however, the
general policy of the United States to favor a
policy which would allow colonial peoples an
opportunity to prepare themselves for increased
participation in their own government with
eventual self-government as the goal.17
Significantly, the United States position was solidified
in a pro-French posture; the need for French friendship in
Europe prevented the United States from risking French
enmity in Indochina.

Both the State Department and Congress,

were willing to compromise traditional American beliefs in
order to secure foreign policy objectives.

Critics of this

policy attacked it as abandoning the major policy goal of
achieving world peace and stability through rule of
legitimate self-government, out of fear of Soviet
intentions.

Additionally, the contrasting positions of EUR

and FE served to define the parameters of the entire
Indochina question for American foreign policy.

American

policy in the Pacific in 1945 largely was determined by
events transpiring in Europe.
Meanwhile, in Vietnam the French tried to settle the
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question of Vietnam's legitimate government unhindered by
outside opinion.

On March 6, 1946, in Hanoi the French

agreed to recognize the DRV as a "free state" within the
French Union, in exchange for the "amicable" return of
French troops to replace the Nationalist Chinese troops in
northern Vietnam.18 By "free state" was meant that
ostensibly the DRV would have its own government and army.
But precisely what this meant in practice was called into
question because sovereignty was not part of the French
concept of "free state."

According to the French

constitution of October 13, 1946, France itself would
dominate the French Union.19 The French Union, a quasifederal structure, was not an association of equal partners
like the British Commonwealth.

Rather, Paris was to the

French Union as Rome is to the Catholic Church.20 France
faced the dilemma of meeting Vietnamese aspirations while
retaining Indochina within the French Union.

Because

American policy toward the area was made within the context
of United States-French relations, the United States
deferred important decisions to the French.

The consequence

of deferment (or neglect) was to inadequately examine the
legitimacy of the French position.
Even though many French and Viet Minh officials
distrusted each other, Ho Chi Minh preferred to resolve the
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question of legitimacy through negotiation.

The status of

the Republic of Cochin China-^declared a "free republic" on
June 1— dominated negotiations held at Fontainebleau
beginning in July 1946.
between the two sides.

The talks showed the differences
According to historian R.E.M.

Irving,
[T]he French regard[ed] the problem of
the status of Vietnam essentially as one of
internal constitutional law, and the Vietnamese
s[aw] it in terms of international law; for the
'former it was a question of 'autonomy within the
French bloc', whereas for the latter it was a
question of 'independence complemented with
association with France.'21
During these negotiations, the French showed a lack of
respect for the Viet Minh as legitimate representatives of
the Vietnamese people by calling another conference at Dalat
with representatives of the Royal Governments of Cambodia,
Laos, Cochin China and of ethnic minorities.

Protesting

lack of French good faith, the Viet Minh left Fontainebleau.
Ho Chi Minh, however, stayed behind and worked out a Modus
Vivendi with the French Government dated September 14, 1946.
As noted above, events in Indochina outpaced diplomatic
initiatives as the French shelled Haiphong Harbor before
this agreement was signed.22 The French, soon thereafter,
occupied Hanoi, forcing Ho to the countryside as conflict
spread throughout Vietnam.23 On the evening of December 20,
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by radio broadcast, President Ho called for the national
resistance war to start.24 The First Indochina War had
begun.
Despite repeated efforts by Ho Chi Minh to negotiate,
some members of the French government, such as Admiral
Thierry d'Argenlieu, French High Commissioner in Saigon
appointed by de Gaulle, did not trust Ho:
d'Argenlieu sought a military solution.

Instead,
In October 1947,

d'Argenlieu inaugurated a large scale offensive against the
Viet Minh.

When this military solution ultimately proved

inadequate, d'Argenlieu decided that resurrecting a
government headed by the former Emperor Bao Dai was France's
best solution.

By supporting the traditional ruling class,

the French hoped to weaken the popular support of the Viet
Minh.

To this end, the French agreed to have Bao Dai return

to Vietnam as Head of State.

The terms were signed in the

Elysee Agreement on March 8, 1949 .25 Yet, because three
years had elapsed before this agreement was signed, the "Bao
Dai solution" "was discredited before it was properly
implemented.1,26
During the period between Ho's proclamation of war and
the signing of the Elysee Agreements, American policy makers
were pre-occupied with Soviet Communism in Europe.

Harry S.

Truman had replaced Roosevelt as President of the United
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States and Truman, more tolerant of colonialism, readily
discarded anti-colonial policies.

Even so, Roosevelt only

had entertained vague ideas about promoting
self-determination and ending colonialism by means of a
trusteeship system.

Because Roosevelt's public

pronouncements favored the supposed colonial powers, the
proper moment for implementing ideas promoting selfdetermination never arrived.

In short, Truman and the

American Congress did not face a real choice.
President Truman, pre-occupied with questions of
European security was not inclined to even consider Asian
self-determination.

The Truman Doctrine (of intervention)

was proclaimed on March 12, 1947.

In May 1947, Congress

passed the Greek-Turkish aid bill as well as a humanitarian
relief bill to help five European countries and China
survive economic difficulties following the Second World
War.27 Soon thereafter, other bills were passed, including
the China Aid Act of 1948.

In Europe, the Soviet challenge

solidified American resolve not to appease aggression
anywhere.
1948.

The Czechoslovakian Government fell February 25,

The countries of Western Europe responded with the

Brussels Pact to ensure collective security and economic
collaboration.

On April 1, 1948, the Soviets began the

blockade of Berlin.

President Truman responded with the

40

Berlin airlift, which lasted from June 21, 1948 to May 12,
1949.

In June, the United States Congress approved Marshall

Plan funds under the Economic Cooperation Act.

In July,

negotiations for the North Atlantic Treaty Association
began, culminating in the creation of NATO on April 4,
1949 .28
The precedent set by bold response in Europe, however,
did not easily translate to conditions in Asia.

The problem

for United States policy makers was how to handle changes in
the Asian balance of power spawned by colonial revolutions.
Although American policy makers were pre-occupied with
European security, deferment to the French version of events
in Indochina was not unequivocal.

On September 27, 1948,

the Department of State issued a paper entitled "Policy
Statement on

Indochina."

This paper stated:

Some solution must be found which will strike
a balance between the aspirations of the peoples
of Indochina and the interests of the
French....Post-war French governments have never
understood, or have chosen to underestimate, the
strength of the national movement with which they
must deal in Indochina.
[The paper concluded that] Ho Chi Minh is the
strongest and...ablest figure in Indochina and
that any... solution which excludes him is an
expedient of uncertain outcome. We are naturally
hesitant to press the French too strongly or to
become deeply involved as long as we are not in a
position to suggest a solution or until we are
prepared to accept the onus of intervention.29
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Nevertheless, the goal of achieving a strong French buffer
in Europe took precedence over Asian nationalism.

While the

Department of State may have questioned French policy toward
Indochina, it felt constrained to await developments.

As a

result, the Truman Administration never challenged the
legitimacy of the French position in Indochina.
At this juncture, the major focus of State Department
concern in Asia was Mao Tse-tung and the Communist conquest
of China.

On March 3, 1949, the National Security Council

issued NSC 34/2 which adopted a wait and see approach hoping
for the creation of an independent China.

While NSC 34/2

acknowledged that the creation of an independent China may
take a long time, the document noted that ” [T]he Kremlin
waited twenty-five years for the fulfillment of its
revolution in China.
longer."30

We may have to persevere as long or

In the meantime, the United States should

attempt to create rifts in the Chinese Communist Party, as
well as between China and the Soviet Union.31

In Indochina,

Mao not only began to supply the Viet Minh, but also to send
troops to the Indochina border in December 1949.

Because

Southeast Asia remained a low priority, American policy
makers were content to let the Bao Dai experiment have a
chance.

Besides, as a former ruler, Bao Dai had a claim to

legitimacy.

Should Bao Dai actualize that claim the United
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States could formally acknowledge his government.
By signing the Elysee Agreement on March 8, 194 9 with
Emperor Bao Dai, the French recognized that the principal
problem in Indochina was political.32 According to this
agreement, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos were to become
Associated States within the French Union;

Although each

associated state could form its own government, France would
dictate foreign and defense policy as well as exert economic
dominance over them.33 The new relationship, however,
failed to meet adequately the aspirations of the Indochinese
people.

Soon, Bao Dai himself began to realize that the

"new" arrangement was just camouflage for French rule.34
Finding little to favor the Elysee Agreement because it
doubted the Bao Dai government enjoyed popular support, the
Department of State entertained ideas of collective efforts
\

by western nations to figure out a solution which also could
check the spread of Communism in Asia.35
On March 29, 1949, the Policy Planning Staff issued a
paper which questioned the correctness of deferring
decisions concerning Indochinese aspirations strictly to
French interpretations.

This paper stated that the United

States should accept the fact that Indochinese nationalism
could not be resolved by full support of either the French,
or the nationalists or by evading the issue.

Because France
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held the key to meeting indigenous demands, the United
States should endeavor to induce "the French to adapt their
policies to the realities of the current situation in
Southeast Asia."36 As part of this inducement, the
Department of State sent a memorandum to the French Foreign
Office on June 6, 1949.

The memo stated that the "United

States Government believes that the Vietnamese will
willingly accept a partnership with France only if the
equality of Vietnam is recognized and if...the sovereignty
of Vietnam is acknowledged."37 Despite such a pointed
stance, however, field officers continued to implement the
old policy.

On June 29, Ambassador David Bruce told French

Foreign Minister Robert Schuman that the United States would
support French goals including the limited sovereignty
granted in the Elysee Agreements.
On July 1, 1949, the National Security Council
considered a State Department report entitled "U.S. Policy
Toward Southeast Asia."38 The report noted that French
military pressure in Indochina had forced some non-Communist
nationalists to rely on the Communists.

The report

recommended that the French yield "their claims to
sovereignty to a native regime.

Only if that is done will

the false issue of French imperialism, which cements
communists and non-communists in unity, be dissolved.1139
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The report stated that the French could yield their claim to
sovereignty to Pro-French Vietnamese or to the Viet Minh.
Either choice, the report stated, would lead to civil war,
during which the United States could woric "through a screen
of anti-communist Asiatics, to ensure;::the triumph of
Indochinese nationalism over Red imperialism.1,40 But either
way was preferable to current French policy which was
leading the area down a "Stalinist blind alley."41 American
policy makers were not only beginning to question the
correctness of the French approach, but also to supply
alternatives.

Such questioning reflected increased State

Department attention to the area brought about by Mao's
success in China.
The Congress also expressed concern about the spread of
Communism in Asia.

In the spring of 194 9, Congress extended

the China Aid Act of 1948.

In addition, another bill— the

Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 or MDAP— included a
provision extending unvouchered funds to forces fighting
Communism in the "general area of China."42 The provision,
Title III, section 303, was well known to the French as the
wording included Indochina.

Another provision of MDAP

authorized the President to send noncombatant military
advisors anywhere in the world, thus providing the basis for
possible future intervention.43
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On December 30, 1949, the National Security Council
issued NSC 48/2, entitled "The Position of the United States
with Respect to Asia."44 Paying heed to the principle of
sovereignty, the document stated that the United States
should try to foster regional associations of non-Communist
states, which the United States might assist if invited.45
The United States, therefore, should not take an active part
in the initial stages of any such association because the
associations should reflect genuine desires of the
participants.

Noting that the United States should help the

governments of South Asia "in their efforts to meet the
minimum aspirations of their people and to maintain
internal security," NSC 48/2 stated with regard to Indochina
that:
The United States should continue to use its
influence in Asia toward resolving the colonialnationalist conflict in such a way as to satisfy
the fundamental demands of the nationalist
movement while at the same time minimizing the
strain on the colonial powers who are our Western
allies. Particular attention should be given to
the problem of...the obtaining by Bao Dai or other
non-Communist nationalist leaders of the support
of a substantial portion of the Vietnamese.46
Acknowledging Bao Dai's slim claim to legitimacy, the
position of the United States was that there was no
satisfactory alternative and that the United States should
recognize his government soon after the French ratified the
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Elysee Agreement.47
The Gravel edition of The Pentagon Papers concluded that
at this juncture:
in the closing months of 1949; the course of
U.S. policy was set to block Communist expansion
in Asia: by collective security if the Asians were
forthcoming, by collaboration with major European
allies and commonwealth nations, if possible, but
bi-laterally if necessary; On that policy course
lay the Korean War of 1950-53, the forming of the
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization of 1954, and
the progressively deepening U.S. involvement in
Vietnam.48
The defense of Indochina assumed greater importance to
American policy makers with the Communist victory in China
in 1949.

By the end of the year Chiang Kai-Shek had fled to

Formosa and Mao Tse-tung had established the People's
Republic of China (PRC) on Indochina's northern border.

On

January 17, 1950, the People's Republic extended recognition
to the DRV.

Two weeks later, on January 30, the Soviet

Union followed suit.49 The attention of American policy
makers, only recently drawn to Asia, now was clearly focused
on Indochina.

Secretary of State Dean Acheson noted that

the Soviet recognition of the DRV "should remove any
illusions as to the 'nationalist' nature of Ho Chi Minh's
aims and [it] reveals Ho in his true colors as the mortal
enemy of native independence in Indochina."50 No longer
were American policy makers content to defer to French
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policy.

Secretary Acheson had given an additional reason

for American aid— anti-communism.51
The French formally transferred "sovereignty” to the
State of Vietnam by ratifying the Elysee Agreement on
February 2, 1950;

By recognizing Bao Dai two days later,

the United States was only a small step away from direct
involvement.

For, in light of Soviet and PRC recognition of

the DRV, American credibility as leader of the free world
was now at stake.

The loss of Indochina to international

communism might cause neighboring countries to lose faith in
the viability of democratic institutions which, ultimately,
might lead to the loss of those countries as well.

On

February 16th the French asked the United States for
economic and military assistance in Indochina.

Noting

Soviet recognition of Ho Chi Minh and the DRV, French
Ambassador Henri Bonnet asked Secretary of State Acheson for
economic and military aid from the United States.52 As
Washington considered the French request, the war for
Indochinese independence was becoming a proving ground in
the Cold War.
On April 14, 1950, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson
sent a letter to Secretary Acheson which underscored the
prevailing Cold War attitude.

Johnson, whose views were

supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), stated that
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"Southeast Asia is a vital segment in the line of
containment from Japan southward and around to the Indian
Peninsula."53 Besides outlining the application of
perimeter containment, Johnson noted that Southeast Asia was
of such great economic importance that the United States
should not let the area enrich the Soviets.

Johnson then

outlined his view of the domino theory: ^the fall of
Indochina would undoubtedly lead to the fall of... Southeast
Asia" and threaten United States security interests in "the
Philippines, Malaya, and Indonesia," as well as the "Pacific
littoral of Asia."54 Johnson concluded that the United
States should send a military aid mission to Indochina to
screen requests for military assistance.55 In a very real
sense, American commitment to the defense of Southeast Asia
had begun.

Not only was containment applied to Asia, but

peculiarities of the Asian situation were recast to support
the application of a containment policy.
Because Indochina was assuming such great importance,
the NSC focused exclusively on the area in a separate study.
On April 24, 1950 President Truman approved NSC 64, entitled
"The Position of the United States with Respect to
Indochina."56 NSC 64 framed the defense of Indochina as
defending against a comprehensive plan of Communist
aggression.

"[T]he threat of communist aggression against
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Indochina," the report noted, "is only one phase of
anticipated communist plans to seize all of Southeast Asia,"
and United States efforts to defend Indochina should include
defense of the general area.57 NSC 64 recommended that the
United States become actively involved in the war in
Indochina.

Based on NSC 48, NSC 64 noted that the Chinese

Communists had approached the Indochinese border and that
France and her Indochinese forces could not "contain" Ho's
forces should China aid or reinforce Ho.58 Fearing the loss
of Thailand and Burma should Indochina become
Communist-dominated, NSC 64 recommended that the United
States prepare a program to protect United States security
interests there.59 To that end, President Truman approved
$10 million of military aid for the French in Indochina on
May 1.60
The program to protect United States security interests
in Indochina, recommended by NSC 64, soon took shape.

On

May 8, Secretary of State Dean Acheson announced that the
United States would begin to provide economic assistance to
the Associated States.

Acheson had met with Robert Schuman,

French Minister of Foreign Affairs, and agreed that France
should have the "primary responsibility" in Indochina.
Secretly, the two also agreed that any United States aid to
the Associated States would necessitate prior consultation
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with the French.61 Significantly, Acheson announced
American aid to Indochina before the outbreak of the Korean
War.62
Previously, the State Department had sent an aid survey
mission on economic assistance under R: Allen Griffin, to
analyze the situation in Indochina.

On May 11, Acting

Secretary of State James Webb publicly noted Griffin's
recommendation that Marshall Plan China Aid funds be spent
to provide economic assistance to Indochina, and that MDAP
"general area of China" funds be spent for military
assistance.63 In his report Griffin noted that France had
"a large stake in prestige" in Indochina.

Griffin noted

intense emotional friction between the three major groups in
Vietnam:

(1) Bao Dai's conflict with the French as he tried

to win over fence-sitters (attentists) who were afraid of
Viet Minh reprisal should they align with Bao Dai; (2) Ho's
popularity and his connections with Moscow; and (3) French
desires to further the French Union.

Griffin mentioned a

fourth group— the Chinese— who were apolitical but unlikely
to align with Bao Dai.

Although a minority, the Chinese

presence served as a reminder of centuries old
Chinese-Vietnamese enmity, and possible Communist Chinese
invasion.

Chinese-Vietnamese ethnic conflict, noted

Griffin, ironically might serve to elevate the French to a
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position of protector.64
In May 1950/ Congress extended Marshall Plan aid by
passing the Foreign Economic Assistance Act (FEAA), of which
Title IV or "point 4," was called the "Act for International
Development."

Point 4 provided $40 million of aid for use

in the "general area of China" presumably to help less
developed countries improve their standards of living.

In

the case of Indochina— the main target of FEAA— the idea was
that improved economic standards would lead to increased
political strength in order to withstand possible Communist
insurgency.65 FEAA established economic aid missions to
each Associated State, which, coupled with the military aid
missions approved by MDAP, facilitated future United States
intervention in the Indochina war.

American policy makers

later used these missions to exert pressure on the French to
increase self-government in the Associated States.

At the

time of its passage, many Republicans and conservative
Democrats opposed the point 4 program, claiming that it
would lead to open-ended foreign aid.

Indeed, in August

1950, Truman requested $303 million for use in the
Philippines, Indochina, and Southeast Asia.66
American perceptions of world-wide Communist intent were
reinforced, if not justified, when North Korean troops
crossed the 38th parallel into South Korea, on June 25,
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1950.

On June 27th, President Truman announced increased

United States military assistance to France and sent
military missions to each of the Associated States as
recommended by NSC 64.

To demonstrate American resolve to

Europeans, Truman also dispatched the Seventh Fleet to the
Formosan Straits.

The North Korean invasion provided

tangible evidence to many Americans that Communism was
intent on world domination.

The effect was to encourage

Congress to approve increased defense spending and foreign
military assistance.
In Indochina, however, the North Korean invasion and
subsequent American troop commitment there, made it unlikely
that the United States would respond in Indochina as well.
At this time the United States lacked a military strategy to
wage battle in Third World revolutionary struggles.

Plans

to deter Communist aggression in Indochina were based on
conventional tactics, as was the case in Korea, not
guerrilla warfare.67 At the highest levels of government,
decision makers would seek to address this deficiency.
Domestically, the Korean invasion had other consequences.
Truman committed United States troops in a foreign war
without the prior approval of Congress.

Truman paid lip

service to Congressional consultation by holding two
one-half hour meetings with top Congressional (mostly
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Democratic) leaders.68 Basically, however, Truman involved
the United States in war based on his constitutional
authority as Commander-in-Chief and on United Nations
Security Council Resolutions to aid Korea;

Truman's quick

response assumed importance in subsequent United States
intervention decisions.
With combat troops in Korea; the Statd Department
continued to wage the fight in Indochina on the diplomatic
front.

Even though French assessments would inform American

policy, some analysts found solutions to the Indochina
problem at odds with French estimates.

On August 7, 1950,

John F. Melby, Special Assistant to Dean Rusk (who was then
Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East), cabled the
findings of a joint State-Defense survey mission to the Far
East.

Referring to Communists as perpetrators of a

"hydra-headed policy of force, terror, propaganda,
penetration, and cynical exploitation of any opportunity,"
Melby's views reflected the anti-Communism prevalent during
the Truman Administration.

Melby stated that the defense of

Indochina was the "keystone" to holding all of Southeast
Asia, and that a total French withdrawal would be
disastrous.

Yet, Melby also stated that French apathy and

strategy of static defense reflected the improbability of a
military solution.

Suggesting short-term stop-gap military
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measures, Melby stated such measures would not solve the
long-range political problems;

Politically, Melby stated

the French should grant the Vietnamese independence as they
"will have it regardless of anything else;"

Melby stated

that granting independence, while not "likely to provoke
dancing in the streets of Paris," was the only "real
prospect for salvaging anything."

Melby noted:

If Vietnam is determined on complete
independence as all evidence suggests, it probably
cannot get it for a long time in face of French
opposition, but it can create the kind of uproar
which will constitute a continuing drain on French
strength and in [the] end benefit only Communists.
Coincidentally, American identification with
French in such eventuality will further weaken
American influence in Asia. Historically no
ruling group has ever remained more or less
indefinitely in power in face of active or even
passive resistance from the governed, or without
ruining itself in the process. There is no
convincing evidence Nationalism in Indochina
proposes to be an exception.69
Melby's views were outweighed by the views of those who
feared antagonizing Paris.

The American legation in Saigon,

for instance, believed that military success might follow
such measures as the creation of a Vietnamese National Army
and increased United States influence over the conduct of
the war.70
Of particular concern to American policy makers was
possible Chinese intervention in Indochina.

On August 16,
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1950, the Policy Planning Staff issued a memorandum
entitled: "United States Policy Toward Indochina in the
Light of Recent Developments."

The memorandum noted that

the French doubted their ability to withstand a Chinese
Communist reinforced Viet Minh, and that the United States
most likely would refrain from supplying American ground
troops to bridge the gap:

Instead of expecting ground

reinforcements, the memorandum noted, Paris should implement
political measures designed to bring a greater degree of
self-government to the Associated States.71

"If Paris does

not feel that it can adopt a bolder political approach with
respect to Indochina," the memorandum concluded, "we must
recognize that the French and we may well be heading into a
debacle which neither of us can afford."72 On September 11,
1950, Dean Rusk wrote a memorandum for Secretary Acheson
entitled "Possible Invasion of Indochina," by Communist
forces.73 Noting that the French Army was the only defense
against Communist aggression, Rusk noted that the United
States had no choice but to assist the French or give up.
Instead of asking whether a military or a political solution
was most desirable, American policy makers were now asking
whether the United States would intervene or not, and if the
decision were to intervene then to what degree.
Significantly, Dean Rusk was advocating United States entry
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into Indochina at this time.
In October 1950, the Chinese entered the Korean War and
any thought of direct United States intervention in
Indochina was shelved.

With this action; argue the authors

of The Pentagon Papers. "China had replaced the Soviet Union
as the principal source of the perceived Communist threat in
Southeast Asia."74 Chinese entry in Korea led some analysts
to consider scrapping projects in Indochina altogether.

On

November 20, 1950 John Ohly, Deputy Director of MDAP in
Vietnam, sent a memorandum to Secretary Acheson.

Ohly

expressed a need to re-evaluate United States policy in
Indochina, because pursuit of the present course could
divert money better allocated elsewhere, such as in Western
Europe.

Specifically, Ohly felt that the advent of Chinese

forces in the Korean conflict could lead to Chinese
intervention in Indochina.

Ohly recommended "that before

any further substantial commitments of equipment, prestige
or forces are made in Indochina," the United States reassess
its policy there.

Noting limited resources, Ohly stated

that the United States might have to abandon certain
world-wide objectives.

As an added caveat, Ohly warned that

the United States was "gradually increasing" its stake in
the outcome in Indochina and that American efforts were
beginning to supplant, and not complement, French efforts.
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Such an outcome, Ohly noted, would make a scapegoat out of
the United States, as though the United States were the
chief party at fault and in interest.75
The upper echelons of policy making also advocated
leaving Indochina alone. A JCS memorandum dated November
28, 1950, and another memorandum written by the Pentagon's
Joint Strategic Survey Committee dated November 17, 1950,
advised against the use of United States troops to assist
France.

The Pentagon memo stated that assisting France in

the absence of a previous Chinese attack would provoke China
to militarily intervene in behalf of the Viet Minh, which,
in turn, would lead to global war.

Such an eventuality, the

memo noted, was ill-advised because the United States then
would be fighting the Soviets in Western Europe, and
the armies of Western Europe were incapable of meeting
objectives in Asia and Europe simultaneously.76 The
Pentagon memo, therefore, advised the United States to
increase political pressure to induce France to grant
greater autonomy to the Associated States.

The Joint

Chiefs, basing recommendations upon the Pentagon memo, also
urged measures to induce France to eliminate its colonial
policies.77 They recommended against the use of foreign
troops in Indochina and were against referring the matter to
the United Nations.

They felt the United States should
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encourage a regional security arrangement under the auspices
of the U.N. Charter which would necessitate entry of the
Associated States into the United Nations.78 This
memorandum became NSC 64/1, and formed the basis of United
States policy until the French left Indochina.79
In the meantime, the French tried to fulfill United
States desires.

Ironically, such attempts led to increased

need for United States aid.

On December 8, 1950, the French

and Vietnamese signed a military convention creating a
Vietnamese national army by transferring units from French
to Vietnamese control.

Ten days later, the French requested

United States aid to equip this army.

The French request

came shortly after the French National Assembly had voted on
November 22 to reinforce the French Army in Indochina and
declare the War an anti-Communist fight.

The vote

symbolized France's inability to solve the Indochina problem
on their own.80 By recasting the Indochina War as part of
the greater anti-Communist struggle, France hoped to enlist
greater American support.

On December 23rd, the United

States signed bilateral mutual defense assistance agreements
with France and the Associated States.
By the end of the year, United States policy makers
recognized the inadequacy of French policies and the need
for collective defense.

On December 29, 1950, the Central

59

Intelligence Agency coordinated a "National Intelligence
Estimate" on Indochina.

This paper stated that the military

situation in Indochina favored the Viet Minh.

The paper

noted that French officers killed in Vietnam equaled the
number graduated at St. Cyr each year, and that 37% of
France's 1949 military budget was spent in Indochina without
showing any gains:

Such figures, the paper stated, lent

credence to the view that France had lost the will to fight.
The situation could only get worse because the new
Vietnamese Army would not be operational for another year
and the Viet Minh could probably defeat the French in
between six to nine months.

The shadow of overt Chinese

intervention, the paper noted, only confirmed this
assessment.

Because the loss of Indochina would affect

neighboring areas, the paper advocated Western assistance to
those areas.81
With the new year, United States policy makers continued
to weigh the possibility of an overt Chinese attack in
Indochina.

This fear led to debate as to whether the United

States should enter into consultations with Britain and
France in hopes of averting a French "sell-out" to Mao.

On

January 1, 1951, Donald R. Heath, American Minister to the
Associated States, informed Acheson of the view from Saigon.
Heath stated that a Chinese invasion was imminent, and that
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except for the area from Hanoi to Haiphong, the entire north
would fall to the Viet Minh.

Heath felt that Haiphong would

fall within six months if the Chinese invaded.

He stated

that recent French concessions were intefpreted by many
Vietnamese as a prelude to French withdrawal, so the United
States should encourage Bao to provide better leadership.
Heath hysteria— fear of Chinese military intervention—
gripped Washington.

On January 31, Dean Rusk sent a

memorandum to Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs, H. Freeman Matthews.

Rusk felt that Chinese

invasion of Burma and Indochina was imminent.

This

assessment was not based on Chinese intentions but on their
increased "ability to do so."

Rusk reiterated the domino

theory: "if Indochina were to fall under control of the
Communists, Burma and Thailand would follow suit almost
immediately," and Indonesia and India would be hard-pressed
"to remain outside the Soviet-dominated Asian-bloc."

For

this reason, Indochina "is the keystone of our policy in the
rest of Southeast Asia."

Rusk stated that United States

policy— to prevent a Communist takeover by every means
possible and to induce France to create a stable nationalist
government in Indochina--gelled in late 1948-early 1949.
the face of possible Chinese intervention and lack of
further French political efforts, Rusk felt the United

In
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States should participate more;

Indeed, to protect our

"investment" Rusk felt the United States should persevere
"to the utmost of our ability."82
As fear gripped Washington, despondency gripped the
French leadership in Indochina.

On March 11, 1951, Heath

wrote Acheson stating that General Jean de Lattre de
Tassigny (French High Commissioner and Commander of French
Forces in Indochina) had launched into an "analysis of the
state of French spirit as a result of the last war" and
French economic losses and inferiority.

De Lattre felt the

United States "must reckon with the inferiority complex and
feeling of the humiliation in the French Government and
among their people."

De Lattre mentioned there existed

"forces in the US that were pushing American policy in IC to
actions injurious to French prestige."83 R.E.M. Irving also
notes the feeling of humiliation following the Second World
War among French politicians and soldiers.

Irving states

that this psychological problem made decolonization
following the war a major problem for the French.84

Irving

states that France's desire to reassert herself on the world
stage following the humiliation of World War II was the
primary motive of French policy in Indochina after receipt
of Marshall Plan aid.

For the French leadership, "with

their Resistance background, the motive of national prestige
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was probably more important than any other single factor in
their Indochina policy.”85
French despair led to American appraisal of the loss of
Indochina in view of a possible Chinese invasion.

On March

20, 1951, a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) assessed
the will and ability of Thailand, Burma and Malaya to resist
Communist pressures or invasion should the Viet Minh defeat
the French.

The NIE noted that these countries could

withstand Communist pressures if the Viet Minh attained
victory without Chinese intervention, but otherwise would be
forced to seek an accommodation with the Chinese in the
absence of outside (Western) support.

The NIE stated that

the interested nations could not organize a regional defense
in time should the Chinese roll through Indochina.

The

prospects for Malaya were not favorable if the Chinese did
so.86 Although defeatism marked United States assessments
at this time, a collective security arrangement seemed to
offer some chance for success.
On May 17, 1951, Truman approved NSC 48/5 which stated
that the United States could not prevent the loss of
Indochina should China invade.87 The NSC Staff also dated a
paper that day which noted that " [t]he guiding principle of
U.S. foreign policy as it relates to meeting the threat of
Soviet aggression is the promotion of a ...[collective
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security system] based on the principles of the U.N.
Charter."

Such a system, tbe paper noted, is "fundamental

to our world-wide struggle for security against Soviet
aggression."88 To that end, the United States should
continue education, information, and psychological warfare
efforts in Asia.

In Indochina, the paper recommended

supplemental aid to the indigenous forces and encouraged
movements toward internal autonomy.
By late summer, fear of a Chinese attack had subsided
temporarily.

A National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) dated

August 7, 1951, stated that the Chinese could change the
military balance in Indochina, but would hesitate to
intervene openly while negotiating for a Korean
settlement.89 The NIE decided that increased activity on
the Indochinese border reflected Chinese interest in
facilitating aid to the Viet Minh and did not represent
plans to intervene.

The NIE concluded that a stalemate was

likely through the end of 1951, as Chinese aid matched
American aid and French reinforcements.90
French despair and consequent American defeatism did not
prevent further French requests for United States aid.

On

September 1, 1951, French Foreign Minister Schuman told
Acheson that France could not stay in Indochina after July
1, 1952, and meet her NATO commitments without massive doses
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of American aid.91 Even though Korea demanded a great
effort, the French manipulated American fears to procure
more funds.

Action for the sake of action became the quid

pro quo or ransom for French blackmail:
Not all Americans in Indochina stood idly by and watched
as French despair led to stalemate.

Robert Blum, the CIA

mission chief in Saigon, felt that to undercut Communist
strength in Indochina the United States should pressure the
French into granting indigenous demands for political
autonomy.

Blum's efforts infuriated the French leadership

in Hanoi. What was to become known as the "Blum
controversy" reflected nothing more than Blum's efforts "to
foster indigenous resistance to Communism."

Nevertheless,

Blum left Vietnam in late 1951 at French insistence.92
Other Americans also urged the French to mollify the
stridency of colonial policies.

Indeed, during 1951,

United States personnel began to intervene in the internal
politics of Indochina by seeking to replace Bao Dai with Ngo
Dinh Diem, a nationalist Vietnamese Catholic and attentiste
who opposed both the French and the Viet Minh.93 United
States efforts were in response to the political stalemate
engendered by Bao Dai's policies.

For all intents and

purposes, Bao Dai himself had become an attentiste— "a
spectator as the French and Americans tested their strength
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against each other, and against the Viet Minh."94
The French did not see the idealism espoused by American
personnel as a blessing.

When General de Lattre visited

Washington in September i951, he complained about the way
some Americans saw their presence in Indochina.

De Lattre

noted that some problems were "caused by the fact that a
number of young men with a ^missionary zeal' were dispensing
economic aid with the result that there was a feeling on the
part of some that they were using this aid to extend
American influence."

De Lattre mentioned that the problem

had improved after finding out that Blum was no longer in
Indochina.

But de Lattre's problem remained.

With the

increased aid came increased American desires to intervene
and influence events.

Blum's attitudes were shared by

Edmund A. Gullion, Counselor of Embassy at Saigon, and R.
Allen Griffin, now Special Far East Representative in charge
of Marshall Plan foreign aid missions.95 They felt that
American aid should come at the price of American influence.
They felt that Bao Dai and his premier, Tran Van Huu, were
not representative of the people and were not desirous of
seeking the needed political solution.

Indeed, Bao Dai

looked to the United States to gain concessions from the
French.96 According to the authors of The Pentagon Papers,
"[T]he 'Bao Dai solution' ultimately solved nothing.

The
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outcome rested rather on France's military struggle with the
Viet Minh, and its contest of leverage with the United
States.,|97
By December 1951, official United States policy was to
use American troops only to help the French evacuate.98 On
December 19, 1951, General Omar Bradley> Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated at a joint State-Defense-JCS
meeting on Indochina, that he doubted the American public
would go along with using American troops in Indochina.99
At the end of the month, David Bruce, Ambassador in France,
cabled that French public opinion was gradually favoring a
withdrawal of French troops from Indochina, absent
internationalization of the war or a larger dose of foreign
aid.100 Bruce noted that one reason the French did not
withdraw was "humiliation of national pride and loss of
prestige abroad," including adverse repercussions in North
Africa.101 Even though the French despaired, their pride and
the fear of further encroachments upon the French Union kept
them in Indochina.
Events in Asia at the start of 1952 did not favor
American policy.

Korean armistice talks that had begun in

July 1951, were not making serious progress.

With Maoist

forces on the Indochinese border, policy makers in
Washington gave more thought to an international solution.
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On January 11, 1952, at a tripartite military conference in
Washington, the military chiefs of Britain, France, and the
United States agreed that their respective governments
should issue a warning to the Chinese stating that
aggression in Southeast Asia would be met by "certain
retaliation from the three powers, not necessarily limited
to the area of aggression;"102 They alsB agreed to set-up a
committee with representatives from Australia and New
Zealand to discuss measures in the event the Chinese failed
to heed the warning.103 Although vetoed by the three powers
in June, such a warning is evidence that the Truman
Administration would use international moral suasion.
At executive sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on January 14 and February 8, 1952, Acheson stated
that some form of international position should be made
known to the Chinese.104 Acheson showed little concern for
the aspirations of the Indochinese people.

He stated:

The problem in Indochina, Senator, is no
longer any conflict between the French and the
Vietnamese. The Vietnamese have got all the
liberty and opportunity that they can possibly
handle or want. Their difficulty now is in
getting the people who can both carry on and
administer the country which is turned over to
them, and can raise the army and get the
resources to maintain both. The level of the
personnel in the indigenous government, the
Vietnamese Government, is not high enough or
vigorous enough. Their financial resources are
low.105
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Acheson's views, made in Washington, supported by those of
Rusk, overrode the views of Blum, Melby; Ohly, and others
who, having witnessed events first-hand; sought legitimate
rule in Vietnam.
On February 13, 1952, the Senior

istaff

of the NSC

circulated a paper— NSC 124/l--that approved a joint warning
to the Chinese.106 The paper also stated that the United
States should oppose any negotiations between France and the
Viet Minh, because settlement would give the Communists
victory.

The paper noted that Communist domination of

Southeast Asia would have a negative psychological impact on
the will and determination of other nations to resist
Communist pressure.

Such psychological impact, the paper

noted, would be felt in the Middle East and that in turn
would undermine the balance of power in Europe.
Economically, the loss of Indochina would cause Japan to
seek Soviet-controlled markets and threaten the United
States offshore island defensive chain.

The paper then

noted that the security of Indochina was an internal
problem.

The study recommended collective action but

opposed unilateral action.

Although the paper suggested

other military action, such as blockade of the China coast
and use of air and naval units, the paper rejected the use
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of ground forces.

Nevertheless, the proposed use of air and

naval forces was the first favorable mention of the use of
United States troops in Indochina.

Pandora's box had been

opened.
On June 25, 1952, Truman approved NSC 124/2— the third
position paper on Indochina, replacing NSC 48 and NSC
64— entitled "United States Objectives and Course of Action
with Respect to Southeast Asia."

NSC 124/2 took a stronger

position than did its predecessors by advocating unilateral
military action against China if necessary to save
Indochina.

NSC 124/2 answered the need for a Presidential

policy in the event of overt Chinese aggression in Indochina
now that such aggression was deemed imminent.107 Three
factors influenced the debate concerning NSC 124/2.

The

first was American efforts to secure French approval of the
European Defense Community, which called for the rearming of
West Germany as a defense to Soviet power in Eastern Europe.
The nations of Western Europe had signed the treaty on May
27, 1952.

Because the French also signed, American policy

makers did not want to impose additional pressure on the
French.

In actual fact the French Parliament rejected the

treaty in 1954.

Second, the Pentagon, reluctant to face the

consequences of provoking a response from the People's
Republic of China, did not want to commit ground forces in
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Indochina.

Last, American policy makers were fearful of a

French withdrawal from Indochina and the United States was
unable to wage the fight alone.108 NSC 124/2 stated that
Indochina was a h;Lgh security interest of the United States
and that a Viet Minh rebellion was the primary threat.109
NSC 124/2 stated that in the event of overt Chinese
aggression, or covert attempts to undermine French
possession of the Tonkin Delta, the United States should
pursue military action.

Primarily limited to use of naval

and air support of French Union ground troops, such action
would also include a blockade of China, air attacks on
Chinese military targets, and covert operations.110
The purpose of NSC 124/2 was to prevent the drift of
Southeast Asia into the Communist orbit by developing the
will of indigenous populations to resist Communism.

The

premise was that communist domination of Southeast Asia
would "critically endanger...United States security
interests.”111 NSC 124/2 stated that the loss of any part of
Southeast Asia would have profound psychological, political,
and economic consequences.

If Southeast Asia were to align

with communism, the Middle East would be affected and so too
would the balance of power in Europe.

The document

discounted the likelihood of a Chinese Communist invasion,
stating the probability of subversion instead.
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NSC 124/2 also discussed United States responses in
light of possible Chinese intervention.

If the Chinese did

not attack, the document recommended helping France build
the armies of the Associated States and develop internal
security against the Viet Minh.

In the event of a Chinese

attack, the document recommended pursuing a diplomatic
course seeking United Nations assistance or at least getting
allies to help in the defense of Indochina.

Militarily, the

document recommended letting France carry the burden of
ground troops yet permitting the United States to interdict
Chinese lines of communication.

Among other steps, the

United States could blockade the Chinese coast, intensify
covert operations, and in general conduct joint air and
naval action against "suitable military targets in China."112

On October 15, 1952, the Viet Minh launched an offensive
in northwest Tonkin.

The French were losing a battle at Na

San and desperately needed American help.

Truman responded

by assigning United States Air Force mechanics to help the
French on a temporary basis.

By the end of the Truman administration, American policy
in Indochina had progressed from a policy of deference to
French interests to a policy which challenged French
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decision making.

At the end of World War II, President

Roosevelt had sublimated his strong anti-colonialism to the
need to establish a viable balance of power both in Europe
and in Asia.

In Europe, Roosevelt felt a heed for a strong

Great Britain and a strong France to check any possible
future continental aggression;

To this en&> Roosevelt

steered away from antagonizing either Britain or France in
their colonial possessions.

In Asia, the United States Navy

was advocating a need for Pacific island bases in order to
check any possible future aggression there.

Such advocacy

quashed questioning of Pacific colonial possessions.

When

Truman entered the White House, aggressive Soviet maneuvers
in Europe threatened the emerging balance of power.

The

American policy of Containment developed as a result of this
Soviet aggression.

By the time the Containment policy

proved successful in establishing a predictable if tense
equilibrium in Europe, Mao Tse-tung had conquered China.
The attention of the American State Department began to
focus on Asia.
Before Asia became the hot spot of the Cold War,
American policy makers had assigned a low priority to
Indochina.

The war in Indochina was France's war and

American policy makers were content to mind their own
business.

Besides, any American interference in the conduct
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of that war might induce France to jeopardize American
interests in Europe.

Thus, France exercised considerable

leverage over United States policy.

The United States

needed French support in Europe; and any attempt by the
United States to manipulate French policy by qualifying
Marshall Plan and NATO aid might create the very end
American policy was supposed to defeat--a weak France.
Indeed, manipulating French aid could lead to a Communist
takeover because the Communist Party was the pre-eminent
party in France.113

In short, the United States considered

French support in Europe more important than fulfilling the
aspirations of the people of Indochina.
Mao's victory in China in 1949, coupled with Chinese and
Soviet recognition of the DRV in Indochina, changed American
thinking in Asia.

United States policy makers viewed events

in China, coming upon the heels of a newly restored
equilibrium in Europe, as a co-ordinated attempt by the
Soviet Union to extend Soviet influence in a new sphere.
Based on this assumption, these policy makers decided to
check such expansion as resolutely as they had checked the
spread of Soviet influence in Europe.

It was essential to

show China, and ultimately the Soviet Union, that the free
world would not succumb to intimidation anywhere.

As a

result, the United States went to war in Korea and the war
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in Indochina received magnified attention.

In changing

their focus from a virtual "attentiste" to an interested
party, United States policy makers failed to account for the
French reaction.

The problem was that the French had become

used to having the United States defer ciecisions to French
authority.
While the United States strategic vision had changed,
leading to American aid to the French in Indochina, the
French view had not changed.

The French were still fighting

a colonial war for themselves— from which they could
withdraw if victory appeared impossible.

The French,

however, would not fight an anti-Communist war for the
United States, grant independence, and withdraw following
victory.

The result was that in the conduct of the war, the

French could call the shots, including screening American
aid deliveries.

While the United States might suggest

methods to "win" the war, the French were free to choose
only those suggestions which would fulfill the French war
aim of establishing French control.

As long as the French

felt the United States would continue their aid program, the
French could continue to attempt to reassert French rule.
The United States objective of establishing a legitimate
non-Communist government was never entertained by the
French.

Having control of Indochina, would secure for
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France a strategic position in the East-West struggle from
which France could assert world power status.114
The Eisenhower administration not only inherited this
constraint of overriding French leverage* but also
perpetuated it by attaching great importance to the European
Defense Community.

The added French leverage led to the

inclusion of Indochina, at French insistence, at the Geneva
Conference in 1954.

Ironically, such inclusion— part of a

search for an acceptable political exit from the war— led in
turn not only to the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, but
also to the importance of that defeat by drawing the world's
attention to it.
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Chapter Three
Dien Bien Phu: The Jungle Verdun

French Indochina
and United States Foreign Policy, January 1953-March 1954

In the early years of his Presidency, Eisenhower
seriously considered direct United States intervention to
help France's deteriorating predicament in Indochina.

The

French position was desperate and lacked assurance of
getting better.

Before committing United States troops,

however, Eisenhower drew up three basic requirements.

In

his own words, "The first requirement was a legal right
under international law; second, was a favorable climate of
Free World opinion; and third, favorable action by the
Congress."1 To fulfill the first requirement, Eisenhower
demanded official requests for United States intervention
from the French and from the Associated States.

Such

requests would render American intervention "legal" or
"just" under international law if the requests were made by
the legitimate sovereign governments that ruled the
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territory intervened.

French approval alone was not enough,

because intervention so based would open up the United
States to the charge of supporting colonialism.
Furthermore, approval of the Associated States would have
the additional benefit of presenting the United States as
champions of independence.

Thus, only legitimate

intervention could remove the taint of imperialism and might
elevate such intervention to a moral plane.

Fulfillment of

the President's first requirement, therefore, would create
the foundation for the second.
Favorable world opinion was a sine qua non for
Eisenhower, because he wanted to protect America's image as
a resister of aggression and not as an aggressor itself.
One way to achieve the desired result was for the Associated
States themselves to request aid directly from the United
Nations.

This possibility seemed unlikely concerning

Indochina assistance, for the Soviet Union would most likely
veto any favorable decision.

Previously, during discussion

of U. N. entry into Korea, the Soviet delegation had
boycotted Security Council proceedings, protesting Security
Council refusal to deny Nationalist China its seat.

Beyond

this, bringing Indochina to the United Nations might damage
relations with France.

Eisenhower courted favorable world

opinion because he wanted to add "real moral standing to a
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venture" which otherwise might appear as overt imperial
aggression.

This need was particularly glaring for "there

was no incontrovertible evidence of overt Red Chinese
participation in the Indochina conflict:”

Thus, Eisenhower

restricted possible United States entry to participation in
a coalition.

For Eisenhower, such a coalition had to

include Britain.2 A coalition, if it were broad enough,
could supply the moral element, justifying intervention in
the eyes of the world, which would be needed in the absence
of complete de facto independence.

But, even in concert

with others, Eisenhower wanted to restrict United States
participation to air and naval units.3
Favorable action by Congress would give the imprimatur
to intervention domestically, just as favorable world
approval would sanction intervention internationally.
Congressional endorsement, therefore, was not Eisenhower's
first requisite.

The first hurdle was to obtain a legal

right for intervention under international law.

This

demanded a sovereign legal status for the Associated States.
On this fundamental requisite United States policy and
French policy always differed.
American policy at this time was to investigate a
military solution while concurrently developing a political
climate to facilitate future United States involvement
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should the military solution prove inadequate.

When the

Eisenhower administration attempted to lay the political
groundwork for legal intervention, they met French
resistance.

The situation in Indochina was not beneficial,

for France would not both grant independence and fight the
Viet Minh.

Further, France would not both fight the Viet

Minh and support the creation of the European Defense
Community (EDC), a treaty originally sponsored by the Truman
Administration which called for a rearmed West Germany as a
bulwark against Soviet encroachment. Faced with a
deterioration in France's ability to save Indochina, the
Eisenhower administration also contended with problems of
collective security in Europe.

In Indochina, Eisenhower

sought to support the French, but simultaneously pursued a
separate policy supporting indigenous anti-Communist
movements as well.

Diplomatically, Eisenhower accepted

discussion of Indochina at an international conference, yet
he formulated the concept of "United Action," which tended
to vitiate the need for that conference.

Further,

Eisenhower's policy included acceptance of a new French plan
for military victory.
The consensus among United States policy makers was that
France should develop the armies of the Associated States
and go on the offensive.

French acceptance of this policy
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highlighted the divergence in the allies? strategies.

Where

the United States sought political considerations— de facto
independence— to improve the military position, the French
pursued military strategies to improve tiie political mess
created by the deterioration of French control.

The French

placed emphasis on a military strategy for the additional
reason that it might provide an opportunity to withdraw from
Indochina without damaging the French reputation in the rest
of the French Union.4 United States policy makers
acknowledged the diplomatic advantages of a military
solution.

In time, they believed military success would

strengthen America's hand at any upcoming conference.

As a

consequence, the United States continued to seek a political
solution without questioning the legality of France's
position.
Soon after Eisenhower entered the White House in January
1953, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reassessed the role of the
United States military in Indochina.

In a memorandum to

Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson dated March 13, 1953,
entitled "Broadening the Participation of the United States
in Indochina Operation", the JCS recommended that the United
States stay out of active combat in Indochina.5 The memo
recommended that because broadening United States
participation might impinge upon France's "primary"
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responsibilities, United States aid should await concrete
proposals from the French Government.

The memo recommended

transporting Korean Military Advisory Group personnel to
Indochina to help train indigenous forces, but not to offer
any "further United States participation in the training of
the Vietnamese forces...unless specifically invited."6 The
idea was to avoid violating international law principles of
nonintervention.

The Joint Chiefs recommended increased

military autonomy for the Vietnamese forces, and aid to
improve the port facilities at Haiphong and air facilities
near Hanoi.

Over the next few months the United States

became more actively involved in military matters in
Indochina.

Specifically, American personnel originally sent

by Truman advised the French on military operations and the
training of indigenous troops.7
On March 26, 1953, President Eisenhower met with French
Prime Minister Rene Mayer, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Georges Bidault, and Jean Letourneau, Minister in Charge of
Relations with the Associated States.

The meeting occurred

aboard the Presidential yacht Williamsburg. Eisenhower
stated that many Americans viewed the war in Indochina as a
colonial war and would not support the French effort there
if they felt the French were delaying action on the European
Defense Community in order to secure that support.

In view
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of this, Eisenhower wanted the French to detail any
conditions precedent to the ratification of the EDC treaty,
as well as to present their military and political plans
concerning Indochina.8 Eisenhower recalled the meeting in
his memoirs, stating that Bidault "evaded, refusing to
commit himself to an out-and-out renunciation of any French
colonial purpose.”9
Before the French arrival, Secretary of State Dulles had
telegrammed the United States Ambassador in France asking
him to conduct exploratory conversations eliciting a French
plan to defeat the Viet Minh.

Dulles felt that such a plan

should aim to liquidate enemy forces within two years in
order for the Executive branch to convince Congress to
appropriate the required funds.10 In Washington, the French
presented such a plan.

Jean Letourneau proposed using

French and newly created Vietnamese battalions to defeat the
Viet Minh by the first half of 1955.

Operationally, the

plan called for a series of offensive "cleanup" maneuvers
beginning in the south and moving northward.

As the regular

forces moved northward, pro-French Vietnamese commando
forces would follow to police the liberated areas and
maintain security.

The plan envisaged a "final battle" in

late 1954 or early 1955.
American reaction to the Letourneau plan was mixed.

The
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Department of Defense felt the plan was too slow because it
deferred military operations in the nortii* the most
important theater of operations.

Walter Robertson,

Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, raised
another concern.

He felt the plan necessitated transferring

an increased share of decision making to the Vietnamese
Government, thereby causing potential political friction
with the French.

But Robertson brushed aside his own

objection, stating that if Defense found the plan militarily
feasible the Department of State should support its
political ramifications.11
Following their talks, the two nations issued a joint
communique on March 28.12 The communique noted that should
China take advantage of a possible armistice in Korea to
launch an assault elsewhere in East Asia, such an attack
would have the most serious consequences on world peace.13
That day, Mayer announced that France would welcome a United
States military mission in Indochina to evaluate the
Letourneau plan.

On May 18, after two months studying

feasible implementation, Under Secretary of State Walter
Bedell Smith telegramed Paris informing Mayer that the
Department of Defense had agreed to send a mission.

Smith

suggested sending the mission on June 10, in order to give
the new French Commander in Indochina, General Henri Eugene
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Navarre, a month to get acquainted with the country.
Navarre had just reported in Saigon on May 19.14 At this
time, Mayer also requested 400 to 500 million dollars to
continue the fight.15
During the interval between Mayer's Bffer and Smith's
telegramed acceptance, various agencies of the Executive
Branch in Washington analyzed the situation in Indochina.
The Joint Chiefs discussed the Letourneau plan and wrote a
memorandum of their findings to Secretary of Defense Wilson v
on April 23, 1953.16 Not favoring the plan, the JCS felt
constrained to endorse it.

They felt that the United States

should bring political pressure against France to wage the
fight more aggressively and to transfer responsibility for
the fighting to indigenous troops.17 At a joint meeting on
April 24, the JCS, the CIA, and the Department of State
agreed that the Letourneau plan was flawed but better than
nothing.

Paul Nitze, Director of the Policy Planning Staff,

stated: "we probably should go along and give this plan a
try even though it may not achieve what the French are
saying it might."18 The Department of State cabled
Secretary of State Dulles then in Paris at a tripartite
Foreign Ministers conference to have him suggest that the
French should try to cut the Viet Minh supply line to
Communist China and build up the armies of the Associated
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States with native officers.

Dulles told the French that

Congress had to approve any American aid> and that Congress
would favor a more aggressive posture in Indochina.19
While the United States investigated sending a military
mission to Indochina, the military situation changed.

The

Viet Minh launched a successful attack in northwest Tonkin,
and invaded Laos on April 9, 1953.

When..the magnitude of

the Viet Minh attack became known, Mayer requested direct
American aid from Dulles.

On April 27, Dulles informed

Eisenhower that Mayer had inquired about the possibility of
American Air Force personnel flying transport missions in
Indochina.

Dulles, who was still in Paris, suggested

American civilian pilots of the Civil Air Transport (CAT)
then stationed on Formosa.

Soon thereafter, the JCS

approved the use of six CAT pilots to fly C-119 sorties in
Indochina.
The decision to approve the use of CAT pilots caused
Eisenhower to scrutinize French prospects in Indochina.
President was not impressed.

The

On May 6, speaking at a

National Security Council meeting, Eisenhower noted French
preoccupation with prestige and stated "that if the French
really desired to cut the best figure before the world, the
obvious course to pursue was first to defeat the Viet Minh
forces and then magnanimously to offer independence to the
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Associated States."20 The next day, Eisenhower sent a
letter to Rene Mayer stressing this belief.

In a meeting

with Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson also on May 7,
Eisenhowerreiterated his
was proven

view by analogy; stating that as

in the case of General Braddock regulars cannot

beat guerrillas when supported by the native populace.21
On May 8, the French appointed General Henri-Eugene
Navarre Commander in Chief of French Union Forces in
Indochina.

Strategically, Navarre faced a difficult task.

His predecessors had followed a strategy of strongpoint
defense with particular emphasis in Tonkin.

The result of

this policy was that nearly seventy percent of his troops
were tied down in defense duties throughout Indochina.

The

Viet Minh, with less total forces, had more troops at their
disposal for offensive action.22 According to one estimate,
the Viet Minh
the French

had greater than a two to one superiority over

in the numbers of troops available for mobile

operations.23 Another difficulty for the new commander was
his ignorance.

General Navarre never had served in

Indochina prior to his appointment, and he knew little about
the country.
A National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Indochina
issued on June 4, acknowledged that the recent Viet Minh
success in northwest Tonkin and Laos had affected the tone
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of the war.

Among anticipated consequences were a

deterioration of the French military situation, which,
coupled with Vietnamese uncertainty and suspicions as to
French political goals, were thought to lead to a decreased
will to fight the Viet Minh.

Moreover, the recent Laotian

campaign renewed Viet Minh prestige and caused domestic
pressure in France to wage the war less, aggressively.

At

this time, the French had not agreed to grant complete
independence for fear "the French National Assembly would
then refuse to support a war in a 'lost' portion of the
French Union."

Sensing this, many Vietnamese felt the

French wished only to retain control.24 The Estimate stated
that the "French are fearful that they cannot achieve a
military decision in Indochina."

Fear of eventual German

rearmament following passage of the EDC treaty led many
Frenchmen to want to recall troops assigned to Indochina;
but loss of prestige in Africa and desires not to lose their
Indochina investment led many to consider staying.

The

Estimate also stated that the Chinese would not intervene
but might use "peace maneuvers" to attain their goals in
Indochina.25 As a result, the Estimate concluded that
"[T]he over-all French Union position in Indochina...will
probably deteriorate during the period of this estimate."26
The Viet Minh military success also may have contributed
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to the American decision to send a mission to Indochina.
The man chosen to lead that mission was Lieutenant General
John W. "Iron Mike" O'Daniel, Commanding General, United
States Army, Pacific.

0 'Daniel was a questionable choice

because he had no in-depth knowledge of the special mixture
of political and military elements in the Indochina
problem.27 Even so, in an earlier visit,to Indochina,
0'Daniel noted that "the enemy was able to blend in with the
local population and exact from them by terrorism a large
measure of cooperation.

In the face of superior forces the

enemy faded away only to return when such forces were no
longer present."28
On June 20, the United States Military Mission to
Indochina under General 0'Daniel left Washington.

As

instructed, 0'Daniel told Navarre that French Union Forces
should take the initiative by making greater use of guerilla
tactics and developing indigenous leaders and troops.29
Navarre responded by handing O'Daniel a statement of
aggressive action, which became known as the Navarre Plan.
The Navarre Plan was a seven part plan for ending the war by
early 1955.

The plan called for:

(1) expanded forces; (2) increased supplies;
(3) development of commando-type offensive units;
(4) more intensive use land-and carrier-based
tactical aircraft; (5) adoption of a continuing
and vigorous offensive strategy; (6) increased
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emphasis upon psychological warfare; and (7)
political measures to gain popular support for the
national governments.30
After analyzing the plan, 0'Daniel recommended two
additions which Navarre agreed to include;

These consisted

of an offensive in Tonkin to begin September 15, 1953, and a
reorganization of mobile groups into divisions.

When

Navarre reported his plan to Paris in July; however, these
American recommendations were not included.

Further,

Navarre reported that his only offensive operation scheduled
for the 1953-1954 combat season was an attack— subsequently
called Operation Atlante— in Annam.

Navarre's reported

proposal for the Tonkin area was to respond defensively to
whatever attack Vo Nguyen Giap (Commander in Chief of the
People's Army of Vietnam) might launch.31 According to the
reported plan, while Navarre envisaged the Dien Bien Phu
campaign as a defense to Giap's actions against Laos, the
French undertook Operation Atlante between January 20 and
early March 1954, in an effort to regain the initiative and
offensive spirit.

Despite having deceived 0'Daniel, the

French still asked the United States for funds to implement
the plan.

Regardless of French duplicity, the Navarre Plan

was militarily sound.32
Soon after returning to Washington, General 0'Daniel
reported the findings of his mission to the Joint Chiefs of
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Staff on July 14, 1953.

O'Daniel reported that Navarre had

agreed to include United States officers in the French units
training indigenous troops and to keep tjie United States
Military Assistance Advisory Group (U.S: MAAG, a military
service of the Executive Branch) in Indochina informed of
all French plans.

Navarre aiso agreed t8 have two Americans

stationed in Hanoi to relay intelligence^ihformation to
Washington.

Further, the French Commander agreed to return

the six C-119s previously loaned to his command and to stepup training of French pilots and mechanics.33 Because, the
new French plans were to cost an additional 150 billion
francs, Laniel informed Dillon on July 29 that unless the
United States furnished this sum the French would have to
withdraw from Indochina.

Laniel stated that without

increased American assistance, the French could not balance
her budget which, in turn, would hurt France's ability to
contribute to the European and Atlantic communities.34
By the time 0 'Daniel reported to the JCS, President
Eisenhower already had requested $400 million in mutual
security funds for Indochina.

The bright picture portrayed

by the 0 'Daniel report led to the passage of this fund, but
not before significant congressional debate.

In late June,

Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) offered an amendment that
no money be allocated until the Government of France gave
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the United States assurance that France would make a
declaration "to the people of the Associated States setting
a target date for the adoption of a constitution for such
States, and for the establishment of their complete
independence.”35 Goldwater drew an analogy to the American
Declaration of Independence and the anti-colonial cause that
had inspired it.

Goldwater stressed tHat the United States

should help the people of Indochina meet their legitimate
aspirations as a people.

Or, Goldwater warned, "as surely

as day follows night our boys will follow this $400
million."36 Goldwater's support came from conservative
Republicans, including Everett McKinley Dirksen (R-Ill) who
had just completed a visit to Vietnam with Warren G.
Magnuson (D-Wash),37 Dirksen, who later supported the war
in the 1960s, asked:
What makes them [the Viet Minh] so tough?
What is the force that makes them resist? It is
an ideological force. It is the nationalism which
they preach. They do not preach communism. They
preach nationalism and freedom. If they can do
that, does anyone believe that sending additional
planes, or $400 million worth of equipment there,
is likely to do the job, when there are still so
many official fence-sitters who believe that Ho
Chi Minh will win, and who are waiting for that
day?
The amendment failed.

Although many Senators felt a need to

pressure France to address legitimate aspirations of the
people of Indochina, few dared to risk French withdrawal.38
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New responsibilities in Asia following tiie outbreak of the
Korean war did not sow th£ seeds for re-election.
On July 27, 1953, the signing of ttie Korean armistice
changed the nature of American involvement in Indochina.
Following the cease-fire, Mao had begun to supply arms and
equipment to the Viet Minh.

As a consequence, American

policy makers became even more fearful of Chinese
intervention.

Before the armistice was signed, on July 10,

in a Joint Chiefs of Staff-State Department meeting, the
consensus opinion was not to send American ground troops
into Indochina.39 American policy was predicated on the
presence of French and indigenous
fighting.

troops who could do the

But, the French were not cooperating.

In Paris,

many French officials looked for ways to save face and
extricate France from the war.

French Foreign Minister

Bidault, for instance, told Dulles that the French public
would not understand why the United States deemed
negotiations acceptable for Korea but not for Indochina.40
Dulles replied that in Korea the allies could employ
"unpleasant" alternatives to negotiation not present in
Indochina.

Beyond this, Dulles liked the chances for

success of implementing the Navarre Plan.41 Thus, the
signing of the Korean armistice increased United States
fears of Chinese entry into Indochina at the same time the
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O'Daniel report suggested the adequacy of the French
presence to wage the fight;
The emergency of the situation created by American fears
of Chinese intervention had two consequences.

First, they

dampened the chances for success of any "political" riders
to the granting of United States aid such as that offered by
Goldwater.

Additionally; American pressure to keep France

in the war intensified.

One form of that pressure was

increased aid.
On August 6 the National Security Council met to discuss
French requests for additional funds.

Before them was a

report written by the Department of State which recommended
granting the request.

The State Department felt that the

Laniel Government was the last French Government likely to
continue the war in Indochina.

Given Laniel's threat of

withdrawal should the the United States not grant the funds,
the State Department warned "If the French actually decided
to withdraw, the U.S. would have to consider most seriously
whether to take over in this area."42 On August 28, the JCS
sent a memorandum to Secretary of Defense Wilson
recommending additional aid to implement the Navarre plan.
The Chiefs, however, felt military success depended on the
development of a political atmosphere which would induce
native intelligence gathering.

Because General Navarre was
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not energetically fulfilling recommendations of the O'Daniel
mission, the Chiefs felt the United States should condition
additional support on French willingness to entertain
seriously United States military advice;43
Although the interested parties had sighed an armistice,
they considered an international conference necessary to
negotiate an end to the Korean war.

Hoping to prevent talks

on Indochina at this conference, or at least hoping that
added dollars could lead to military victories and allow the
French to negotiate from strength if Indochina were
included, in September 1953 Washington approved an
additional $385 million for French use.

Many Congressmen

based their approval on General O'Daniel's optimism for the
success of the Navarre Plan.

Navarre himself in a secret

report to Paris noted that a stalemate— or a

coup

nul— was

the best that France could hope for.44 Washington feared
the threat of French withdrawal if the new money were not
appropriated.
While pursuing a policy aimed at keeping France in the
war, Eisenhower's Secretary of State also tried to keep the
Chinese out.

On September 2, 1953, Dulles mentioned in a

speech in St. Louis that the United States would welcome an
opportunity to discuss the Indochina war at the upcoming
conference to settle the Korean dispute, so long as
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Communist China wanted to hold such a conference.

Dulles

reiterated a warning to China that "a second aggression
could not occur without grave consequences which might not
be confined to Indochina."45 The following day, Dulles
repeated the United States willingness to hold such a
conference if the Chinese were also wiilirig.46
While pressuring France to stay on in Indochina,
Eisenhower continued to entertain the hope that the French
would listen to American proposals concerning the political
situation.

On September 8, in a paper prepared for the

National Security Council meeting on the following day,
Eisenhower is quoted as saying that:
we must get the French to commit themselves
publicly to a program which will insure the
support and cooperation of the native Indochinese.
The later increments of our increased aid should
be provided only if the French have made real
progress in giving the natives greater
independence.... If we are to give greatly
increased support, the French must invite our
close military advice in the conduct of the war in
Indochina.
Eisenhower also demanded French assurances regarding passage
of the European Defense Community Treaty.47
On September 9, the National Security Council met with
Secretary of State Dulles to discuss France's request for
additional money and iron out the position of the executive
branch.

Dulles stated that the money would encourage the
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French to remain and discourage the Chinese Communists from
entering Indochina.

Dulles also reported Eisenhower's

position on Indochina.

Eisenhower felt that Indochina was

the first priority of United States foreign policy; a loss
in Korea might be confined to Korea, but a loss in Indochina
might lead to a Communist conquest of the rest of Southeast
Asia.

Eisenhower also wanted Congressional consultation so

as to prevent handing Congress a fait accompli.48 Although
the Senate had defeated the Goldwater rider, the NSC set
three conditions on their approval of the French request.
They wanted France to publicly announce a program of support
and cooperation with the Associated States and to accept
closer United States military advise in Indochina.

The NSC

also wanted French assurance of passage of the European
Defense Community.49
On September 29, Bidault wrote to Ambassador Dillon
accepting these conditions for receiving additional United
States aid.

Bidault mentioned that France was committed to

"perfecting" the independence of the Associated States.
per the Navarre Plan, Bidault acknowledged France's
willingness to initiate an offensive with increased
participation by indigenous forces.

Reserving primary

responsibility for France, Bidault agreed to listen to
American military advice and to provide the United States

As
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with France's economic information.

Finally, Bidault stated

France's intent to meet her NATO obligations.

Dillon, in a

reply to Bidault, agreed on behalf of the United States to
provide France $385 million by the end 6£ 1954 .50
Meanwhile, in Indochina, the major political question
concerning the relationship between the Associated States
and France continued to develop.

On July 3> 1953, France

had announced intentions to grant independence and
sovereignty to the Associated States.51 In a declaration,
the French Government stated that
there is every reason to complete the
independence and sovereignty of the Associated
States of Indochina by insuring, in agreement with
each of the three interested governments, the
transfer of the powers that she [France] had still
retained in the interests of the States
themselves, because of the perilous circumstances
resulting from the state of war.
The July 3rd declaration was the result of increased demands
for political autonomy made by the Associated States.

The

problem was that French officials appear "to have been
rather slow to recognize the serious limitations of
'independence within the French Union.'"52 The July
declaration reflected France's inability to meet Vietnamese
wishes for self-rule, and at the same time reassert French
dominance following possible military success.

The French

felt that Vietnamese aspirations could be met under the
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umbrella of the French Union.

But, unlike the British

Commonwealth system, the French Union gave France a dominant
role, as the French constitution did not provide for the
independence of overseas territories.53 Such dominance of
one nation over another negates the very principle of
sovereignty.

Adding to the French dilemma was the fact that

the French colony of North Africa would .regard jealously any
grant of sovereignty given to the Indochina States.

Despite

retaining the notion of French dominance, the language was
acceptable to United States policy makers.

Secretary of

State Dulles stated in a speech in St. Louis on September 24
that the United States could increase aid to the French "in
good conscience."54
To the Vietnamese, the declaration recognized the
equality between two sovereigns.

As part of the effort to

achieve sovereign status, Bao Dai announced the convening of
a Vietnamese Congress to select representatives to meet with
the French.

Before Bao Dai could act, Ngo Dinh Nhu, Ngo

Dinh Diem's brother, created the Movement of National Union
for Independence and Peace and held an unofficial Congress.
The National Congress stated that because international
cooperation rested on the principle of free and equal
sovereign nations acting independently, and because the
French Union was one of dominance contrary to the principle
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of sovereignty, the people of Vietnam decided not to stay
within the French Union.55 The National Congress also
i

decided that treaties would have to be signed between
Vietnam and the French, which then must fee ratified by a
General Assembly of Vietnam, constituted by universal
suffrage.56 Bao Dai's Congress, which met October 15-17,
1953, adopted a resolution similar to positions espoused at
Nhu's Congress.

A Few days later, after pressure from

France and the United States on Bao Dai, the resolution was
modified to read the people of Vietnam chose not to stay
within the French Union "in its present form."57
To convince Indochinese that their desires for
independence could be met within the French Union, the
French had to clarify the legal relationship between the
Associated States and herself.

To this end, Laos and France

signed a treaty of amity on October 22, 1953, explaining the
French concept of sovereignty.58 Stating that Laos was "a
fully independent and sovereign State," the treaty also
reaffirmed the position of Laos within the French Union.
For France the French Union was "an association of
independent and sovereign peoples" where "all the associates
place in common their resources in order to guarantee the
defense of the Union as a whole."59 On October 27, Laniel
further defined the French Union in a speech before the
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French National Assembly;

"The French Union is founded upon

a vital notion," Laniel stated, "the necessity of placing in
common the appropriate resources for the defense of the
member States, from which proceeds the necessity of
recognizing France's coordinating role in the use of these
resources."60
In the meantime, Navarre started to.implement his plan.
On November 20, Navarre parachuted a large force into the
northwest Tonkin village of Dien Bien Phu.

Navarre chose to

land a force at Dien Bien Phu in an effort to prevent Giap
from entering Laos.

Navarre justifiably decided to defend

that country in the fall of 1953.

As Navarre stated in

1963: "Suppose that I had... abandoned Laos on my own
initiative and opened to the Viet-Minh the road toward total
victory: I would be branded today as the man who had
betrayed the honor of his country."61 The decision to
select Dien Bien Phu as the place to conduct that defense
was Navarre's responsibility.

Navarre knew the French

commanders in Indochina were opposed to the mission.62
Nevertheless, Navarre ignored their advice and decided to
set-up a fortified airhead astride Viet Minh supply lines to
Laos.

Even though the position could not be reinforced or

supplied by road, and it was at the maximum operating range
of French air support in Hanoi, Navarre went ahead with the
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plan because his intelligence staff reported that the
operation carried little or no risk.63 Having committed his
forces, Navarre felt that Giap lacked the logistic
capability to get his artillery and ammunition to the hills
which surrounded the Dien Bien Phu valiey:64 That
underestimation of the enemy would prove costly.
While French forces were digging in..around Dien Bien
Phu, the Viet Minh sent peace feelers to the Laniel
government.

On November 26, 1953, Ho Chi Minh offered to

negotiate with the French during an interview with the
Swedish Newspaper Expressen. Upon learning of Ho's
overture, Georges Bidault stated that Ho was "on the point
of capitulating" and negotiations should await the success
of the Navarre Plan.65
On January 8, 1954, the National Security Council
debated recent developments in Indochina.

Allen Dulles,

Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), addressed
the military situation at Dien Bien Phu.

Dulles stated that

three Viet Minh divisions had surrounded the French
garrison, and that the French, though in a strong position,
were "locked up in it."

Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, then informed the meeting that
General Navarre had assured him that although the Viet Minh
were strong enough to capture Dien Bien Phu, they probably
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would not because they would suffer many casualties and
wanted to advance into Laos instead.

Allen Dulles replied,

however, that the psychological and political damage to the
French will to carry on in Indochina occasioned by the
possible demise of Dien Bien Phu was worth heavy losses to
the Viet Minh.66
After Allen Dulles' presentation;

Jseneral

Robert Cutler

(Special Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs) presented a briefing on United States policy in
Indochina.

Following this, Eisenhower asked why the French

did not allow the Associated States to bring the issue of
Communist aggression before the UN, now that France had
declared the Associated States independent.

Secretary John

Foster Dulles replied that France feared opening the door to
raising the issue of Morocco's independence before the U.N.
According to a Memorandum prepared three days after the
meeting, Eisenhower retorted that the French did not know
"whether to go it alone or to get assistance from other
nations clandestinely."

Eisenhower stated "with great

force," that "he simply could not imagine the United States
putting ground forces anywhere in Southeast Asia, except
possibly in Malaya, which we would have to defend as a
bulwark to our off-shore island chain.

But to do this

anywhere else was simply beyond his contemplation."
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Eisenhower felt that it was senseless for the United States
to replace the French for "the key to winning this war was
to get the Vietnamese to fight."

Otherwise, the President

stated, "the Vietnamese could be expecteci to transfer their
hatred of the French to us."

Indeed, Eisenhower stated

"with vehemence" that he was "bitterly opposed...to such a
course of action."

The President conclucied that "[T]his war

in Indochina would absorb our troops by divisions!"67

In

Eisenhower's judgment, while Indochina may have occupied a
strategic geographic area, replete with vast economic
resources, the United States would not commit armed services
personnel in a situation where military success seemed
unlikely and, even if likely, where prospects for subsequent
political success were nil.
Eisenhower's declaration did not preclude further
debate.

Vice-President Richard M. Nixon promptly voiced his

doubts about the strength of a Vietnamese national army.
Nixon said "the French are fighting in the hope of keeping
Vietnam in the French Union, whereas the Vietnamese really
want independence outside the French Union."

Thus, Nixon

concluded, the French probably would prove unwilling to
allow American assistance in training such an army.

Richard

Nixon then avowed that if the French allowed the Vietnamese
to become strong enough to defend themselves, the Vietnamese
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probably would remove Vietnam from the French Union.
Eisenhower replied: "if the French had been smart they would
long since have offered the Associated States independence
on the latters' own terms."

Eisenhower stated that if the

French let the United States take over part of the training
of indigenous troops, this would free up French troops for
combat.68 Even though the majority of bis forces were
committed to defensive positions, Navarre later rejected
this proposal.69
In other discussion at the meeting, Admiral Radford felt
"the United States should do everything possible to
forestall a French defeat at Dien Bien Phu."

Radford

suggested sending over an aircraft carrier to help defend
the garrison.

George Humphrey, the Secretary of the

Treasury, felt that the loss of Dien Bien Phu could not be
"bad enough to involve the United States in combat in
Indochina."

Eisenhower agreed but submitted that if the

United States did not send pilots why not send planes and
maintenance personnel.

Radford concurred, stating that

United States planes could destroy Viet Minh anti-aircraft
guns at Dien Bien Phu, which the French felt incapable of
destroying on their own.

Humphrey, supported by Robert

Cutler, Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, felt that such a commitment would lead to
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greater commitments.

Radford again proposed a one day air

strike saying: "We [are] already in this thing in such a big
way that it seemed foolish not to make the one small extra
move which might be essential to success:"70 President
Eisenhower suggested the use of CIA CAT pilots.

The

i *

President then ended the meeting with tiie Defense Department
and CIA agreeing to make a report to the. NSC on possible
policy alternatives the United States could pursue in
achieving the success of the "Laniel-Navarre" Plan.71
Four days after Admiral Radford suggested sending United
States carrier-based aircraft to bomb the Viet Minh
encircling Dien Bien Phu, Secretary Dulles gave a foreign
policy address before the Council on Foreign Relations.
Dulles began by lauding the policies of the Truman
administration, stating that Truman's bold response was the
appropriate remedy to counter Soviet inspired emergencies.
But, Dulles averred, a policy based on coping with
emergencies is too short-term.

"Emergency measures are

costly; they are superficial; and they imply that the enemy
has the initiative."72 The United States needs a long range
strategy, Dulles stated, worked out in compliance with our
"true purposes."73

"We need allies and collective

security," pursued at minimal cost.

"This can be done by

placing more reliance on deterrent power and less dependence
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on local defensive power."74 Dulles then outlined the
basics of this new, efficient policy:
Local defenses must be reinforced by the
further deterrent of massive retaliatory power....
The way to deter aggression is for the free
community to be willing and able to respond
vigorously at places and with means of its own
choosing....
[The President and the National Security
Council have made the] basic decision;;.to depend
primarily upon a great capacity tcMretaliate,
instantly, by means and at places of our
choosing.75
Having outlined the administration's general strategy,
Dulles detailed certain specifics.

Dulles stated that in

the Far East the new policy led to an armistice in Korea as
the fighting had "spread beyond the limits and methods
which" the Communists had selected.

Dulles reiterated his

warning to the PRC that open aggression in Indochina would
meet with "grave consequences which might not be confined to
Indochina."76 Dulles concluded his remarks stating his
belief as to what the new policy would accomplish: "[w]e
intend that our conduct and example shall continue, as in
the past, to show all men how good can be the fruits of
freedom."

The ultimate hope is that the Soviet leaders will

realize "that there are limits to the power of any rulers
indefinitely to suppress the human spirit."77
Dulles' speech was meant for three audiences.
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Domestically, Dulles demonstrated coherent leadership at the
top of the foreign policy hierarchy.

Eisenhower and the NSC

had worked out an effective strategy to counter Communism
consistent with American ideals and designed to avoid
economic hardship.

As such, the speech was consonant with

American idealism for America would lead primarily through
good example.

To the Communist world, the address was

designed to forestall aggressive advances anywhere in the
world.

In Indochina in particular, Dulles sought to

dissuade possible Chinese intervention on behalf of the Viet
Minh.

Because the Chinese not only did not enter the fray

with ground forces, but also, in tandem with the Soviets,
pressured the Viet Minh to accept less favorable conditions
f

at the bargaining table in the summer of 1954, this part of
Dulles' address may have been successful.

To America's

allies, the speech sought to instill courage in the defense
of freedom.

The problem was that Dulles did not foresee

that his language would serve to frighten allies.

This

unforeseen consequence would reveal itself during late April
when Great Britain checked United States efforts to relieve
the fortress outpost at Dien Bien Phu.
On January 14, the National Security Council met to
discuss the current state of United States foreign policy as
announced in NSC 5405.

On December 8, 1953 the United
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States Army had pointed out to the NSC Planning Board that
the United States did not possess enough ground forces to
meet European and Asian troop commitments and also
supplement French troops in Indochina:78 NSC 5405 sought to
answer that difficulty.

NSC 5405, originally was two

documents: NSC 177, written December 31; 1953, and NSC 177
Special Annex, written by the JCS' Joint Strategic and
Logistics Plans Committees.79 Because the Special Annex
espoused sending American troops to Indochina given certain
conditions, the NSC withdrew the document on January 8,
1954.

At the NSC meeting of January 14, Secretary of State

Dulles said that if France withdrew the United States should
recruit Vietnamese to conduct guerilla operations against
the Communists.

Vice President Nixon doubted the ability of

the United States to recruit Vietnamese as guerrillas, but
felt a French departure would resurrect the Indochinese
"will to fight," and allow American personnel an opportunity
to train indigenous forces.
renumbering it NSC 5405.

The NSC then approved NSC 177,

Because NSC 5405 was a rewrite of

NSC 124/2 of June 1952, American policy remained static.80
Two days later, on January 16, 1954 President Eisenhower
approved NSC 5405 entitled "United States Objectives and
Courses of Action With Respect to Southeast Asia."
At this time, Eisenhower decided that the mounting
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crisis in Indochina deserved additional action.

On January

16, 1954, he empowered an ad hoc committee to study the
Indochina problem and ways to support the Navarre plan.
Called the Special Committee on Indochina and led by Under
Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith; the Committee was a
self-contained independent think-tank personally accountable
to the President.

In addition to Smith; Eisenhower's Chief

of Staff during World War II and Director of the CIA to
February 9, 1953, other members included Allen Dulles,
Admiral Radford, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roger Kyes, and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.81 At the first meeting of this
group, Eisenhower requested that an "area plan" be drawn up
to discuss courses of action should Indochina fall.82 This
request signaled a shift in administration attitude.
Concern about the domino effect seemed to have been placed
on the back burner.

As Smith told an executive session of

the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 16, 1954,
"part of Indochina might be lost without losing the rest of
Southeast Asia."

Smith suggested that Communism could be

checked, in that event, by "an area defense pact."83
The Special Committee met on January 29, 1954 to discuss
a recent French request for planes and 400 American Air
Force aircraft technicians.

The French needed assistance

for the French air maintenance force was one-third
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understrength.84 Radford opposed sending the technicians;
Smith proposed sending 200.
lead to sending more.

Kyes felt sending 200 would

Smith, noting tii<e difference between

maintenance personnel and ground forces; stated that he
would favor intervention with air and naval forces.
agreed.

Radford

Understanding that only the President could decide

whether to intervene or not, the Smith Sommittee decided to
send 200 technicians provided they be stationed away from
areas of possible combat.85 The Committee also agreed to
send CIA-hired United States civilian pilots to fly planes
from the CIA-owned airline— Civil Air Transport (CAT)— to
help transport French forces and supplies.86 President
Eisenhower approved the Smith Committee's recommendations
later that day.87
In the meantime, the Smith Committee had set up a
Working Committee headed by General G.B. Erskine, Director
of Special Operations of the Department of Defense.

Other

members of the Working Group consisted of representatives
from the JCS, the CIA, and the Departments of State and
Defense.88 The Erskine Committee wrote a report considering
United States options, short of using United States troops,
for the Smith Committee's perusal at the January 29 meeting.
Radford, aware that consideration of the domino effect was
absent, sent the report back for further review to consider
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options of using United States troops and not using United
States troops.

Smith agreed.89

News of President Eisenhower's decision to send 200
American personnel to Indochina was met by strong
Congressional reaction.

Senator John C; Stennis (D-Miss)

expressed a concern previously entertained by Humphrey and
Kyes.

He was worried that "we should certainly stop short

of sending our troops... for....when we send one group, we
shall have to send another to protect the first and we shall
thus be fully involved in a short time."90 Senator Stennis'
fears sound similar to a genre of later criticisms of United
States policies based on the "quagmire theory" of American
participation in the Vietnamese civil war.

David

Halberstam, for one, wrote that President Johnson escalated
American involvement in Vietnam for "the protection of our
men and material, which meant the arrival of our boys, which
of course meant more boys to protect our boys (and later
greater bombing of the North to protect our boys, who were
of course there originally to protect the airfields.)"91
Why the United States went to war in 1965 based on this
model of analysis and not in 1954 for the same reasons is
not explained.
Other legislators echoed Senator Stennis' concerns.
a result, on February 3, 1954, Eisenhower told Smith to

As
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consult with Congressional leaders before sending the
technicians.

Radford and Kyes met with the Senate Armed

Services Committee.

Soon thereafter, on February 8,

Eisenhower met with Senate Republican leaders, where Senator
Saltonstall (R-Mass), Chairman of the Armed Services
Committee, told Eisenhower that the Committee objected to
sending uniformed American personnel to Indochina.
Saltonstall stated that opposition in the Committee would
diminish if the administration unequivocally announced that
the technicians would be removed by June 15, regardless of
French ability to meet the requirement.

Eisenhower replied

that the technicians could be removed by that date and
telephoned Wilson to devise a plan accordingly.

Eisenhower

agreed to use civilian personnel after June 15, if
Saltonstall would support the use of Air Force personnel
until then.92 Eisenhower's plan, similar to the later Nixon
Doctrine,

was to use "indigenous troops in any Asian

battles, with the United States providing a mobile reserve
for the overall security of the free world."93
While Congress debated the technician commitment, three
reports of Congressional missions to Indochina were
circulating on Capitol Hill.

Senator Mike Mansfield (D-

Mont) visited Indochina in September 1953.

In his report,

Mansfield wrote that "The issue in this war [is]...the
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continued freedom of the non-Communist world, the
containment of Communist aggression, and the welfare and
security of our country."

Senator H. Alexander Smith (R-

N.J.) also visited Indochina and wrote a report published
January 25, 1954.

Denying universalism; Smith wrote: "[W]e

must not try to rebuild these countries in the image of
America."

He also felt a heed to reirivigdrate the will to

fight, assure independence, support a regional security
pact, and warn the native population about the danger posed
by the Chinese.94 A House Foreign Affairs Committee
delegation also visited Indochina and issued a "committee
print" of their report in February 1954..

They felt that

"[F]or the free world to seek a truce with the Communists in
Indochina is to engage in appeasement equivalent to an
Indochinese 'Munich.'"95
Senator Smith's report on the impact of American foreign
policy in the Far East is a significant document relating
America's postwar idealism and foreign policy.

Smith stated

that Moscow's overall strategy to dominate Asia involved the
combination of Chinese manpower, Japanese industrial
capacity, and the rich raw materials of Southeast Asia.

Of

this strategy, Smith noted that China was now in Communist
hands, that the conquest of Japan had been stopped in Korea
at the 38th parallel, and that the Kremlin was actively
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intent on winning the struggle in Indochina.

Smith felt

that because the Marshall Plan and NATO iiad rebuffed the
Soviets in Europe, the Communists had placed primary
emphasis in the East, making Asia the new battleground.

The

Soviets' main weapon in their conquest Bf Asia, Smith noted,
was in co-opting native sentiment against foreigners.

By

branding western efforts ks colonial;„.Smith observed, the
Soviets furthered their own imperial designs and invidiously
endangered the future freedom of the area and the world.96
Smith made a few recommendations for future American
foreign policy.

He felt that independence was the

fundamental solution.

M [T]here can be no more imperialism,

no more colonialism, no more totalitarian dictatorships."97
Smith felt that the United States should try to understand
and appreciate the point of view of the people of Asia, and
to help them understand the West.

Smith recommended

continued assistance to the anti-Communist nations of Asia,
including the training of native Asian troops.

He felt that

the United States should encourage the idea of collective
security, and resist moves "to appease the Communist
aggressors."

He stated: "Our policies should be pursued

with firmness and patience."

Emphasizing the need for

negotiations, Smith felt that recognition of the People's
Republic of China would put the stamp of appeasement on
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Communist conquest in the area.

Smith stated that it is not

enough to condemn communism, but the United States must
"demonstrate the positive values of the democratic way of
life."98 Smith‘stated that: "[w]e must not seek to dominate
or dictate.

We must not try to rebuild these countries in

the image of America.

We must help them in their keen

eagerness to work out their own future
Smith concluded by noting his aversion to the use of
force.

Smith noted that in this struggle, "[f]inal and

lasting victory can be won by winning the critical war of
ideas."

He noted that the struggle in Indochina for the

loyalty of the people was a "battle of ideologies, " as well
as a military fight.

Smith noted France's dual

responsibility of trying to hold out full freedom to the
Vietnamese while continuing to fight the Viet Minh.

He

noted the difficulty of winning over the fence-sitters who
feared retribution from the Viet Minh.

He noted the

relationship between French politics and French prosecution
of the war; notably, French war weariness, left-wing
sympathy for Ho, right-wing fear of a rearmed Germany and
the inconsistency of defending an area whose inhabitants
have been granted independence.

Additionally, he noted the

strategic position of Indochina drawing reference to the
fact that Japan conquered this area before attacking the
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United States at Pearl Harbor.100
The House Study Mission to Indochina was led by Walter
H. Judd (R-Minn), a highly respected senior Republican.

The

Judd report, dated January 29, 1954, but distributed in
early February, was a country-by-country analysis of
American foreign policy in Southeast AsiS;

With respect to

Korea, the Judd report stated that United States policy must
continue "to support the goal of a free, independent Korea."
Yet, the report was wary of attaining that goal via
negotiation with the Soviets.

The report recommended that

if at any conference scheduled to unify Korea, the Communist
representatives give evidence of using the conference to
engage in propaganda, abuse and delay, the United States
representatives should withdraw promptly.101 With respect to
Japan, the report recognized Japan's need to acquire
markets.

The report stated that if Japan could not trade

with the free world, they would be driven to trading with
the Communists.102 Concerning Indochina, the report
disparaged French military strategy.

Noting France's

"Maginot-line" mentality of strongpoint defense the report
concluded: "[C]learly, the war cannot be won from fixed
positions."103 Politically, the Judd report also noted the
inadequacy of French policy.

Judd felt that granting

independence would win over the fence-sitters, and
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strengthen the "real problem" of Bao Dai's "weak political
base."104 The report acknowledged, however, that
independence would signal the end of French rule in
Indochina:
The real issue for France is how far it can
lessen the heavy burden on itself without
sacrificing all hope for a role in postwar
Indochina. Neither the present state of the
French Government nor of1the French economy
encourages the continuance of a struggle in which
France stands to bear the burden of defeat and, if
victorious, cannot return to its former
position.... the French recognize that their heavy
burdens in Southeast Asia are part of the price
they must pay for continuance as a world power and
even for their freedom in Europe."105
In larger terms, the report felt the war had turned into an
international conflict from an anti-colonial revolt.

In

that struggle, the report felt that to agree to a truce was
unwise, and that the French could "truce" away the entire
country.106 The report concluded its section on Indochina
stating "[t]he struggle in Indochina today is at best a
touch-and-go proposition."107
Many of the conclusions of the Judd report coincided
with the conclusions of the Smith report, including the
premise that the United States had a significant stake in
Indochina.

Judd, too, sensed a "larger Communist strategy"

to dominate Asia.

Likewise, he felt the Communists would

combine "the manpower of China, plus the industrial capacity
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of north Asia, plus the agricultural and raw material
resources of South Asia," and "create a most formidable
power element moving against the free world;"108 Like Smith,
Judd felt recognition of the PRC would constitute
appeasement, and "[h]istory proves that there is no peace in
appeasement.11109 Judd also agreed that tfie experience of the
Korean War showed the need for collective security.

Yet, he

thought the initiative for a Pacific pact must come from
Asians confident that America will support their proposal.110
Judd felt that before Asian anti-Communists could act they
had to be assured of United States support.

He noted that

Asians must attempt to understand the history behind western
political ideas in order to effectuate their goal of
establishing a western polity.

But, he reasoned that "Asian

nations must work out their own political pattern in the
light of their own background and experience."111
While Capital Hill was abuzz with the struggle in
Indochina, the National Security Council held its weekly
meeting on February 11.

High-level government assessments

on the military situation at Dien Bien Phu were optimistic.
Allen Dulles reported that the Viet Minh were by-passing
Dien Bien Phu and moving into Laos.

Dulles felt that a

frontal assault on Dien Bien Phu was unlikely, and felt
confident in the Navarre Plan's success.112 On February 21,
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Navarre himself told Ambassador Heath that Dien Bien Phu was
not threatened.

Navarre stated: "Dien Bien Phu is a

veritable jungle Verdun which he hopes will be attacked as
it will result in terrific casualties t8 the Viet Minh and
will not fall."113
On February 16, at an executive session of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee attended by._Smith and Radford,
Radford assured the Senators that the deterioration of the
French military position as played up in recent press
reports was exaggerated.

Senator H. Alexander Smith said he

felt relieved, because he felt that from his recent trip to
Indochina that Navarre and the French could win in two
years.

Two days later, Radford and Bedell Smith attended an

executive session of the House Foreign Relations Committee.
Radford stated that there was "no danger" of losing Dien
Bien Phu to the Viet Minh.

"The Viet Minh," Radford stated,

"are not anxious to engage in a showdown fight, because
their ammunition supplies are not large, and a great deal of
it is homemade."114
At the Berlin Conference, which ended February 18, the
Foreign Ministers of the United States, Great Britain,
France and the Soviet Union agreed to hold a conference in
Geneva scheduled to begin on April 26, 1954, to discuss an
end to the Korean war.

At the insistence of the French, the
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Geneva Conference would also discuss the problem in
Indochina.

Initially opposed, the United States acquiesced

after Bidault threatened to scuttle the EDC, and the British
supported the French.115 Realizing that Indochina was
France's war, and that the Laniel Government might fall into
disfavor with an unsympathetic French pufeiic, Dulles gave in
to French leverage.

Viet Minh peace feelers since Ho's

Expressen interview had heightened French domestic sentiment
for an end to the war.116 Many Frenchmen hoped that the
armistice agreement negotiated at Panmunjom had provided a
worthy precedent.117 Dulles, however, felt negotiations
should await military gains on the battlefield.

Reports

from American observers convinced Dulles that the Navarre
Plan promised victory.

At Dien Bien Phu, Chinese aid had

allowed Giap to change tactics from guerrilla operations to
conventional warfare, and would prove American observers
wrong.

Intense diplomatic activity ensued during the

interim between the end of the Berlin Conference and the
scheduled beginning of the Geneva Conference.
On February 24, in an executive session of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Dulles felt
that if the United States had not acquiesced at Berlin, the
Laniel-Bidault Government in France would have fallen.
Dulles felt that this was the best government the United
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States could hope for in France in view of American
interests in Indochina and the European Defense Community.
Dulles also noted that the United States was not bound to
remain at the Conference should events necessitate
leaving.118 Dulles also told the Committee "there probably
will not be any major or anything like decisive engagements
during the remaining 2 months of March arid April of the
fighting season."

Dulles felt that if the French could hold

on until the end of April, the rainy season would last six
months when the fighting could resume.

In the interval,

Dulles hoped for the development of the French will to,
fight, the development of national armies, and for China to
decide to stop aiding the Viet Minh.119

In a February 2 6

report to the NSC, Dulles noted that had the United States
vetoed the French proposal at Berlin, the French would have
declined to join the EDC and probably would have withdrawn
from Indochina.120
Optimism about the situation in Indochina continued.

In

the first week of March, Harold Stassen, Director for
Foreign Operations, reported to the National Security
Council that the French hoped for a Viet Minh attack because
they were sure to defeat it.121 While the French may have
evinced optimism, many wanted to leave the country.

On

March 5, speaking before the French National Assembly,

132

Laniel stated that all of France is united "in desiring a
settlement through negotiation."122 French optimism
reflected the hope of holding on until Geneva where
diplomacy could effect a face-saving.
Despite the optimism of the French and American
observers, the Working Group of the Smith Committee
continued to weigh United States options in Indochina.

On

March 11, 1954, Under Secretary of State Smith sent
Eisenhower Part 1 of a two-part report prepared by the
Working Committee of the Special Committee.

The report

stated that there was enough equipment, supplies and
manpower in Indochina to defeat the Communists, but that
success was dependent on French willingness to inspire and
utilize the native potential and instill a sense of fighting
for freedom.

The Erskine group recommended that short of

direct involvement, the United States should continue aid to
France; strengthen the United States military mission with
"advisory authority over training and planning;" assign
United States personnel with duties within the French
forces; have Eisenhower write to the Heads of State of the
Associated States to explain American motives; and encourage
Bao Dai to be more active.

Barring Chinese intervention and

French discouragement, the Group felt their recommendations
could lead to victory.123
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The same day Eisenhower received part one of the Erskine
report, he stated at a press conference that "...there is
going to be no involvement of America in war unless it is a
result of the constitutional process that is placed upon
Congress to declare it."124 Eisenhower's public
pronouncements were consistently anti-interventionist.
Shortly after announcing his technician^commitment,
Eisenhower had declared at a news conference on February 10,
that "...no one could be more bitterly opposed to ever
getting the United States involved in a hot war in that
region than I am....I cannot conceive of a greater tragedy
for America than get heavily involved now in an all-out
war.. .particularly with large units."125

Significantly, the

President's public posture paralleled his stance taken at
the January 8th NSC meeting.

The President's resolve would

soon receive a major test.
On March 14, 1954 Ambassador Heath sent a cable to the
Department of State:
The long expected Viet Minh attack on Dien
Bien Phu, the 'Verdun' which the French military
command threw up in the 'Thai country' in northern
Indochina early last winter, began last evening at
6 o'clock [March 13, in Washington]...[Ambassador]
Dejean is confident that the French will be able
to hold Dien Bien Phu because of the strength of
its fortifications and its fire-power and inflict
heavy losses on the attackers....Not only does
Dejean think the French will hold Dien Bien Phu
but he regards the Viet Minh decision to attack as
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evidencing elements of desperation and weakness.126
Against the backdrop of the deteriorating French
position at Dien Bien Phuwas the Geneva~~Conference just six
weeks away.

President Eisenhower wouid liave to decide how

to combat Asian Communism and still adhere to principles of
international law.
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Chapter Four
A Concert of Readiness:
From Operation Vulture to United Action

The decision to discuss Indochina at the Geneva
Conference magnified the importance of the Viet Minh attack
at Dien Bien Phu.

While the siege continued, American

policy makers debated the ramifications of that decision.
Although many pinned their hopes on the success of the
Navarre Plan and a French military victory, others debated
the consequences of defeat.
In a memorandum dated March 12, 1954, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff wrote to Charles E. Wilson, the Secretary of
Defense, that "the loss of Indochina to the Communists would
constitute a political and military setback of the most
serious consequences."

It was their opinion that "a

negotiated settlement...would fail to provide reasonably
adequate assurance of the future political and territorial
integrity of Indochina."

Because of this, "the United

States should decline to associate itself with such a
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settlement, thereby preserving freedom of action to pursue"
other alternatives.1 Fearful that Communist propaganda
could make a negotiated settlement appear to be a Communist
victory, the JCS worried about the impact of the loss of
Indochina on neighboring countries, particularly Japan, "the
keystone of United States policy in the Far East."2 The JCS
concluded that the United States should prevent the loss of
Indochina to Communists either "in concert with the French;
or in the event the French elect to withdraw, in concert
with other allies or, if necessary, unilaterally."3
Ironically, while Washington was discussing the American
position at Geneva, General Giap of the Vietnamese People's
Army was preparing to scuttle the Navarre Plan.

According

to Bernard Fall, Navarre felt Dien Bien Phu was the perfect
place to lure the Communists away from guerilla tactics and
into the open in a set-piece battle where the French "could
outmaneuver and outgun the enemy."4 Nevertheless, by
January 1954, Giap's troops in the mountains surrounding the
French garrison outnumbered the French by about five to one.
Since the Berlin Conference in February, both the French and
the Viet Minh realized that military victory in the field
would augment their respective positions at the bargaining
table.

Accordingly, after three months of siege, on March

13, 1954, Giap switched to the offensive.

That night, the
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Viet Minh overran the French outer position named
Strongpoint Beatrice, killing almost seventy-five percent of
the defenders.

By morning the Viet Minh were dug-in and

ready to fire on the main camp.
In the meantime, the Smith Committee continued to
discuss the importance of Indochina.

On March 17, General

Erskine sent the second part of his report to this
committee.

Erskine stated that military victory was the

only acceptable United States objective, but that active
involvement should await Geneva in light of the trouble at
Dien Bien Phu.

Specifically, it recommended that "no

solution to the Indochina problem short of victory is
acceptable."

Should the French accept a settlement short of

this goal, the "U.S. should decline to associate itself with
such a settlement."

Further, the Report recommended that

<»

political steps could be taken to force French and British
acceptance of the U.S. position, including "possible
pressure against the French position in North Africa, and in
NATO."5 The United States should inform the British and
French before the start of the Geneva Conference, that the
United States would not associate with an outcome which
falls short of military victory.

Rejecting proposals to

negotiate an end to the war— a cease-fire, coalition
government, partition of Vietnam, or free elections— the
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Working Group felt that the United States should continue
fighting if the French withdrew, yet, in concert with
allies.

The Group noted that the NSC should ascertain

domestic and world opinion on the necessity of continuing
the fight.

Specifically, the United States should address

American willingness to commit United States troops with or
without French cooperation.6
Following the Erskine Report, Eisenhower redistributed
the Special Annex to NSC 177, which had been withdrawn at
the National Security Council meeting on January 8.

The

Annex outlined the basic choices facing Washington:
accepting the loss of Indochina while strengthening the rest
of Southeast Asia, or undertaking direct military
intervention prior to Geneva.

Two plans of action were

drawn up--one based on a scenario in which France continued
to fight, the other on French withdrawal.

Under the first

possibility, the Annex pointed out that the issue of the
Independence of the Associated States should be settled,
that indigenous units be built up with American material
support, and that French troop levels remain constant.
Generally, the Annex report recommended that preparations
should be made for possible United States entry in the
Indochina conflict.

Under the scenario of a French

withdrawal, the Annex reiterated the Erskine line, which was
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the choice of accepting the loss of Indochina or active
intervention.

The Annex argued that the best course under

the latter option would be "to join with indigenous forces
in combating the Viet Minh until they were reduced 'to the
status of scattered guerilla bands.'"

The Annex stipulated

that should the Chinese or Soviets intervene, or should
hostilities resume in Korea, the American position would
have to be re-evaluated.7
Meanwhile, the military situation at Dien Bien Phu
looked bleak.

On March 18, at the weekly NSC meeting, Allen

Dulles stated that the French had a 50-50 chance of
surviving the Viet Minh attack.8 Eisenhower was perplexed.
Stating that news from Indochina was serious, Eisenhower
wondered that "[i]t was difficult to understand, in light of
General Navarre's earlier statements that he hoped to be
attacked by the enemy at Dien Bien Phu, why the French
suddenly had become so very pessimistic."9 Secretary of
State Dulles noted that Bidault told him the Viet Minh
attack was an effort to gain a stronger hand at Geneva.10
The next day, Radford ordered an Attack Carrier Striking
Group to lie off the Indochinese coast on a three-hour alert
to undertake offensive operations.11
Despondency was not confined to within Dien Bien Phu.
According to The Pentagon Papers. "[t]his fortress in
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Northern Vietnam was to take on a political and
psychological importance far out of proportion to its actual
strategic value because of the upcoming Geneva
Conference."12 The French felt that they were doomed
"unless they received a formidable dose of outside help.
Only the United States could furnish that aid quickly and
effectively.

So another engagement had to be fought in

Washington."13 Thus, on March 20, 1954, General Paul Ely
(Chief of Staff of the French Joint Chiefs of Staff) at
Admiral Radford's invitation, flew to Washington.14 Because
Washington thought that France was ready to negotiate, "it
became increasingly clear to the American leaders that they
would have to commit the United States more deeply to the
struggle."15
On the night of March 20, a stag dinner was held for
General Ely.

In attendance were Admiral Radford, General

Ridgway, Vice-President Nixon, Douglas MacArthur II, and
Allen Dulles.

During discussion, Ely told Nixon that a

defeat at Dien Bien Phu would have adverse effects on French
public opinion and the strength of the Laniel government.
Yet, Ely felt the Viet Minh would effect only a political
victory while suffering many casualties.16
After a day of talks with American officials, Ely met
Eisenhower on March 22.

Ely presented specific requests of
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aid from Navarre to Eisenhower and Radford.

Principally,

f>

Ely asked for twenty-five additional B-26 bombers to assist
in the defense of Dien Bien Phu.
But Ely was not through.

This request was met.17

Historian Philippe Devillers

suggests that M [t]he main object of Ely's mission covered
the guarantee of American action in the case of Chinese air
intervention.”18 MIG-15's allegedly bearing Viet Minh
insignia had been spotted standing on Chinese airfields near
the Indochinese border.

France wanted American aid, but not

at the cost of alarming China.

Dulles later stated that he

could not give Ely an answer at that time to an American
response to Chinese intervention.19 That day, the Attack
Carrier Striking Group lying off the Indochinese coast was
ordered to prepare for a possible attack on the Communists
at Dien Bien Phu.

The Group was ordered not to tell the

French about these preparations.20
While Ely was talking with Eisenhower and Radford,
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles held a press
conference on March 23, in which he reported the defense of
Dien Bien Phu.

Dulles stated that the United States had

always made it a point to listen to French requests for aid.
Dulles mentioned that he had yet to meet with Ely, but that
Ely had met with Admiral Radford and presumably requested
additional aid.

Although he had yet to speak with Ely,
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Dulles stated that as long as China supported the Viet Minh
the United States would rule out a negotiated peace.21 At
this early date, Dulles had stated an uncompromising
American policy the significance of which would not become
apparent until much later.
That evening, Dulles finally met General Ely.

Ely told

him that "France was now determined upon a settlement."22
In a memorandum to Eisenhower, Dulles stated that Ely was
worried about Chinese intervention.

Ely asked Dulles about

United States help should the Chinese send fighters to
Indochina.

Dulles told Eisenhower that he replied:

that if the United States sent its flag and its
own military establishment— land, sea or air—
into the Indochina war, then the prestige of the
United States would be engaged to a point where we
would want to have a success. We could not afford
thus to engage the prestige of the United States
and suffer a defeat which would have worldwide
repercussions.23
Dulles warned Ely that overt American participation would
incur American pressure for independence of the Associated
States and the training of indigenous forces.24 Ely
admitted to Dulles that the primary problem in Indochina was
political, not military.

Ely felt that the Viet Minh attack

at Dien Bien Phu was inspired to reap political advantage at
Geneva, because the military value of the valley was not
worth the effort expended by the Viet Minh.25 Ely did not
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say why the French thought the valley important enough to
commit a large French force there in the first place.
On March 24, Radford telephoned Secretary Dulles stating
that the talks with Ely had made little progress in FrancoAmerican relations.

Dulles felt that wherever France

occupied territory in the world, a power-vacuum would occur.
The East-West challenge was to determine who would fill that
vacuum.

Radford stated that Ely had concerns about the

benefits of American aid.

Reminiscent of the Blum

controversy, Ely stated that "Americans act as if the United
States sought to control and operate everything of
importance," and "the United States appears to have an
invading nature as they undertake everything in such great
numbers of people."26 Radford concluded:
I am gravely fearful that the measures being
undertaken by the French will prove to be
inadequate and initiated too late....If Dien Bien
Phu is lost, this deterioration may occur very
rapidly due to the loss of morale among the mass
of the native population. In such a situation
only prompt and forceful intervention by the
United States could avert the loss of all of
Southeast Asia to Communist domination. I am
convinced that the United States must be prepared
to take such action.27
President Eisenhower met with Secretary Dulles, Radford,
and the NSC on March 25, 1954.

Eisenhower criticized French

judgment in choosing Dien Bien Phu, and stressed the domino
effect should Indochina fall.

Yet, Eisenhower felt
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intervention to prevent that fall would require UN approval.
Eisenhower noted that if France asked the UN for help, some
countries would object to the UN supporting colonialism.
Eisenhower, therefore, felt that the Associated States
themselves should seek UN assistance.

Eisenhower stated

that the United States would not intervene in Indochina
"unless the Vietnamese welcomed our intervention."28
Eisenhower felt a mutual security arrangement along the
lines of an expanded ANZUS treaty would facilitate United
States intervention under the auspices of the UN.
Additionally, a mutual security treaty would have the
advantage of garnering the necessary two-thirds majority for
Senate ratification.

Eisenhower stated too "that the

Congress would have to be in on any move by the United
States to intervene in Indochina.

It was simply academic to

imagine otherwise."29
Dulles felt there was plenty of time to explore
intervention with Congress or to secure UN backing, because
the Communists were seeking a political victory at Dien Bien
Phu and not a military victory.

Dulles then reiterated a

point he had made to Radford over the phone the day before.
Dulles stated that the West was witnessing the collapse of
France as a great power, and he wondered who would fill the
void left by France, especially in the colonial areas.30
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Dulles finished by stating the United States could not
intervene until an adequate study estimating world-wide
repercussions of such intervention were made.31 The meeting
ended with the Planning Board charged with drawing up
recommendations on possible United States intervention.
His mission accomplished, Ely was prepared to go home.
Curiously, however, he was asked to stay on another twentyfour hours. On March 25th, Admiral Radford proposed to
General Ely that the United States could launch tactical air
strikes to relieve Dien Bien Phu regardless of possible
Chinese reaction.

The Radford proposal--called by the

French, Operation Vulture— was for a joint Air Force and
Navy nighttime raid on the perimeter of Dien Bien Phu.
Sixty B-29 heavy bombers stationed at Clark Field in the
Philippines, escorted by 150 fighters of the United States
Seventh Fleet, could execute saturation bombing in an effort
to weaken the will of the Viet Minh.32
At the time and afterward Operation Vulture was the
object of confusion and controversy.

Although Vulture was

"originally devised by French and American officers in
Saigon, 1,33

"no record of Operation Vulture has been found

in the files examined" by the authors of the Pentagon
Papers,34

In 1965, at the Dulles Oral History Project at

Princeton University, Admiral Radford described his meeting
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with Ely.

Radford said that Ely failed to understand that

he, Radford, "had no authority to commit the United States"
and that should the United States intervene it would
internationalize the war.

It was Radford's opinion that

"Ely wanted us to come in, strike Dien Bien Phu, and break
the siege...then withdraw and leave the fighting to them."
But, said Radford, "you can't just get one foot wet and then
pull out again."35 Whether or not Ely knew that Radford was
not speaking officially, Ely at least formed the impression
that formal authority to commence Operation Vulture merely
awaited the French request.36 In any event, by Radford's
plan the United States would have some say in the planning
of military operations.

On March 26, Ely flew back to

Paris.
On March 2 9, Admiral Radford sent a memorandum to the
Smith Committee concerning his conversations with General
Ely.

Despite the crisis at Dien Bien Phu, when cohesion of

purpose dictated unity, Radford wrote that there was great
friction among the allies.

Radford wanted a direct role for

the United States MAAG in training indigenous troops, to
which he felt "the French are disposed firmly to resist."
Ely expressed similar sentiments with respect to direct
United States operations in psychological, clandestine and
guerrilla warfare.

Furthermore, Ely had mentioned to him
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eight areas of discord.

Particularly, Ely felt that

American aid was accompanied by overly zealous American
administrators.

Radford wrote that he had endeavored to

meet Ely on each point of conflict, stressing "the fact that
Americans were growing very impatient with France over its
lack of action on the EDC and German rearmament and French
tendencies to overemphasize their prestige and
sensitivities."

Radford concluded with a recommendation

that the United States be ready to intervene.

Strangely, he

did not mention Operation Vulture.37 Although, as he later
acknowledged, he had no authority to commit the United
States to such action, it seems odd that in an internal memo
he would not mention that he had put forward such an
unequivocal plan.
Although primarily concerned with the crisis at Dien
Bien Phu, the Radford memorandum highlighted another
important aspect of Franco-American relations: the proposed
European Defense Community.

If this multi-nation treaty

were passed, then it would allow for the rearmament of West
Germany.

The object of the Treaty was for Europe to be able

to meet a possible Soviet invasion on its own.
problems arose.

Three

First, France felt that she could not

financially support troops in both Europe and Indochina.
Second, France did not fear a Soviet invasion of Western
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Europe.

Third, France did fear a rearmed West Germany.

The basic problem was that France did not feel the need
for EDC while America considered it essential.

The authors

of The Pentagon Papers observe that, " [b]ecause of the high
priority given to EDC in American planning, there was a
strong reluctance to antagonize the French in Indochina,"
yet, "the French in being able to threaten to withdraw
possessed an important instrument of blackmail."38 The
United States wanted an anti-Chinese Southeast Asia and an
anti-Soviet Europe.

The result of this conflict of needs

was that France retained complete control over the situation
in Indochina, a point underscored in Radford's memorandum
concerning Ely's areas of discord.

Thus, "French leverage

over the United States was made possible by the conviction,
apparently firmly held in Washington, that the maintenance
of a non-Communist Indochina was vital to Western—
specifically American--interests."39 The French retained
control because not only did they not want EDC, but also,
and more importantly, many Frenchmen wanted to get out of
Indochina.

The United States was more determined to achieve

victory than France was.

The result was French leverage,

which, as Stanley Karnow has written, was "the polite term
for blackmail."40
One of the more elemental paradoxes of United States
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involvement in Vietnam concerns this question of leverage.
According to Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts, it was a paradox
between American goals, strengths, ends and means.

"As

American aid and involvement increased, American leverage
decreased.

The French tail could wag the American dog."

Furthermore, "as U.S. leverage shrank, so too did the chance
of inducing Paris to make the necessary reforms and
compromises in Vietnam."41 Thus, the two were inextricably
linked; as U.S. aid grew U.S. leverage shrank, making both
political and military reforms impossible.
In addition to differences over the necessity of the
EDC, the French and the Americans disagreed about the
conduct of the war.

While the French wanted complete

autonomy in Indochina, the United States wanted enough of a
say to help direct the efforts in the field, as well as to
persuade Paris to make needed reforms leading to
independence for the Associated States.

The United States

felt that reforms would create a will to fight among the
indigenous forces, as well as provide a way to remove the
taint of colonialism.

Should the United States overtly

intervene, colonialism would create a negative reaction in
American public opinion.

The American public would not

support a colonial or neo-colonial war in Asia, especially
so soon after the Korean conflict.

Perhaps Operation
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Vulture was an attempt by Admiral Radford to increase
American influence while the French, in light of Dien Bien
Phu, faced a harsh judgment at Geneva.

Vulture would lead

to the internationalization of the war and could have led to
an increased United States stake in the decision making on
the war.

In such an analysis, the prospect of relief for

Dien Bien Phu was the ransom for American dominance.

Ely's

complaint— that "Americans acted as if the United States
sought to control and operate everything of importance
becomes, then, a real complaint, and American impatience
becomes American frustration at an inability to bend France
to United States will.

In effect, Vulture may have been an

attempt to blackmail the blackmailer.

In any event, the

desideratum was to avoid a course of overt action which
would not have the support of the American public.
While Admiral Radford was pursuing Operation Vulture,
President Eisenhower instructed Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles to begin a different line of "attack" to
appeal to American public opinion.

This began on March 29,

1954, in a speech--previously scrutinized by Eisenhower—
before the Overseas Press Club.

The thrust of his speech

was to broaden possible American intervention by making it
part of a united venture:
Under the conditions of today, the imposition

163

on Southeast Asia of the political system of
Communist Russia and its Chinese Communist ally,
by whatever means, would be a grave threat to the
whole free community. The United States feels
that possibility should not be passively accepted,
but should be met by united action. This might
involve serious risks. But these risks are far
less than those that will face us a few weeks from
now, if we dare not be resolute today.42
Dulles said that Ho Chi Minh— who "was indoctrinated in
Moscow"— was being used by the Soviets in order for the
Soviets to "amalgamate," or to bring into the Soviet orbit,
the area known as Indochina.

To this end, noted Dulles,

Communist China trained and equipped Ho's nationalists— as
did Russia with munitions made by the Skoda Munitions Works
in Czechoslovakia.
Danger"

Dulles then outlined the "Scope of the

in terms of the domino theory.

purpose, he stated,

The Communists'

"is to dominate all of Southeast Asia."

Because

"[t]he area has great strategic value,...Communist

control

of Southeast Asia would carry a

grave threat to the

Philippines, Australia and New Zealand....The entire Western
Pacific area...would be strategically endangered."43 Dulles
then declared that America would meet aggression with
"united action."

Dulles said that recent American

statements were "designed to impress upon potential
aggressors that aggression might lead to action at places
and by means of free-world choosing, so that aggression
would cost more than it could gain."44
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Dulles next turned his attention to the People's
Republic of China.

He stated that the United States

recognized Communist China as the de facto government of
China, but would not favor admission of the People's
Republic to the United Nations.

Dulles hoped that the

Communist Chinese would "cease and desist" their "conquest
of Southeast Asia."

Finally, he likened the free world

resolve to thwart Communism to the situation at Dien Bien
Phu.

In both defenses the enemy "continue unceasingly to

burrow and tunnel to advance their positions against the
citadels of freedom."45
Dulles' speech was important for many reasons.

First,

it was a strategic outline of the diplomatic aim for
achieving a collective defense pact— united action— in the
Western Pacific.

Perhaps no speech was more indicative of

the Eisenhower strategy of containment, as outlined by John
Lewis Gaddis.

This policy was consistent with most post

war American formulations in that the policy-makers
"perceived themselves as responding to rather than
initiating challenges to the existing international
order."46 Gaddis called the Eisenhower-Dulles conception an
asymmetrical response or strategy.
this phrase in Dulles' own words.

He defined his use of
It was a strategy "of

applying one's own strengths against adversary weaknesses,
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rather than attempting to match the adversary in all of his
capabilities."47 Or, in other words, "to respond vigorously
at places and means of its [our] own choosing."

This meant,

"the certainty of a response with uncertainty as to its
nature."48 The bottom line of Dulles' theory of
.asymmetrical strategic

deterrence was "massive retaliation."

But, noted Gaddis, for Eisenhower "means;" such as nuclear
weapons, were subordinated to "ends," so that whatever could
be used to thwart Communism would be used.

Besides nuclear

weapons, more appropriate "means" included alliances,
psychological warfare, covert action, and negotiation.49
In his speech, Dulles warned the Chinese Communists to
desist from supplying the Viet Minh or face an American
reaction.

While leaving the nature of that reaction vague,

Dulles did say that "aggression would cost more than it
could gain."

His speech was also a call to the free-world

nations to meet future

aggression via a defense pact or

united action.

wanted freedomof action to pursue

Dulles

whatever means any change in the situation in Indochina
dictated--be it nuclear weapons in response to overt Chinese
aggression or an alliance system to protect against future
losses.

Thus, there appeared to the public to be a

contradiction of means in Dulles' comments.

This

contradiction was accented, but not explained, in the
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"heading" to the article which detailed Dulles' speech in
U.S. News and World Reports.

This heading read, in part:

Blunt notice now given to Communists that
U.S. does not intend to let Indochina be gobbled
up, even if it means big war.... Secretary of State
Dulles calls for 'united action' to meet the
threat of Communist aggression in that part of the
world.50
The result of such a dichotomy of means was, as Gaddis has
written, to "confuse the public, alarm allies, and bewilder
adversaries."51
Thus, the first meaning of Dulles' speech was a
strategic summary of the Eisenhower-Dulles asymmetrical
approach to achieve security within the context of the
containment doctrine.

The choice of response would be

determined by the choice of aggression, the importance of
the interest and the ability of that interest to withstand
aggression by itself.
The second meaning of Dulles' speech, therefore, was
that Indochina became an arena of cold war significance to
be developed in the consciousness of the American people.
The public was made aware, in no uncertain terms, that
Indochina was a region of prime interest.

The "rice-bowl"

of Asia, rich in tin, oil, rubber, and iron ore, was viewed
as a key trading partner for Japanese markets.

If Southeast

Asia "fell" economic benefit would accrue to the Communists
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and strategic geo-political danger would ensue.
would have to be taken.

A stand

One historian plausibly argues that

Dulles' speech was designed to allow a national debate on
the wisdom of intervention and that Eisenhower hoped a
consensus would form against such intervention.52 Be that
as it may, American public opinion would support
intervention in concert with allies if those allies--France
and the Associated States— requested the intervention.

In

that event, the United States also would have a legal claim,
under principles of international law, to invade the
territory of a sovereign state.
The third major significance of Dulles' speech was that
a pervasive sense of urgency was given to the Indochinese
war.

Action for the sake of action become an imperative.

At Dien Bien Phu, and in the world at large, the Communists
were ceaseless burrowers against the citadels of freedom.
And, like the types of rodents who burrow and tunnel in
efforts to weaken foundations, they must be stopped.

To

state that Communist action demanded urgent response by the
West implied that current defenses were inadequate.

Only a

United States-sponsored coalition, it seemed, could meet the
challenge.

American diplomacy during the next few weeks

would seek to create such a coalition and prevent France
from negotiating Indochina away.

Even though the speech
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might have stymied negotiation efforts, and even though
Dulles may have revealed information compromising French
intelligence sources, the speech was well received by
Frenchmen anxious to have some sort of help in Indochina.53
Doubtless, the speech encouraged the will to fight.
On March 31, at his weekly news conference, President
Eisenhower commented on his Secretary of State's speech.
Merriman Smith asked Eisenhower if he could enlarge upon
Dulles' remark that the United States was ready to take
united action in the Far East.

The President said that "the

speech must stand by itself," that he had gone "over every
word of it beforehand" with Dulles and that they were "in
complete agreement."54 Eisenhower said "that it is in
united action of all nations and peoples and countries
affected in that region that we can successfully oppose the
encroachment of Communism, and should be prepared to meet
any kind of attack that would come in there."55 Martin
Agronsky then asked about the possibility of "direct
intervention or direct use, more accurately, of American
troops."

Eisenhower replied that he could "conceive of no

greater disadvantage to America than to be employing its own
ground forces, and any other kind of forces, in great
numbers around the world, meeting each little situation as
it arises."

Eisenhower continued "what we are trying to do
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is to make our friends strong enough to take care of local
situations by themselves."56 In response to a question on
the European Defense Community, the President replied that
"I am all out for the approval of EDC and establishing it as
a factor that will insure Europe's safety."57
The significance of this news conference was, first, the
idea that the press had absorbed the concept of "united
action."

The press was worried about the engagement of

American troops in another ground war in Asia— a possibility
Eisenhower disavowed.

Second, Eisenhower not only endorsed

Dulles' policy statement, but also had approved every word.
Third, that united action was part of a broader policy
confidence in alliance systems, a fact evidenced by
Eisenhower's strong support of EDC.

Fourth, ideological

anti-Communism was complemented by a political realism which
included alliances and the "use" of indigenous ground
forces.

The Eisenhower administration was faced with a

crisis in Indochina, and joint Western involvement in tandem
with local forces was the only option made public.

If

Dulles' policy address confused the public and alarmed
allies, then Eisenhower's follow up comments might have been
aimed at reducing those fears at the same time that
adversaries were left bewildered.
Meanwhile, the top echelons of American policy making
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debated the relative merits of Operation Vulture.

On three

separate occasions— March 31, April 2, and April 3— Radford
asked the Joint Chiefs for their position on intervention.
All three times, the Chiefs opposed committing United States
personnel.58 Army Chief of Staff, General Matthew B.
Ridgway, was particularly vociferous.

In his autobiography,

Soldier, General Ridgway, wrote that he strongly disapproved
of Vulture.

Probably referring to Harold Stassen, Ridgway

wrote that he was concerned to hear of individuals stating
"that now was the time, and here, in Indo-China, was the
place to 'test the New Look,' for us to intervene."59 As a
result of such pro-interventionist sentiment, Ridgway sent
an Army team of experts to investigate the terrain.

"I felt

sure," Ridgway asserted, "that if we committed air and naval
power to that area, we would have to follow them immediately
with ground forces in support."60 Ridgway felt that in this
eventuality, America faced a problem of unsound logistics.
"The area...was practically devoid of those facilities which
modern forces such as ours find essential to the waging of
war."61 But, Ridgway stated, if the United States did go in
to Indochina, we had to go in to win and the United States
had to be prepared to sustain heavy casualties.

Ridgway

sent a report to the President, which Ridgway felt "played a
considerable, perhaps a decisive, part" in the subsequent

171

American decision.62 Although Ridgway's opposition to
intervention contributed to the subsequent American
decision, a recent study more accurately states that "his
opposition only reinforced prior decisions."63
Ridgway's report was probably the Army position paper
submitted to the NSC in the first week of April, 1954.

The

tone of this eight point argument was that "U.S.
intervention with combat forces in Indochina is not
militarily desirable."64 The report contended that ground
troops would be needed, that atomic weapons could not
influence victory and that American contingency plans would
have to account for all the possibilities which could occur
should France withdraw, China intervene or both.

Finally,

the paper declared that should the United States decide to
intervene, it would take five months to build up adequate
ground forces.65
The Department of Defense and the JCS also took a dim
view of achieving victory with United States personnel.
Their joint analysis was that victory lay with the French if
the French would only adopt the policies necessary to that
end.

They felt that France was losing the war because "(1)

lack of the will to win; (2) reluctance to.meet Indochinese
demands for true Independence; [and]

(3) refusal to train

indigenous personnel for military leadership."66 The
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Department of Defense felt that it would be foolish to
commit United States forces if these French deficiencies
were not corrected.

"The net effect of the Defense-JCS

position was to challenge the notion that a quick U.S.1
military action in Indochina would be either feasible or
necessary."67 As April opened, the Army and General Ridgway
felt Vulture to be unsound militarily for logistical
reasons, while the Department of Defense and the JCS decried
Vulture because victory seemed more likely should France
follow political policies necessary to achieve it.
American policy makers were now determined on united
action.

On April 1, 1954, Secretary of State Dulles

telegramed the American Ambassador in London, Winthrop W.
Aldrich.

Dulles told Aldrich that the United States "will

not only not be a party to but will actively oppose any
solution of any kind which directly or indirectly in [the]
near future or over [a] period of time could lead to [the]
loss [of] Indochina to Communists."68 Dulles directed
Aldrich to see British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden and
encourage British support of the American position.

Dulles

also told Aldrich to give Eden a copy of Dulles' speech
before the Overseas Press Club and to point out that part of
the address where Dulles warned against giving the Chinese
Communists what they wanted at Geneva.69
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In the meantime, Eisenhower was preparing the domestic
front for the possible implementation of Operation Vulture.
On April 1, he met with Roy Howard and Walter Stone,
chairman and editor-in-chief of Scripps Howard Newspapers,
to discuss the Indochina situation.

Eisenhower stated that

the United States might have to send squadrons from two
aircraft carriers off the Indochina coast to bomb the Viet
Minh at Dien Bien Phu.

According to Jim Hagerty, Eisenhower

stated: "Of course, if we did, we'd have to deny it
forever."

Why the President was prepared to tell

newspapermen beforehand about an operation he wanted kept
secret, is not explained.

The following day, Hagerty

recorded in his diary that Chinese Communists were supplying
the Viet Minh with trucks, ammunition, and antiaircraft
guns .70
On April 2, the Smith Committee issued a report which
favored a mutual defense system for Southeast Asia.

The

Committee felt that such a "regional and Asian mutual
defense arrangement" should be "subscribed and underwritten
by the major European powers with interests in the
Pacific."71 The State Department backed the Smith Committee
position, but added a caveat.

Fearful that Peking would

view American intervention as a prelude to attacking China,
the Department of State urged that the United States clearly
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disavow such intent.

Beyond this, the State Department

recommended that no immediate act or promise of intervention
should be taken or made.

Yet, State advised that plans for

such an eventuality should continue.

For the moment, State

recommended negotiations to set-up a regional alliance if
the results at Geneva proved unacceptable.72
While policy makers in Washington were struggling with
the crisis of intervention, the American public was kept
abreast of the situation.

In an April 2, 1954 article,

reporter Robert P. Martin accurately described the French
debacle.

Whether or not Martin knew of Operation Vulture,

he did not mention it.

Martin wrote that the war in

Indochina "can be won...without direct U.S.
intervention....But it....will require a basic change in
French attitudes."

Martin wrote, "this is a war for the

loyalty of the people, and the side that secures that
loyalty will win."

Martin noted the French dilemma, stating

that if they increased the size of indigenous forces "the
French stand to lose in Indochina much of what they have
been fighting for, a highly profitable protectorate."73
Even so, Martin felt that if the French were to become more
flexible, and changed attitudes by employing such techniques
as psychological warfare and building up the Vietnamese
National Army, then the French would be able to secure the
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loyalty of the Vietnamese people and win the war.

United

States troops did not have to be brought in because the
needed military and political means were already present in
Indochina.

Although Martin recognized that for the French

to carry out his recommendations they would lose their
profitable protectorate,

Martin failed to see that the

French stood to lose Indochina if they built up the
Vietnamese army and government or if they remained
"inflexible."

Instead, Martin blamed the French for their

dilemma and pinned the probable loss of Indochina on French
defeatists in future political negotiations.
On April 3, 1954, one of the most intriguing and
significant events of the intervention crisis occurred.
According to George Herring, because Eisenhower and Dulles
were "sensitive to Truman's fate in Korea, they were
unwilling to act without backing from Congress."
Eisenhower, therefore, "instructed Dulles to explore with
Congressional leaders the conditions under which American
military power might be approved."74 While Eisenhower spent
the day at Camp David, Dulles and four members of the
administration met eight congressional leaders.

There were

five Democrats and three Republicans.75
According to Chalmers Roberts, the primary source for
the meeting, Dulles began by asking for "a joint resolution
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by Congress to permit the President to use air and naval
power in Indo-China."76 Dulles feared being "forced back to
Hawaii" should Indochina fall, which Dulles felt was a
possibility since he "was not complimentary about the
French" handling of the war.

The day before the meeting,

Eisenhower, Dulles, Wilson and Radford had met to draft a
resolution to give the Congressional leaders.

Although not

actually presented, the resolution was designed to delineate
executive and legislative authority over the President's use
of force.77
Admiral Radford, speaking after Dulles, explained to the
Congressmen why stepped-up Chinese aid to the Viet Minh
required a response from the United States.78 Radford
outlined his plan for Operation Vulture, which he said would
only occur after a resolution was passed by Congress.

The

revised plan called for two hundred planes from the United
States naval carriers Essex and Boxer, presently on
"training" maneuvers in the South China Sea, to be escorted
by Air Force fighters from Clark Field, in the Philippines,
for the purpose of carrying out a single strike on the
perimeter of Dien Bien Phu.79 The Congressional leaders did
not like the plan because they were "not inclined to let the
Executive embark on a course of action that could lead the
United States into another conflict of the Korean type."80
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After their presentations, Dulles and Radford fielded
some questions, three of which were particularly poignant.
First, one of the Congressional leaders asked about the use
of land forces.

Because "Radford did not give a definite

answer" to this question, the members of Congress grew
suspicious.81 Second, Earle Clements (D-Ky and Minority
Whip) then asked Radford: "Does this plan have the approval
of the other Joint Chiefs of Staff?"

"No," replied Radford,

no one else agreed.82 Third, fearing another "Korea,"
Lyndon Johnson (D-Tex and Minority Leader) then asked if
other nations had been consulted.

Dulles answered that no

one else had been approached, pointing out that the United
Nations procedure would take too long to be of help.

To

make Vulture sound more palatable, Dulles waved off a
possible Chinese or Soviet reaction.83 The leaders "were
agreed that Dulles had better first go shopping for
allies."84 The "meeting had lasted two hours and ten
minutes.

As they left, the Hill delegation told waiting

reporters they had been briefed on Indo-China.

Nothing

more."85
According to The Pentagon Papers, the Congressional
leaders would not support Vulture for three reasons.

In

addition to the need for allies, the Congressmen wanted
France to remain in Indochina and to declare "an interest to
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accelerate independence for the Associated States."86 Once
these prerequisites were met, the Congressmen might have
been amenable to granting Eisenhower a resolution.

The

Pentagon Papers also stated that the Essex and Boxer carried
nuclear weapons, but that their use was not seriously
considered except as a possible counter-attack against
Chinese targets should China enter Indochina with large
numbers of troops.87 The net result was that Vulture was
temporarily blocked.

A subsequent State Department Summary

stated:
It was the sense of the meeting that the U.S.
should not intervene alone but should attempt to
secure the cooperation of other free nations
concerned in Southeast Asia, and that if such
cooperation could be assured, it was probable that
the U.S. Congress would authorize U.S.
participation in such "United Action."88
As Devillers has observed, Vulture may have been blocked but
the Congressional leaders "had provided themselves with a
foreign alibi that later enabled them to point to Great
Britain as the scapegoat."89
The following evening, Sunday April 4, Eisenhower met
Dulles and Radford in the President's study in the White
House.

Eisenhower concurred with the three preconditions of

Congressional approval, namely that there must be a
coalition, France must accelerate independence— to remove
the taint of colonialism— and France must not withdraw
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should the United States intervene.90 According to Townsend
Hoopes, Eisenhower had "reasserted Presidential command."91
Further, Hoopes felt that for Eisenhower to accept these
preconditions, it reflected "[t]he solid common sense of a
President with a feeling in his bones that military
adventures ought not to be undertaken without allies, and
that decisions involving war and peace must have explicit
Congressional participation and support."92 Dulles'
operational groundrules were "to be a coalition 'with active
British Commonwealth participation'; a 'full political
understanding with France and other countries,' and
Congressional approval."93
United Action had replaced Operation Vulture as the
basis of American diplomacy.

The evening of April 4,

Eisenhower dispatched a cable to Winston Churchill in order
to arrange a collective security defense system for
Indochina.

Eisenhower stated that "there is no negotiated

solution of the Indochina problem which in its essence would
not be either a face-saving device to cover a French
surrender or a face-saving device to cover a Communist
retirement."

Drawing from their prior experience together,

Eisenhower stated "we failed to halt Hirohito, Mussolini and
Hitler by not acting in unity and in time....May it not be
that our nations have learned something from that lesson?"94
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Eisenhower's letter was just the first attempt by America to
gain British support.

According to Townsend Hoopes,

Eisenhower's letter clearly showed that the United States
was strongly opposed to "any serious search for a settlement
at the forthcoming Geneva conference."95
Meanwhile, in Indochina, the men responsible for
implementing Operation Vulture prepared as though the
diplomats would approve the mission.

On April 1, Lieutenant

General Earle E. "Pat" Partridge arrived in Saigon to
discuss the situation.

Accompanying Partridge was Brigadier

General Joseph D. Caldara who was chief of the FEAF Bomber
Command, and who would fly and command the "Vulture"
mission.96 Appalled by the lack of French preparedness and
equipment, Caldara decided to judge the target from the sky.
On the night of April 4th, Caldara flew a B-17 with an
American crew over Dien Bien Phu.97 In the valley below,
the Viet Minh had taken five strongholds protecting the
eastern side of the fortress and a major position to the
west.
The view from Paris was equally grim.

The situation at

Dien Bien Phu had grown so desperate that Prime Minister
Bidault made an unusual request to Ambassador Dillon.
Dillon had been called to an emergency meeting of the French
Cabinet on the evening of Sunday April 4th, at 11:00 p.m.
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With President Laniel present, Bidault informed Dillon that
"immediate armed intervention of U.S. carrier aircraft at
Dien Bien Phu is now necessary to save the situation."98
Bidault stated that the French request was based on Admiral
Radford's personal assurances of United States support.
Bidault continued, "the fate of Southeast Asia now rested on
Dien Bien Phu" and that "Geneva would be won or lost
depending on the outcome" of the siege.99 Less than two
days after United Action had become the primary aim of
American diplomacy, Bidault had called upon the United
States to intervene unilaterally.

Immediately after his

meeting with Bidault, Dillon cabled Dulles with the request.
The morning of April 5, Dulles called Eisenhower informing
him that the French based their request on Admiral Radford's
proposal which included the possibility of nuclear
weapons.100 Eisenhower told Dulles to inform the French that
they must have misunderstood Radford.101 Dulles instructed
the Ambassador to inform the French that unilateral
intervention would not be possible.102
That day the NSC issued a report which discussed United
States military•intervention in Indochina.

This report--

entitled NSC Planning Board Report on NSC Action No. 1074a--considered three alternatives of United States
involvement.

These three were action: 1) "in concert with

182

the French;" 2) "in concert with the French and others in a
regional grouping;"3) "in concert with others or alone in
the event of a French withdrawal."103 The report
acknowledged that many people throughout the world viewed
the conflict "as essentially colonial or imperialist in
character" and recommended that "it would be most important
to attempt to counteract or modify" that view.104

The report

suggested that if the United States decided to intervene,
the United States should obtain Congressional approval,
continue military preparations, disavow possible settlement
until greater Communist concessions appeared plausible,
explore possible regional groupings, and determine the
independence issue of the Associated States, and "prepare
them to invite U.S." participation.105 The report also
stated that under the third option, nuclear weapons would
probably be available, that 275,000 United States personnel
might be necessary, that the United States budget would have
to be re-examined, and that "once U.S. forces and prestige
have been committed, disengagement will not be possible
short of victory."106 The report noted that nuclear weapons
would be used only after consultation with allies and if
collective security were seriously threatened.107
While the NSC was outlining the scenarios of
intervention, the President's Special Committee urged
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political and diplomatic pressure be brought against France
to keep her in the war.

In Draft Report By The President's

Special Committee; Southeast Asia- Part II, dated April 5,
the Committee reaffirmed a position taken in NSC 5405 and
Part I of the Special Committee Report, namely that "it be
U.S. policy to accept nothing short of a military victory in
Indo-China."108 The Smith Committee recommended against a
negotiated settlement if the French did not support the
United States position.

In that event, the Smith Committee

recommended direct overtures to the Associated States.
Whether France supported the United States position or not,
the report recommended action in concert with other nations.
In order to facilitate this program, the United States
should conclude economic and cultural treaties with the
Associated States which could eventually culminate in mutual
defense arrangements.

The report, noting the inability of

Western influence to stop the spread of Communism, listed a
variety of measures which could be taken in Indochina.

"The

U.S. should, largely through covert means, take steps "to
promote ... indigenous anti-Communist leaders ....[and to]
exploit opportunities to strengthen western-oriented anti
communist political parties."
On the evening of April 5, President Eisenhower gave a
radio and television address to the American people.

His
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main point was that there were many reasons why the Russians
would not start a war.

"None is greater," Eisenhower said,

"than the retaliation that will certainly be visited upon
them if they would attack any of our, or any part of our
vital interests, aggressively and in order to conquer us."109
In effect, Eisenhower was trying to reduce any fear of war
that Americans might have had, as well as to justify
retaliation should Russia attack a "vital interest" such as
Indochina.

Eisenhower excused the morality of American

retaliation by saying "...it is up to us to lead this world
to a peaceful and secure existence."110
Diplomatic activities continued apace.

On April 5th,

while Ambassador Dillon was giving Bidault America's
rejection of Operation Vulture, Dulles was talking to a
House Foreign Affairs sub-Committee on foreign aid stressing
the idea of peace through strength and United Action.111 The
following day, Dulles indicated to the Ambassadors of
Australia and New Zealand that he anticipated those
countries would pledge to contribute troops as part of
United Action in Indochina.112

In Paris, at a closed session

of the Council of Ministers, Dulles' proposal of United
Action was rejected.

The ostensible reason for the

rejection was that "French opinion tended to regard the
American plan as liable to reduce the chances of an
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acceptable compromise in Geneva."113 The United States had
refused Vulture, and now the French had refused the
multinational solution of United Action in order to retain
freedom of decision-making in Indochina.
the French rebuff on April 8th.

Dulles received

The day before, he had

received a similar reply from Britain, although Churchill
had expressed a desire to talk with Dulles in London on
April 12th.

Eisenhower, therefore, decided to send his

Secretary of State to London and Paris in order to organize
a regional grouping before Geneva.114
At the April 6 NSC meeting, Eisenhower stated that the
passage of any Congressional resolution on regional
arrangements must await prior agreement with allies.
Reiterating his familiar position on intervention,
Eisenhower stated that unilateral intervention was out of
the question and that the Vietnamese would have to invite
American intervention.

Otherwise, Eisenhower declared, the

United States would appear as a colonial successor to French
interests.115 Eisenhower also felt that the safety of
Indochina did not depend on the success of Dien Bien Phu and
that the loss of Indochina did not necessitate the loss of
the whole of Southeast Asia in light of a Southeast Asian
political organization for defense.

Dulles supported the

President, stating that if the United States could organize
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a regional grouping prior to the Geneva Conference, the
Communists might back down.

Dulles then recounted the three

preconditions of Congressional approval.116 Secretary of the
Treasury, George Humphrey, voiced concern that a regional
grouping might induce the United States to try to police
situations in every part of the globe;

Eisenhower replied

that "we cannot afford to let Moscow gain another bit of
territory.... we are not prepared now to take action with
respect to Dien Bien Phu in and by itself, but the coalition
program for Southeast Asia must go forward."

Eisenhower

added that "[tjhis grouping would give us the needed popular
support of domestic opinion and allied governments, and we
might thereafter not be required to contemplate a unilateral
American intervention in Indochina.117 The desideratum was
to organize a regional grouping to avoid having to follow a
unilateral course.

In response to Vice-President Nixon's

concerns, Dulles stated that such a grouping would relieve
internal subversion as well as external aggression posed by
Communist expansion.

Dulles stated further that such a

grouping would cause colonial powers to re-examine their
colonial policies in light of the fact that "peoples of the
colonial states would never agree to fight Communism unless
they were assured of their freedom."118
The meeting ended without action on the use of American
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forces in Indochina, although Eisenhower clearly favored
containment of Communism via united action and not
unilateral American action.

Concerning efforts to pursue

united action, the consensus was that prior to Geneva the
United States should organize a regional anti-Communist
grouping and elicit British support for American Far East
policies, and the United States should continue to press the
French to accelerate independence for the Associated States.
Those present also agreed to ask Congress to approve sending
additional technicians and possibly aircraft to Indochina.119
Eisenhower understood that a military action demanded
domestic, allied and local support.
At a news conference on April 7th, President Eisenhower
outlined one of the basic assumptions that guided American
policy makers during the thirty year history of American
participation in Indochina.

Though prevalent for many

years, no one had stated the assumption as cogently as
Eisenhower did on this day.

This basic belief would soon

become known as the "domino theory."

Robert Richards of the

Copley Press had asked Eisenhower for a clarification of the
strategic importance of Indochina.

After noting the dangers

of losing a sizable population and valuable resources to
Communism, Eisenhower observed:
Finally, you have broader considerations that
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might follow what you would call the "falling
domino" principle. You have a row of dominoes set
up, you knock over the first one, and what will
happen to the last one is the certainty that it
will go over very quickly;...[Specifically the
President noted] the loss of Indochina, of Burma,
of Thailand, of the Peninsula, and Indonesia
following.
...[I]t takes away, in its economic
aspects,that region that Japan must have as a
trading area or Japan, in turn, will have only one
place in the world to go— that is toward the
Communist areas in order to live.120

Basic to an understanding of the "domino theory" is that
it was used by Eisenhower as a psychological device to
equate post-war Communist expansion to pre-war fascist
expansion.

In his letter to Churchill, Eisenhower had

asked: "May it not be that our nations have learned
something from that lesson" of failing to halt Hirohito,
Mussolini, and Hitler in time?

Now Eisenhower had set-up a

row of dominoes— Indochina, Burma, Thailand, the Malaysian
Peninsula, Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand— identical
to the path of fascist conquest perpetrated by Japan during
the thirties.

For Daniel Yergin, "'Appeasement' was being

translated into what later would be called the domino
theory."121 Eisenhower was letting the American public know
that he was not ready to appease Communist expansion under
any circumstances.

Instead, he would contain Communism, and

United Action was at the core of that policy.
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While United Action was inherently offensive in
character— albeit as a counter measure— Japanese
considerations were the "defensive component" of United
States policy in Asia.

Japan was the strongest link in the

defensive island chain.

One of Eisenhower's chief concerns

was to prevent the loss of Japan to Communist expansion.
The loss of Southeast Asia was equated with the loss of
Japan, for if the former were overthrown then the latter
would "have only one place in the world to go"— the
Communist areas.

In that event, the United States would

lose a valuable geo-political ally as well as a defensive
buffer to American overseas interests.

The defensive island

chain was only as strong as the weakest link— Indochina.
In an article written for Volume V of the Gravel edition
of The Pentagon Papers, John Dower has noted the sratetegic
and political significance of Japan.

"Japan's role vis-a-

vis China, clear since 1950, has been to contain it
militarily, isolate it economically and enable other less
developed countries to do likewise."122 The fear was that
should the United States fail to contain Communism in
Southeast Asia, "Japan would move into the Communist
camp."123 For this reason, Dower has called Japan the
"Superdomino."
Besides delineating the "domino theory," Eisenhower
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answered other questions concerning United States foreign
policy at his April 7th news conference.

Eisenhower stated

his concern for the independence of the Associated States.
"No outside country can come in and be really helpful unless
it is doing something that the local people want....the
aspirations of those people must be met, otherwise there is
in the long run no final answer to the problem."124
Concerning allies, Eisenhower said "We must have a concert
of opinion, and a concert of readiness to react in whatever
way is necessary."125 When asked if he approved of Dulles'
"scare-tactics," Eisenhower replied: "[s]o far as I know,
Secretary Dulles has never made an important pronouncement
without not only conferring and clearing with me, but
sitting down and studying practically word by word what he
is to say."12e When asked if the United States had
approached "other free nations to join in a joint
declaration warning Communist China against any aggression
in Southeast Asia?"

Eisenhower replied: "No," saying that

to do so would be to propose an answer before the study of
the question.127 On the chances of reaching a negotiated
solution at Geneva, Eisenhower answered: "No, not one that
the free world would consider adequate to the situation."128
To another question, Eisenhower replied that no action would
ensue unless agreed to on a "bipartisan basis."129 When
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asked if the United States would go it alone in Indochina,
Eisenhower answered: "I am not saying what we are prepared
to do because there is a Congress, and there are a number of
our friends all over this world that are vitally engaged."
The President said that to say anything more "stultifies
negotiation."130
The answers to these questions were indicative of
Eisenhower's foreign policy at this time.

The President

expressed a genuine interest to help all Vietnamese people.
He considered Congressional and free world approval as a
sine qua non to any overt American action.

He maintained

control over foreign policy as evidenced by his screening of
Dulles' every word.
declaration.

He disavowed a desire for a joint

And, finally, while he held no hope for

Geneva, he did not wish to hamper current diplomatic
activity.

By April 7th, America had come very close to engaging
forces in Viet Nam, and preparations for war were actively
going on.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—

Admiral Arthur W. Radford— had volunteered to his French
counterpart, the use of American naval bombers escorted by
American Air Force fighters, to raid the Viet Minh positions
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surrounding the beleaguered French garrison at Dien Bien
Phu.

Radford's plan was put forth as an informal offer and

not as official United States policy.

By the time the

French had decided to accept Admiral Radford's proposal,
however, the United States was unwilling to carry it out.
President Eisenhower had deemed it necessary to ask for
bipartisan Congressional support and to obtain British
endorsement.

Through it all, American policy was based on

an anti-Communist ideology as well as practical issues of
economics and geopolitics.

The former dictated an effort to

stop Communism, while the latter designated Indochina as the
place of battle.
Operation Vulture was dead for the moment; replaced by
United Action.

Eisenhower left it up to Secretary of State

John Foster Dulles to secure the requisite support for
United Action from London and Paris.
England on April 11, 1954.

Dulles' plane left for
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Chapter Five
Peace Through Strength:
French Indochina and United States Foreign Policy,
April 10, 1954-May 1954

On April 11, 1954, John Foster Dulles flew to London to
persuade Britain to join united action.

In a White House

press release issued that day, Dulles stated that his was "a
mission of peace through strength."1
The British told Dulles that they favored a coalition
aimed at securing Southeast Asia, but that such a coalition
would have to await an outcome at Geneva.2 The British did
not want to give the impression that certain options were
foreclosed prior to Geneva, and were wary of signing on to a
possibly open-ended future commitment that might lead to war
with China and the Soviet Union and where atomic weapons
might be used.3 Instead, they proposed the formation of a
"working group" to study the possibility of an Asian NATO.4
While Dulles liked the idea of collective security, he was
thinking more along the lines of an ad hoc coalition to act
immediately, but which later could develop into a Southeast
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Asian defense organization.5
British reluctance to entertain immediate action
reflected their distrust as to "the true import of united
action."6 Mainly, the British feared a wider war.

Beyond

this, Eden did not see the need for prompt action as he felt
the French were strong enough to prevent a complete takeover
of Indochina even if they surrendered at Dien Bien Phu.

As

Ambassador Aldrich had previously wired Dulles, Eden felt
the "French cannot lose the war between now and the coming
of the rainy season however badly they may conduct it."7
The British also did not believe in the domino theory.

The

British, however, did agree to a joint communique with the
United States that expressed a wish to examine collective
security arrangements for the defense of Southeast Asia and
the Western Pacific, within the framework of the principles
of the United Nations Charter.8
On April 13, 1954, Dulles flew on to Paris.

Laniel

related that many Frenchmen wanted to get out of Indochina
at any cost.9 In the diplomacy over the next two days,
Dulles failed to understand that the French just wanted a
simple military victory at Dien Bien Phu and not a wider and
longer war.

His ignorance may have led him to follow the

strange course of attacking French handling of the
independence issue.

On the morning of April 14, at the Quai
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d'Orsay, Dulles told Bidault that the Associated States
should have their independence.

Perhaps Dulles believed the

French desperately wanted American aid, and in their
desperation would accede to stringent United States
conditions such as granting more substantial independence.
Perhaps, too, he already assumed French willingness to keep
on fighting.

In any event, Bidault questioned Dulles'

assumption that independence was a key to Vietnamese
courage.

Bidault stated that France would consider

collective security if Geneva failed, but as of then, it was
a French war.

Bidault wanted to give Geneva a chance.10

Dulles mentioned that the French position on sovereignty
for the Associated States appeared as but a disguise to
perpetuate French control of Indochina.

Dulles suggested

that the French should develop some scheme to grant full
independence and even mentioned the possibility of giving
the Associated States an opportunity to opt out of the
French Union.

Bidault replied that the French public would

not support the war effort in Indochina if the French Union
were put in doubt.11 Dulles concluded that Eisenhower was
prepared to go to Congress for powers to participate in a
united effort in Indochina provided the French grant two
prerequisites.

These were a "real" sense of united action

and that such action "was to preserve real independence for
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the states in the area," and not a veiled endeavor to
perpetuate colonialism.12 Following their discussion,
Dulles, Laniel, and Bidault issued a statement similar to
the British communique.13
Upon his return to the United States on April 15, Dulles
spoke at Syracuse University.

He stated that he was

satisfied with the results of his trip.

Noting that unity

of purpose rested on a full understanding of interested
nations, Dulles felt confident that his trip helped to
create that understanding.

At stake, Dulles stated, was the

potential loss of people, resources and strategic position
to the Chinese Communists should Southeast Asia fall.14
Dulles' satisfaction and confidence would not last.
On April 16, at a meeting of the American Society of
Newspaper Editors, Vice President Nixon said that the United
States might have to send troops into Indochina should the
French withdraw.

Although Nixon spoke off the record, the

New York Times printed the statement on April 17.

The

announcement was met with grave Congressional concern as
Nixon mentioned neither Congressional nor allied support as
prerequisites to armed intervention.

A State Department

Press Officer read a statement that day to the effect that
Nixon's remarks were in response to the hypothetical case of
French withdrawal.

Such an event, the Department spokesman
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related, was "highly unlikely."

A truer statement of United

States policy, the official stated, was set forth by the
Secretary of State on March 29.15 While Nixon was upset
about the furor his statement created, Eisenhower and Dulles
told him not to worry because now the nation was awakened to
the situation.16 Furthermore, his announcement had the
beneficial effect of keeping the Communists guessing as to
American intentions.17
Just after his return from Europe, Dulles had extended
invitations to several nations to study collective defense
in Southeast Asia in a meeting scheduled to begin on April
20.

On April 18, Roger Makins, the British Ambassador in

Washington, reported the decision of his government not to
attend.

Dulles was furious with the British for reneging on

the Communique of the previous week.

His anger lasted until

Eden told him in Paris on April 22, that Asian countries,
including the former Commonwealth countries India and Burma,
were meeting at Columbo on similar issues on April 26.18
Eden's stated concern was that those nations meeting at
Columbo who were not invited to Washington would believe
that they also were not invited to the security arrangement.
In which event, Eden feared harmful effects of bad publicity
at Geneva.19 Dulles was convinced, however, that the
British were worried about sending a negative impression to
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India.20 Additionally, Vice President Nixon's remarks had
given the British cause for worry that attendance would lend
British support to a military intervention.21 Thus, on
April 18, Dulles hastily got the British Ambassador to agree
to attend a meeting of twenty Ambassadors to discuss the
upcoming Geneva Conference in general terms.

Nonetheless,

the British effectively had put an end to Dulles' concept of
united action.22
On April 19, Eisenhower and Dulles met to discuss a
Department of Justice report detailing the President's warmaking powers, drawn up specifically to address the
Indochina situation.

Eisenhower felt it unwise to ventilate

the problem before Congress and the American people in light
of the Bricker amendment brouhaha.23 Eisenhower did state
that he would take the responsibility of any action.

Later

that day, Dulles spoke to the press at Augusta, Georgia.
Dulles stated that the Communists were recklessly
squandering the lives of their soldiers at Dien Bien Phu in
order to confront the Geneva Conference with a military and
political victory for Communism.

Dulles stated that the

gallant defense of Dien Bien Phu was serving to draw the
free world "closer together in unity of purpose" rather than
succumbing to violent intimidation.

Noting the creation of

NATO following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Dulles
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observed the series of Pacific mutual security pacts that
followed the Chinese invasion of Korea.

Once again Dulles

urged collective defense to meet the menace of Soviet
Communism and stated the "unity of purpose" of the West
prior to Geneva.24 Dien Bien Phu appeared lost, but the
United States had not given up hope to minimize the
Communist victory.

Dulles then flew to Paris for a pre-

Geneva NATO meeting.
In Paris, Dulles confronted harried French requests for
American assistance, as well as renewed French efforts at
blackmail.

On April 22, Dulles, Radford and Ambassador

Dillon met with Bidault and General Ely.

Bidault told

Dulles that United States military intervention at Dien Bien
Phu was necessary to save the garrison, and that if Dien
Bien Phu fell the French would not only not support united
action, but would leave Indochina altogether.

Dulles cabled

the renewed request for American aid to Eisenhower.
Eisenhower replied, without mentioning the request, that
Dulles should apprise the British of the seriousness of the
situation.

Empathizing with Dulles' frustration with

France's vacillating position on American military
intervention, Eisenhower felt the British should understand
the importance of the fall of Dien Bien Phu.25
Dulles then met with Eden and Bidault to discuss the
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relationship of united action and the Geneva conference
scheduled to begin in four days.

Attempting some blackmail

of his own, in the guise of moral suasion, Dulles stated
that the Soviets would be a bit more conciliatory if they
knew that the West had joined in a common defense system as
envisioned by united action.

A problem with Dulles'

attitude, however, was that it implied that the French had
bungled things in Indochina.26

Somewhat conciliatorily,

Eden told Dulles that Britain might entertain discussions
concerning efforts to bolster Thailand should Dien Bien Phu
fall.27
The next day, Dulles received a message from Bidault
during the middle of an afternoon NATO meeting presided over
by Bidault.

To Dulles, the French Foreign Minister, who had

just received a copy of a message from General Navarre, gave
"the impression of a man close to the breaking point."
General Navarre had cabled Laniel stating that Operation
Vulture was the only practical solution other than a cease
fire of saving Dien Bien Phu and Indochina.

At Dien Bien

Phu Giap's forces had just taken two strongholds to the west
of the French command post.

Their loss reduced the size of

the camp and the drop zone to two kilometers on each side.
French reinforcements and supplies would fall into Viet Minh
hands in greater quantities now as the Viet Minh controlled
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over ninety percent of the airfield.28 After reading the
message, Dulles told Bidault that Operation Vulture was
probably out of the question.

Dulles then cabled Eisenhower

who confirmed Dulles' suspicions.

Once again, Eisenhower

had decided not to intervene.29 Two hours later, at 10
p.m., Dulles sent another cable to Washington.

Dulles

observed that " [t]he situation here is tragic.

France is

almost visibly collapsing under our eyes....It seems to me
that Dien Bien Phu has become a symbol out of all proportion
to its military importance."30
That evening, the French Foreign Office hosted an
official dinner at the Quai d'Orsay for the NATO powers.
During a conversation with Eden and NATO Supreme Commander
Alfred Gruenther, Dulles informed Eden of France's request
to proceed with Operation Vulture.

Eden told Dulles that he

was against an air strike as far as Dien Bien Phu was
concerned, because he was wary of precipitating World War
III.

Dulles tried to persuade Eden by telling him that the

collapse of France in Indochina would signal the collapse of
France as a world power.

Dulles also stated that if Britain

went along with Operation Vulture, Eisenhower was prepared
to ask Congress for authority to intervene.

Not persuaded,

Eden asked Dulles to inform the British should the United
States decide to intervene militarily.

Dulles agreed.31

In
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the meantime, the French sought to keep Vulture alive.

That

evening, Bidault told Dilion that if the United States went
ahead with Operation Vulture, the French would feel honor
bound to continue fighting.

Otherwise, defeatism would take

over France, leading to the possible election of a leftist
government.32
On April 24, Dulles met with Eden orice more.

This time

Dulles was accompanied by Admiral Radford who had just flown
in from Washington.

Dulles suggested that the British and

the Americans join in collective action to support France,
but ruled Operation Vulture out of the question.

Radford

stated that an air strike at that juncture was of little
value, but an announced intent of collective defense would
bolster French morale and possibly keep the Laniel
government in power.

Eden replied that such an announcement

would be politically "hell at home."33
Later that afternoon, Dulles and Eden met with Bidault.
Bidault requested American and British support, but did not
say whether France would withdraw should Dien Bien Phu
collapse.

Bidault told Dulles he could not guarantee what

France would do, for while both he and Laniel wished to stay
in the fight, the psychological reaction in France would be
severe.

Bidault told Dulles that Dien Bien Phu had been a

mistake, that the French had placed troops there for the
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political reason of protecting Laos, but that it is always a
mistake to make military plans based on political
considerations.

Bidault stated that the French Cabinet, in

a morning session, had given him instructions for the Geneva
Conference.

Bidault said that he was not bogged down with

crippling instructions, but, rather, he could go to Geneva
with free hands.34

In Washington that day, Hagerty recorded

in his diary that Eisenhower had put the White House "Staff
on an hour's call to return to Washington because of
Indochina.1,35
After leaving Bidault, Dulles then met with Laniel.
Laniel too was worried about the "psychological blow" should
Dien Bien Phu fall.

In Indochina, Laniel felt that

indigenous troops would desert the French cause.

At home,

Laniel felt the loss of Dien Bien Phu would lead to the
overthrow of his government and strengthen the position of
those Frenchmen desirous of ending the war at any cost.
Dulles informed Laniel that United States military action
would require Congressional approval.

Dulles told Laniel

that if Britain would join a collective arrangement and if
the Indochinese were granted complete independence, the
resulting alliance might send troops to Indochina in the
coming weeks.36
That evening, General Ely openly requested the
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commencement of Operation Vulture from Admiral Radford.
Realizing American intervention would have no bearing on the
situation at Dien Bien Phu, Ely stressed the importance it
would have on opinion both in France and Indochina.

Because

Operation Vulture had undergone various interpretations
since Radford suggested it to Ely a month earlier, Radford
reported to the State Department that he did not know to
which interpretation Ely referred.37
While Ely talked with Radford, Eden flew to London on
the evening of April 24, to consult with Churchill
concerning intervention in Indochina.

Denis Allen, Under

Secretary for Foreign Affairs, informed Eden that if Dulles
pressed for American intervention Bidault probably would
advise Laniel to reject the offer.

When Eden discussed the

matter with Churchill, Churchill felt it would be a mistake
to join the United States in intervention.

Churchill agreed

with Eden that intervention would be ineffective and might
lead to world war.

Eden later wrote that "Sir Winston

summed up the position by saying that what we were being
asked to do was to assist in misleading Congress into
approving a military operation, which would in itself be
ineffective, and might well bring the world to the verge of
a major war."38 Eden and Churchill then agreed that a
partition of Indochina might prove the best solution, but
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that Britain could join a collective defense arrangement to
support a settlement reached at Geneva.

The British Cabinet

endorsed the Eden-Churchill plan the next day.39
That night, at 10:15 p.m., Dulles met Eden when the
latter flew into Geneva.

Eden stated that intervention

would prove ineffective.40 Eden then told Dulles that on
his way through Paris to pick up his wife he ran into
Bidault at Orly airport. Eden related that he had informed
Bidault that Britain would support the French in Geneva as
far as reaching a satisfactory settlement on Indochina, and
that Britain would be willing to join with the United States
in guaranteeing that settlement.

Failing a satisfactory

settlement, Eden told Bidault that Britain was prepared to
examine the situation more thoroughly.

Dulles told Eden

that Britain should take a stronger stand.

Dulles noted

that the French needed some form of hope or they would
withdraw from Indochina should Dien Bien Phu fall.

Eden

answered that Britain was opposed to any direct involvement
in Indochina, let alone air intervention at Dien Bien Phu.
Dulles rejoined that there was little comfort for the French
in the British estimate of the situation.41
That evening, Dulles cabled Washington.

He stated that

intervention in his opinion was unwarranted, and that the
security of the United States was not directly threatened.
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Further, he stated that in the event of a new government in
France, the French may decide to leave Indochina regardless
of United States intervention.

He stressed that action

without British support was not feasible, and that
intervention would remove any leverage the United States
presently had over the French.42 Dulles' denial of a threat
to United States security given the Indochina situation,
lends credence to the view that his dire forecast of March
29, was aimed at its domestic psychological effect.
On April 2 6, the Geneva Conference opened as scheduled.
In Washington, Eisenhower met with Republican congressional
leaders.

Eisenhower reported that the French "are weary as

hell," and that Dien Bien Phu might fall within the week.
The President stated that "[t]he French go up and down every
day— they are very volatile.

They think they are a great

power one day and they feel sorry for themselves the next
day."

Eisenhower further stated that if the United States

put one combat soldier into Indochina, then our entire
prestige would be at stake throughout the world.

He felt

that American troops would not be needed in Indochina unless
our allies go back on us.43 Eisenhower believed that
unilateral intervention would be a "tragic error."44 He
felt that because indigenous forces could fight for
themselves, the United States could be left to supply air
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and naval support as well as training for the indigenous
forces.

Eisenhower felt the United States must continue to

press for collective security and show the Communists that
the United States would not stand for any more chipping away
of the free world.

Eisenhower stated tliat collective

defense was hindered by British reluctance to move in
Indochina, for fear of Chinese retaliation in Hong Kong.45

At this juncture, the President considered domestic
reaction.

After meeting with the Republican congressmen,

Eisenhower asked Hagerty to prime a reporter to ask a
question about Geneva at his next news conference.

In his

answer, Eisenhower would attempt to de-emphasize the
Indochina situation stating "that all is not lost if Dien
Bien Phu falls, which probably it will within a week."46 At
a Cabinet meeting that day, the President discussed the
domestic impact of that eventuality.

Aware that his

popularity had soared after he extricated America from the
Korean War, Eisenhower expressed the fear that the Democrats
would accuse him of losing Vietnam, just as Republicans
previously had accused Truman of losing China.47
On the afternoon of April 26, Under Secretary of State
Bedell Smith held a meeting at the State Department for
members of the Far East Subcommittees of the Senate Foreign
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Relations and the House Foreign Affairs Committees.

Smith

talked about possible use of air and naval forces in
Indochina following a declaration of common interest with or
without the British.
bolster French morale.

Smith felt the key ingredient was to
To this end, he thought the United

States should at least threaten to intervene without British
support.

Such a threat would also have the effect of

creating uncertainty as to United States intentions.48
That afternoon, Dulles, Eden and Bidault met at Bidault's
villa.

During the conversation, Dulles formed the

impression that the British were pressing the French to
accept any kind of settlement because the British were
fearful that United States policy was leading the allies
into a major war with the Chinese.

To counter this

perceived British maneuver, Dulles suggested to Bidault that
a cease-fire might encourage the Vietnamese to rise up
against the French and massacre them.49 Perhaps, Dulles was
attempting vainly to gain British support through French
fears.
Sometime that day, President Eisenhower summarized his
views in a letter to General Alfred M. Gruenther (Commander
in Chief, U.S. European Command, and Supreme Allied
Commander, Europe). Eisenhower stated that for over three
years he had tried to convince the French that they could
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not win in Indochina, or receive American support unless
they unequivocally pledged to grant independence to the
Associated States upon attainment of military victory.
Beyond this, Eisenhower had argued that ho Western nation
could use military force in Asia "except as one of a concert
of powers, which concert must include local Asiatic
peoples."

For Eisenhower; "[t]o contemplate anything else

is to lay ourselves open to the charge of imperialism and
colonialism— at the very least— of objectionable
paternalism."

For this reason, Eisenhower believed that

even if an air strike could save Dien Bien Phu, the
conditions imposed by the French would render that effort a
pyrrhic victory.

Eisenhower opined that "[ejver since 1945

France has been unable to decide whether she most fears
Russia or Germany.

As a consequence, "France was unwilling

to make the sacrifices needed to reinstate- her as a great
world power.

Particularly, the French needed to recognize

that failure to coordinate plans with allies reflected
foolish false pride.

Eisenhower believed that France's

problem, then, was one of spirit.

They needed a new

inspirational leader who possessed the "capability of
reversing the trend toward pessimism, defeatism and
dejection."50
Despite his discouragement, Eisenhower assessed the
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situation as follows.

Principally, he believed that the

fall of Dien Bien Phu would not necessarily lead to the loss
of Indochina.

The solution was for all interested Western

nations to unite and stop "the Communist advances in
Southeast Asia."

In that union, each nation could provide

its quickest most useful asset.

France could provide the

ground forces while the United States could foot the bill.
Other European powers with troops in the area and local
Asiatic powers could provide additional ground forces.

The

plan envisioned that this concert of nations "should assure
freedom of political action to Indo-China promptly upon
attainment of victory."

Finally, Eisenhower believed that

if the goals and peaceful purposes of the plan were publicly
announced, "as in NATO," then the United States might not
have to fight.51
On April 27, Radford sent Secretary of Defense Wilson a
report stating that Operation Vulture could not save Dien
Bien Phu and could serve to involve the United States
militarily in Indochina.

Ironically, Eisenhower reported in

his diary that " [t]he situation at Dien Bien Phu has looked
a bit brighter than it has for the last ten days."52
Eisenhower then noted the latest reports from Dulles which
stated the British position at Geneva.

Apparently, the

British wanted a cease-fire, regardless of the complex
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decisions that solution would entail for the French and the
Vietnamese, because the British feared the possibility of
World War III should the fighting continue.

Eisenhower felt

Australia and New Zealand were resentful of the British
attitude and might approach the United States with the idea
of forming a collective security agreement to the complete
exclusion of the British.

Eisenhower noted he would

probably accept such a proposal because he felt the British
showed a lack of awareness of the Communist threat in the
area.53 That day in the House of Commons, Prime Minister
Churchill stated that the British Government "was not
prepared to give any undertakings about United Kingdom
military action in Indochina in advance of the results of
Geneva."

Churchill stated further that Britain had not

entertained any new political or military commitments.54
Churchill's statement disappointed both France and the
United States because Rene Massigli (French Ambassador to
the Court of St. James) and Radford were then in London in a
last ditch effort to pressure the British into accepting
some sort of united action.55
On April 28, France signed two treaties with Vietnam.
Although never ratified, one treaty granted Vietnam total
independence and the other defined the terms for Vietnamese
association with the French Union.56 Such belated attempts
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at clarifying the relationship between Vietnam and the
French Union came far too late to support the legitimacy of
the French position.
In Washington, President Eisenhower, met with Under
Secretary of State Smith, Presidential Assistant Robert
Cutler, and Admiral Radford, who had just flown in from
London.

Eisenhower unequivocally stated his decision that

the United States would not intervene militarily in
Indochina by executive action.

While he authorized American

assistance to rebuild three airfields in Indochina,
Eisenhower stressed that United States personnel should
avoid undue risk of getting involved in combat operations.57
At his weekly press conference that day, Eisenhower stated
that the United States would not go to war unless war was
declared by Congress.
On April 29, the National Security Council held its
weekly meeting.58 Allen Dulles stated that based on a
national intelligence estimate, the possible loss of Dien
Bien Phu would be "serious but not catastrophic."

Under

Secretary of State Smith then summarized activity at the
Geneva Conference where Secretary of State Dulles was
continuing to negotiate.

Smith read parts of a cable he had

just received from the Secretary.

Dulles had written that

in view of the weakening world positions of France, Britain
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and Italy, the United States had an increased obligation "to
take the leadership in what we think is the right course,
having regard to long-range US interest which includes
importance of Allies."59 Eisenhower, fearing the
implication of Dulles' words, stated that the United States
could not use force in Indochina, except "in concert with
some other nations and at the request of the Associated
States themselves."60
Radford then informed the NSC about the probable fall of
Dien Bien Phu and lack of allied support to intervene.
Radford related that the French were still dropping troops
in the fortress which had dwindled to an area 1500 yards in
diameter.

He stated that a relief column of 3000 indigenous

troops with French officers were 29 miles from Dien Bien
Phu, but probably would not affect the outcome unless
reinforced from the air.

Harold Stassen, Director for

Foreign Operations, stated that the United States should
intervene unilaterally.

Eisenhower replied that if the

United States replaced the French in Indochina, many Asians
would consider American colonialism to have supplanted
French colonialism.

Eisenhower felt that unilateral

intervention in world trouble spots would be tantamount to
policing the entire world, open up the United States to
charges of imperialism, and undermine America's free world
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support.

For Eisenhower "the concept of leadership implied

associates."61 Stassen stated that now and in Indochina
were the time and place to take a stand.

Eisenhower,

perhaps sarcastically, replied that if that were so we might
as well declare war on the Soviet Union, instead of "playing
the enemy's game" of getting involved in brushfire wars.62
In his memoirs, Eisenhower made the same point stating that
the United States might as well strike "at the head instead
of the tail of the snake, Red China itself."63
Under Secretary of State Smith then suggested a
compromise.

Smith felt that if the United States conducted

air strikes, regardless of the fate of Dien Bien Phu, the
French might continue the fight, and the United States might
be able to take a stronger role in training indigenous
forces, and keep United States forces at home.

Further, if

allies in Asia came forth the United States could still
follow the united action principle, despite British
unwillingness to participate.

Nixon agreed with Smith

stating that doing nothing was tantamount to giving the
British a veto over the United States freedom of action.64
Smith felt that as preconditions to such strikes, the French
should remove General Navarre and give assurances for the
complete independence of the Associated States.

Eisenhower

agreed to ask Congress to consider the idea if the French
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agreed to continue the fight even if Dien Bien Phu fell.
But, Eisenhower also decided to await Dulles' report upon
his return from Geneva.

Eisenhower then ended the meeting

stating that intervention with United States ground forces
was a politically unfeasible option.65
The NSC Planning Board met later that day and decided
that Eisenhower's desire that the Associated States invite
United States participation was not a possibility.

The

Planning Board noted that the French Cabinet was unwilling
to grant full independence to Vietnam until after Geneva,
thereby vitiating another Congressional prerequisite.

The

Planning Board then discussed the possible use of nuclear
weapons.

Eisenhower and Nixon felt nuclear weapons would

not help Dien Bien Phu, but decided to consider offering
them to the French.

The President stated that the United

States would not use the atom bomb unilaterally.

Eisenhower

reiterated that a collective defense arrangement remained
his key policy goal.66
On April 29, Dulles, still in Paris, sent a telegram to
the State Department.

Dulles stated that some Frenchmen

were hopeful that Dien Bien Phu would not fall.

Dulles

related that while the French Parliament was in recess,
diplomatic activity was difficult.

Bidault operated with a

free hand because no one in his cabinet felt sure enough to
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suggest alternative courses.

Consequently, any agreement

must be considered undependable because it would be
temporary.

Dulles felt that a defense of enclaves in the

deltas backed up by united action could keep the French in
the war.

Dulles concluded, noting the general weakness of

the allies.67
President Eisenhower spoke about Dien Bien Phu to
Hagerty on April 29.

Eisenhower said: " [t]he French have

built up Dien Bien Phu as a symbol and are trying to hold it
against impossible odds.

They are losing seasoned troops

and most of the green reinforcements they are trying to
parachute in.

Navarre wouldn't take our advice— why I don't

know— on ways to relieve Dien Bien Phu."

Eisenhower

mentioned French planes were sitting ducks for Viet Minh
artillery fire because the pilots radio directly in French,
which the gunners understand.68
On April 30, 1954, a National Intelligence Estimate
examined the immediate consequences within Indochina
following the fall of Dien Bien Phu..

Noting that French

morale would receive a severe blow, the Estimate indicated
that in the absence of native desertions, the relative
military positions of the French Union and Viet Minh forces
would not change.

Politically, however, the Estimate stated

that, unless checked, the French Union-position would
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collapse by the end of 1954.69

At 8 a.m. in the morning of May 5, i954, Eisenhower,
Dulles, MacArthur, and Cutler met at the White House.
Dulles, who had just returned from Geneva, discussed recent
relations with allies and the development of regional
groupings.

Dulles blamed the British and the French for

frustrating United States policies at Geneva.

The British,

Dulles felt, were influenced by possible reactions from
India and other Commonwealth countries, as well as the fear
of world war following United States intervention in
Indochina.

The British solution to the problem was to

divide Vietnam, and create a regional defense arrangement to
defend the non-Communist division, Laos, Cambodia, and the
rest of Southeast Asia.

Dulles felt the Communists would

balk at such a division, and, instead, want the removal of
all foreign troops followed by a general election.

The

consensus of those present was that Eden's current behavior
was attributable to domestic British politics and his bid to
succeed Churchill as Prime Minister.
The French, Dulles thought, had resisted American
efforts to internationalize the war and were not forthcoming
in granting independence to the Associated States.

Dulles
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felt that France, whose requests for United States
intervention never progressed beyond informal offers, feared
that if the United States entered the struggle, then France
would "not have a free hand to 'sell out and get out.'"
Dulles concluded his views by stating that conditions did
not favor overt United States intervention.

Eisenhower

f

agreed and then stated that "our allies are willing to let
us pull their chestnuts out of the fire, but will let us be
called imperialists and colonialists."

Dulles then agreed

with the decision of the April 28 NSC meeting to organize a
regional defense system with as many members as possible.70
On the afternoon of May 5, Secretary Dulles held a
meeting for congressional leaders at the State Department.71
Dulles had invited the leaders as well as some members of
the foreign policy and armed services committees of both
Houses of Congress.

Dulles noted the two informal French

requests of April 4 and April 22, to conduct Operation
Vulture and his trips to London and Paris.

Describing the

French mood as urgent, Dulles opined that British policy led
to the subsequent failure of united action.

When Dulles

remarked that Eden had reneged on the April 13 communique,
several Congressmen voiced their disapproval.

Dulles

explained Britain's change of heart by pointing out the
British dilemma.

On the one hand, France and the United
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States had asked for aid.

On the other hand, fear of the

Hydrogen bomb and pressure by Nehru in India, led some
Englishmen to shy away from support of the French in
Indochina.

But, Dulles felt, the British were finally

swayed against intervention because they feared the risk of
a Chinese invasion should the West intervene.

Some

Congressmen remarked that Britain was trying to create for
herself the position as "middleman" between the United
States and the Soviet Union.
Dulles then stated his view of the future of American
policy with regard to Southeast Asia.

He felt the United

States should not intervene in Indochina until United States
preconditions were met, namely referring to the acquisition
of allies.

Dulles noted that fulfillment was not likely

given Britain's decision not to participate and domestic
opposition in France to internationalization of the war
effort.

Dulles felt the United States should help construct

a Southeast Asia defense arrangement as soon as possible.
Such a community, with British support, could "insulate" the
rest of Southeast Asia against the possible loss of Vietnam.
Discounting a partition of Vietnam, Dulles thought a
coalition government based on general elections would follow
the withdrawal of all foreign troops.

For Dulles, such an

eventuality "would probably result in the loss of Vietnam to
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the Communists."72 Dulles concluded that the United States
should not "write off" the British and French as allies,
because diversity of opinion was a welcome disadvantage of a
democratic system.

Although some members of Congress

expressed concern over Britain's lack of support, most
members supported the Eisenhower administration's handling
of the situation.73
That day in Indochina, two United States civilians were
killed at Dien Bien Phu.

Captain James B. "Earthquake

McGoon" McGovern, who was so big his C-119 had a specially
built pilot's chair, and his co-pilot, Wallace Buford were
flying supplies to the beleaguered French garrison.
McGovern was flying his forty-fifth mission over Dien Bien
Phu when his plane was shot down by Communist anti-aircraft
fire.74 McGovern and Buford were part of a squadron of CAT
pilots flying United States Air Force C-119 transports
camouflaged by gray paint.75 CAT pilots had flown C-119.
"Flying Boxcars" to airlift supplies to the French as early
as March 19, the sixth day of the siege.76 There were
twenty-nine C-119's flying supply operations, and twentyfour had American crews.

According to Bernard Fall,

" [o]fficially, the crews were all 'civilian' but in actual
fact some American military pilots had been quietly detached
to CAT to familiarize themselves with the area in case of
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American air intervention on behalf of the French."77
At a meeting in the President's office at 9:30 a.m., in
the morning of May 7, Robert Cutler told Eisenhower that
some members of the NSC Planning Board were against the
proposal Bidault gave to the French Cabinet of a cease-fire
in Indochina.78 These members— principally military
members— felt that a cease-fire would erode the French and
Vietnamese will to fight, causing fence-sitters to jump to
the Viet Minh side and that "the Communists would evade
covertly cease-fire controls."

These members also felt the

United States should intervene in Indochina following
Congressional approval, if France agreed to certain
conditions.

These included a grant of genuine freedom to

the Associated States; an increased share for the United
States in military planning including the training of
indigenous troops; a French guarantee to stay in the fight
even though the United States would not intervene with
ground forces; and for France to accept possible United
Nations intervention.79
Cutler then told Eisenhower what opposing members of the
Planning Board had indicated.

These members felt that were

the United States to follow the Board's plan it would do so
without international backing as desired by Congress.

They

also felt that French internal politics did not favor United
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States entry.

They noted that no French government of the

present or foreseeable future was competent to make
decisions that a subsequent government might abrogate, and
that France had not indicated a present intention to
internationalize the war.

They were also afraid that in the

eyes of the world, the United States would be "bailing out
colonial France."

Finally, they felt that the United States

could not be international trouble-shooters and attempt to
save every situation.

Eisenhower remarked that any proposal

of American intervention, like that presented by Harold
Stassen at the April 29 NSC meeting, was not thoroughly
thought out.

In instructions to Dulles, who was the third

member of the meeting and who was to meet Ambassador Bonnet
that afternoon, Eisenhower remained firm to the three
prerequisites that he had felt essential since the
beginning.

Eisenhower would not intervene alone, he

required that there be some kind of invitation by the
indigenous peoples, and he required that there be some kind
of collective action.80 Congressional approval was not a
prerequisite to Eisenhower's decision, only to actual
approval.
At 5:30 p.m., on May 7, 1954, the fortress outpost at
Dien Bien Phu fell to overwhelming Communist forces.
16,544 defenders, 7,000 were taken prisoner.

Of

40 percent of
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them were wounded.81 Under the battlefield truce, 885
wounded soldiers, including 27 unwounded medical personnel,
were handed over to the French.

The remaining French forces

faced a 500 mile march to Viet Minh prison camps.

While 78

prisoners successfully escaped during the march, many more
died of their wounds.

Among those who survived were

Genevieve de Galarde-Terraube— a French.nurse whose plane
was shot down on March 28, the last day the airstrip was
serviceable— and Dr. Grauwin, who continued to care for the
wounded while in captivity.82 Despite Grauwin's and
Galarde's efforts, many wounded died during a brutal
captivity.

Only 3000 survivors eventually were freed in

August as a result of the July 20 accord worked out in
Geneva.

Vietnamese casualties numbered close to 23,000,

nearly 8, 000 of these had died.83
On May 7, President Eisenhower sent a message to French
President Rene Coty, expressing respect for the gallant
defenders at Dien Bien Phu.

Eisenhower stated that their

sacrifice "will forever stand as a symbol of the free
world's determination to resist dictatorial aggression and
to sustain its right to self-determination and its
dedication to the dignity of the human being."84 Eisenhower
sent a similar message to Bao Dai.85
That evening, in the United States, Secretary of State
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Dulles gave a nation-wide radio and television address.
Previously, President Eisenhower had gone over the draft of
Dulles speech and made "quite a few suggestions and changes
in the text."86 Dulles said: "[a]n epic battle has ended.
But great causes have, before now, been won out of lost
battles."87 Dulles related his fear that a cease-fire could
lead to a Communist takeover of all of Indochina.

But he

noted that if hostilities continue "the need will be even
more urgent to create the conditions for united action in
defense of the area."88 Dulles then stated that "only the
Congress can declare war," and that President Eisenhower
would not seek Congressional support absent allied
participation.

The President himself had urged Dulles to

include the necessity of "Congressional authority."89
Dulles concluded his address by placing the issue of
Communist aggression in a larger perspective.

Ascribing

unity of purpose to the Communists, Dulles noted, " [glreat
despotic powers have always known that they could impose
their will and gain their conquests if the free nations
stand apart and none helps the other."90 But, if free
nations stand together, Dulles noted, the despots can be
stopped.

Dulles pointed to NATO which prevented further

successful Soviet aggression in Europe.

Dulles concluded by

noting that the United States was "the first colony" in
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"modern history to win independence for itself," and that
the United States must be in harmony with peoples of the
world attempting to prevent Soviet Communism from co-opting
their independence.

If the United States is successful,

Dulles stated, "we shall be in harmony with those moral
forces which ultimately prevail."91
On May 8, the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference
began in the former council chamber of the League of
Nations.

Nine powers were in Switzerland to take part in

the Indochina phase of the conference.

They were: the

Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the State of Vietnam,
France, the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union,
China, Cambodia and Laos.

During the ensuing weeks,

diplomatic activity at Geneva would reflect the powers
attempts to integrate the events of the previous weeks into
the Cold War framework.

The position of the United States

at the conference was ambiguous.

Dulles, who turned his

back on Chou En-Lai's proffered hand, had left for
Washington on May 4, leaving Walter Bedell Smith in charge
of the American delegation.

The Chinese, who had heavily

supplied the Viet Minh at Dien Bien Phu, let the French talk
to the Viet Minh only through Chinese intermediaries.92 For
their part, the French regarded Churchill as a "1954 version
of Chamberlain at Munich."93
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While the talks dragged on, the French National Assembly
elected Pierre Mendes-France Premier on June 17, 1954.
Mendes-France, a member of the Radical Socialist Party,
promised to resign if peace in Indochina was not arranged by
July 20.

On the evening of July 20, the clocks in the

meeting hall mysteriously stopped at midnight while last
minute details concerning Cambodian objections were worked
out.

In the early hours of July 21, an agreement was

signed.

The truce agreement had three main parts:

(1) it

created a temporary division at the 17th parallel;

(2) it

allowed 300 days for the people of Vietnam to move to their
preferred side of the parallel (repatriation); and (3) it
established an International Control Commission, with Indian
(as Chair), Canadian, and Polish representatives, to
supervise elections scheduled for July, 1956.

In the final

analysis, one-half of Vietnam and two provinces of Laos were
placed under Communist control by the agreement.

The French

had lost 92,000 dead and 161,000 wounded while the Viet Minh
lost up to 200,000 dead.

Despite a strong Army still in

Vietnam, the French decided to vacate her Asian colonies.
North Africa would feel the repercussions.
After the fall of Dien Bien Phu, United States policy
makers reappraised the domino theory.

The Pentagon Papers,

noting that the domino theory "had been at the center of
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United.States policy in Southeast Asia since the late
1940s," stated the theory was no longer appropriate.94
Indeed, at a press conference on May 11, Secretary of State
Dulles observed that the loss of Indochina might not
inexorably lead to the loss of Southeast Asia.

The loss of

these States, the Secretary noted, while important, did not
create a hopeless situation.

Foilowing.J^eneva, the concept

of "united action" was transformed from a short-term
military response to a long-range collective defense
alliance.

As the Pentagon Papers noted the "loss of Tonkin

was no longer seen as leading necessarily to a Communist
take-over of other territory between China and the American
Shore."95 The creation of the Southeast Asian Treaty
Organization (SEATO), on September 8, 1954, was designed to
insulate the loss of "one such domino."96
In the final analysis, sovereignty for Vietnam
translated into the establishment of a pro-Western
government, capable of surviving on its own, yet within the
American sphere of influence.

Throughout 1954, United

States policy makers believed that the creation of such a
government was best achieved if that government were
responsive to the aspirations of its people.
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Chapter Six
Conclusion: The Quiet Diplomacy

President Eisenhower's handling of foreign policy fits
the description: "the Quiet Diplomacy."

Eisenhower

possessed a strong degree of control over foreign policy.
In reaching foreign policy decisions, Eisenhower judiciously
used the policy making apparatus so that each component was
used to its best advantage.

Eisenhower set-up a division of

labor where he allowed all of his advisors to express their
point of view.

According to that division of labor, John

Foster Dulles was the administration "point man" or "tough
guy."

Dulles was allowed to publicize administration

policies and he was given a free hand to achieve those
policies diplomatically.

Eisenhower reserved for himself

the role of the calming influence.

If Dulles exceeded his

bounds or his efforts created unfavorable domestic or world
opinion, Eisenhower was ready to step in and add an air of
even-handed sobriety.

If Dulles' tactics succeeded, then so
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much the better.

For Eisenhower, leadership and the quest

to claim credit for successful policy were anti-thetical.
As Eisenhower preferred results to publicity, he probably
preferred successful policies to an adoring posterity.
In the policy crisis occasioned by the battle at Dien
Bien Phu the Eisenhower Administration considered military
intervention in Indochina.

President Eisenhower had drawn

three requirements which had to be met before he would
authorize intervention: "[t]he first requirement was a legal
right under international law; second, was a favorable
climate of Free World opinion; and third, favorable action
by Congress."1 Fulfillment of the first requirement would
lay the foundation for the second.

If Eisenhower had

presented a request to intervene in Indochina given
fulfillment of these requirements, Congress most likely
would have granted the request.

Congressional endorsement

was not a primary requisite for United States intervention
in Indochina.

Favorable action by Congress would merely

give the imprimatur to intervention domestically, as
favorable world opinion would internationally.

The first

hurdle for either was a legal right under international law.
This demanded a sovereign legal status for the Associated
States.

On this fundamental issue United States policy and

French policy differed.
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To fulfill the requirement of a legal right under
international law, Eisenhower demanded overt requests for
United States intervention from the French and from the
Associated States.

If the legitimate sovereign governments

that ruled the territory in which the United States wished
to intervene made the requests, then principles of
international law made the intervention "legal."

French

approval was not enough for Eisenhower, for intervention so
based would open up the United States to the charge of
supporting colonialism.

The Vietnamese themselves must

invite United States intervention.
Numerous times during the Dien Bien Phu crisis the
Eisenhower administration demanded that Vietnamese
invitation precede American intervention.

Eisenhower stated

at the National Security Council meeting of March 25, 1954,
that the United States would not intervene in Indochina
"unless the Vietnamese welcomed our intervention."2 Six
weeks later on May 7, Eisenhower repeated that he would not
intervene alone, for he required that there be some kind of
invitation by the indigenous peoples.3
Legally valid intervention, however, still had to avoid
the risk of marking the United States with the taint of
colonialism.

In a letter to General Alfred M. Greunther

(NATO'Supreme Commander) President Eisenhower stated that no

Western nation could use military force in Asia without the
consent of the local population.

"To contemplate anything

else is to lay ourselves open to the charge of imperialism
and colonialism— at the very least— of objectionable
paternalism."4 Eisenhower's concern was not just that local
invitation would pass international law muster, but also the
practical matter that force only succeeds where the hearts
and minds of the local inhabitants are in harmony with the
proposed intervention.

To this end the administration tried

to persuade the French to modify their colonial aspirations.
On March 26, 1953, Eisenhower warned French Prime Minister
Rene Mayer that because Americans saw the war in Indochina
as a colonial war, they would not support the French if they
felt the French were delaying action on the EDC in order to
secure that support. 5 Additionally, while attempting to
enlist French support for united action, Dulles stated that
Eisenhower would go to Congress for war powers if the French
publicly stated their goal was to assure independence for
Indochina and not a veiled endeavor to perpetuate
colonialism.6 Unblemished by the taint of colonialism the
United States could appear as champions of independence,
thereby raising intervention to a high moral plane.

In a

radio and television address on May 7, 1954, Dulles stated
that if the United States helped other nations secure their
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independence, then "we shall be in harmony with those moral
forces which ultimately prevail."7
Unsullied, legitimate intervention would lay the
foundation for favorable world opinion, which was a sine qua
non of Eisenhower's Presidency.
American idealism

Eisenhower's sense of

required that America defend against

aggression rather than become the aggressor.

Support for

independence of the Associated States would mark the United
States as a moral leader and true champion of liberty.

In

terms of the East-West struggle, subject peoples and world
opinion generally would look to the United States for advise
and support.

Congressional views were consonant with

Eisenhower's belief.

Senator Goldwater, for example,

stressed that the United States should help the people of
the Associated States meet their legitimate aspirations as a
people.8 Senator Smith in his report on the Far East
likewise intoned: "[t]here can be no more imperialism, no
more colonialism, no more totalitarian dictatorships."9
Unity of anti-colonial beliefs in the United States could
show the world that Americans were sincere in their
professed desires to meet the aspirations of subject
peoples.
The Eisenhower administration's support of Indochinese
independence divides into three separate parts.

First, in
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order to conform with American idealism and to induce a
favorable world opinion, United States policy makers
genuinely believed that attainment of independence by
colonial peoples served the interests of humanity.

Second,

armed with this belief, Americans put pressure on a
recalcitrant France to grant independence to the people of
the Associated States.

Last, American pressure led France

to grant small incremental grants of autonomy which
ultimately proved inadequate.
Numerous Americans genuinely held the belief that France
should grant independence to the people of the Associated
States.

On separate occasions Senators Goldwater, Kennedy,

Mansfield, and Smith, and Congressman Judd all stated that
independence was the fundamental solution to the problems in
Indochina.

Goldwater, for example, wanted to pressure

France into setting a target date for the establishment of
the complete independence of the Associated States, and Judd
felt that independence would win over enough attentistes to
correct the "real problem" of Bao-Dai's weak political
base.10

In addition, reports from Indochina supported a

policy geared to granting the Associated States
independence.

As far back as August 8, 1950, State

Department official John F. Melby had cabled Washington
recommending that France grant independence to the
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Vietnamese as they "will have it regardless of anything
else.n11
President Eisenhower was an enthusiastic supporter of
inducing France to grant independence to the Associated
States.

At the National Security Council meeting of May 6,

1953, Eisenhower stated "that if France really desired to
cut the best figure before the world, the obvious course to
pursue was first to defeat the Viet Minh forces and then
magnanimously to offer independence to the Associated
States."12 At the January 8, 1954, NSC meeting, Eisenhower
stated "if the French had been smart they would long since
have offered the Associated States independence on the
latters' own terms."13 As he subsequently stated at his
April 7, 1954, news conference, "[n]o outside country can
come in and be really helpful unless it is doing something
that the local people want....the aspirations of those
people must be met, otherwise there is in the long run no
final answer to the problem."14
Armed with this belief, American policy makers put
pressure on France to grant independence to the Associated
States.

On September 29, 1953, French Minister of Foreign

Affairs, Georges Bidault, accepted National Security Council
conditions of additional United States aid.

Namely, Bidault

stated that France was committed to "perfecting" the
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independence of the Associated States.15 But a recalcitrant
France repeatedly refused to grant the needed reforms and
American pressure continued.

On March 23, 1954, Dulles told

General Ely that overt American participation in the
Indochinese war would incur American pressure for
independence of the Associated States.16 The members of the
National Security Council meeting of April 6, 1954, agreed
that the United States should continue to press the French
to grant independence.17 Additionally, Dulles felt
constrained to resume direct pressure on Bidault on April
14, 1954, and on Laniel on April 24, 1954.18
American pressure may have led France to grant small
incremental measures of limited autonomy to the Associated
States, but these measures ultimately proved inadequate.
The French leadership did not want to grant independence
for, as a NIE of June 4, 1953, stated, they feared "the
French National Assembly would then refuse to support a war
in a 'lost' portion of the French Union."19 For France the
French Union was defined as "an association of independent
and sovereign peoples" where "all the associates place in
common their resources in order to guarantee the defense of
the Union as a whole."20 But, unlike the British
Commonwealth system, the French Union gave France a dominant
role, as the French constitution did not provide for the
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independence of overseas territories.21 Indeed, the French
Union was a quasi-federal structure, in which Paris governed
the Union as Rome governed the Catholic Church.22 Such
dominance of one nation over another negated the very
principle of sovereignty.
The French failed to clarify the legal relationship
between herself and the Associated States to the
satisfaction of the Associated States.

Ever since March 6,

194 6, when the French agreed to recognize the DRV as a "free
state" within the French Union, the precise definition of
that status remained cloudy.

In an attempt to clarify that

concept at Fontainbleau in the summer of 194 6, French action
signaled that sovereignty was not part of the French concept
of "free state."

The talks at Fontainbleau showed the

essential difference between the two sides:
[T]he French regarding [sic] the problem of the
status of Vietnam essentially as one of internal
constitutional law, and the Vietnamese seeing
[sic] it in terms of international law; for the
former it was a question of "autonomy within the
French bloc", whereas for the latter it was a
question of "independence complemented with
association with France."23
The French maintained their perspective throughout the
entire Dien Bien Phu crisis.

When Dulles went to Paris to

enlist French support in getting Britain to join united
action, the French objected to Dulles' accusations that the
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French position on sovereignty for the Associated States
appeared as but a disguise to perpetuate French control of
Indochina.

Even though the hands of the French leadership

were tied by the French Constitution, they tried to
legitimize their position by signing two treaties on April
28, 1954, with the Vietnamese.24 The treaties granted
Vietnam total independence and defined the terms for
Vietnamese association with the French Union.

Although

never ratified, the treaties highlighted the fact that small
incremental grants of autonomy failed to satiate the
appetite for independence of the peoples of the Associated
States ,25
While the French constitution may have been a good
reason for the ultimate failure of the French to create
under the umbrella of the French Union a relationship
suitable to the Indochinese, a better reason was French
national pride.

Admiral Thierry D'Argenlieu, the French

High Commissioner for Indochina during the Fontainbleau
conference, caused the Indochinese delegates (save Ho) to
walk out of the conference when he declared Cochin China a
"free state."

D'Argenlieu wanted to wage a military

struggle with Ho instead of attempting to negotiate a
settlement.

After the military strategy failed, it was

D'Argenlieu who pushed for the acceptance of the Bao Dai
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solution.

Although a man's actions may not admit of simple

deciphering, R. E. M. Irving posits that D'Argenlieu, who
was appointed by DeGualle, was motivated by a desire to
avenge France's humiliation suffered during World War II.26
Irving states that a feeling of humiliation following the
war led many Frenchmen to attempt to reassert France as a
world power.27

Indeed, Irving states that avenging lost

pride was the primary political motivating factor of the
MRP, the Christian Democratic Party which dominated French
politics for the first decade after the war.

"For the MRP,

with their Resistance background, the motive of national
prestige was probably more important than any other single
factor in their Indochina policy."28
Other sources confirm that wounded pride motivated a
gradual, incremental French policy.

On March 11, 1951,

Minister Heath sent a telegram to Secretary of State
Acheson.

Heath stated that he had talked with the French

Commanding General de Lattre who had launched into an
analysis of the state of French spirit as a result of the
last war and French economic losses and inferiority.

De

Lattre believed that the United States "must reckon with the
inferiority complex and feeling of the humiliation in the
French Government and among the French people."

De Lattre

mentioned there existed "forces in the US that were pushing
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American policy in IC to actions injurious to French
prestige."29 At the end of December, 1953, David Bruce,
United States Ambassador in Paris, cabled Washington echoing
Heath's comments.

Bruce stated that one reason why the

French did not withdraw from Indochina at that time was
"humiliation of national pride and loss of prestige abroad,"
including adverse repercussion in North Africa.30
French pride and American idealism were bound to come
into conflict.

The Blum controversy bears witness to the

fact that Americans were not restricted by certain policies
that shackled the French.

Blum wanted "to foster indigenous

resistance to Communism" by having France grant demands for
political autonomy.

The French, however, were constrained

by their definition of the French Union.31 Blum was not
alone.

Other Americans in Indochina also were urging the

French to soften the harshness of French colonial policies.
Naturally, the French in Indochina rebelled.

When he

visited Washington in September 1951, de Lattre complained
that problems were "caused by the fact that a number of
young men with a 'missionary zeal' were dispensing economic
aid with the result that there was a feeling on the part of
some that they were using this aid to extend American
influence."32 When General Ely visited Washington in late
March 1954, he complained that "Americans acted as if the
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United States sought to control and operate everything of
importance.1,33
Even though American idealism could cause friction
between allies, Eisenhower believed that a policy imbued
with American traditions and values would bear fruit in
creating a favorable world opinion.

Eisenhower wanted to

add "real moral standing to a venture" which otherwise might
appear as overt imperial aggression.

While allies were

important in themselves, Eisenhower felt a particular need
for allies in his conception of united, action.

United

action could supply the moral element, justifying
intervention in the eyes of the world, and thereby create
favorable world opinion.
In addition to a legal right under international law,
and a favorable climate of Free World opinion, Eisenhower
also wanted favorable action from Congress before he made
any decision to intervene in Indochina.

President

Eisenhower had enormous respect for the role of Congress in
foreign policy decision-making.

Not only was he aware of

Congress' role in appropriating funds and approving foreign
aid commitments, but also Eisenhower respected the Congress'
position in the Constitutional balance of power.

At the

National Security Council of September 9, 1953, for example,
Eisenhower stated that with respect to aiding the French in
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Indochina he wanted prior Congressional consultation so as
to prevent handing them a fait accompli.

This concern led

Eisenhower on February 3, 1954, to tell Walter Bedell Smith
to consult with Congressional leaders before sending
technicians to Indochina.

The "deal" worked out with

Senator Leverett Saltonstall (R-Ma) is an example of
Eisenhower's ability to establish congenial work
relationships with members of Congress.
Although Eisenhower developed a close working
arrangement with members of Congress, he may have felt
constrained to pursue such a course because of
constitutional limitations on his use of power.

At a press

conference on March 11, Eisenhower stated "...there is going
to be no involvement of America in war unless it is a result
of the constitutional process that is placed upon Congress
to declare it."34 Eisenhower repeated this acknowledgment
of Congress' role when he stated at the National Security
Council meeting of March 25, "that the Congress would have
to be in on any move by the United States to intervene in
Indochina.

It was simply academic to imagine otherwise."35

Whether Eisenhower's view reflected mere adherence to duty
and responsible use of Presidential authority, or he
actually believed in the merits of Congressional
participation, likewise is academic.

On April 3, to prevent
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presenting Congress with a fait accompli, as Truman had done
with respect to hostilities in Korea, Eisenhower called
eight Members of Congress to a briefing session on possible
Indochina activity.
At the meeting of April 3, Dulles asked for "a joint
resolution from Congress to permit the President to use air
and naval power in Indo-China."36 This request was a
leading question for Dulles had a draft resolution that had
been worked out the previous afternoon in his hip-pocket.
Although not presented, the resolution was designed to
delineate executive and legislative authority over the
President's possible use of force in Indochina.
delineation was important to Eisenhower.

Such

On April 19,

Eisenhower and Dulles met to discuss a Department of Justice
report also detailing the President's war-making powers.
Perhaps by this juncture certain administration officials
felt that Congressional approval of military power was more
of a constraint than a necessity.
Despite the Constitutional requirement of Congressional
approval, Dulles used said approval as a political football
in order to garner allied support for United States
intervention.

On April 14, Dulles told Bidault that

Eisenhower was prepared to go to Congress for powers to
intervene in Indochina provided Bidault help create a "real"
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sense of united action by getting Britain to join, and that
the French disavow attempts to perpetuate colonial rule in
Indochina.37 On April 23, Dulles told Eden that if Britain
supported Operation Vulture, Eisenhower was prepared to ask
Congress for authority to intervene.38 Dulles's tactics
worked to a limited extent.

On April 25, the French

Ambassador in London, Rene Massigli, stated on behalf of his
government, that if the British supported United States
intervention in Indochina, President Eisenhower could get
the required support from Congress.39 Eden and Churchill,
however, were unmoved by Dulles' tactics.

To Eden, "Sir

Winston summed up the position by saying that what we were
being asked to do was to assist in misleading Congress into
approving a military operation, which would in itself be
ineffective, and might well bring the world to the verge of
a major war."40 Churchill's analysis reflects his
understanding that President Eisenhower felt allied support
a necessary prerequisite to asking for Congressional
approval.
Dulles wittingly used a domestic constitutional
restraint to feign unity of purpose at home and thereby gain
foreign support for a military venture.

On April 16, Vice-

President Nixon unwittingly evoked the same domestic
constraint.

In a response to a hypothetical question
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concerning United States action should France withdraw from
Indochina Nixon stated that United States troops might fill
the void.

Nixon's off-the-record remark was printed in the

New York Times and was met with Congressional and foreign
concern as Nixon failed to mention the necessities of prior
Congressional and allied support.41 Taken as a trial
balloon for administration policy, their concern was wellfounded.
The witting and unwitting tactics of those
administration officials seeking intervention created a
situation, as Gaddis has written, to "confuse the public,
alarm allies, and bewilder the adversaries."42 To correct
any possible misunderstandings held by the public, allies or
adversaries, President Eisenhower stated at his weekly press
conference on April 28, that the United States would not go
to war unless declared by Congress.43 Additionally, in a
radio and television address on May 7, Dulles stated that
"only the Congress can declare war," and that President
Eisenhower would not seek Congressional support absent
allied participation.

The President himself had read the

text of Dulles' address and he urged Dulles to include the
necessity of "Congressional authority."44
Even though Eisenhower occasionally had to clarify
United States policy as a result of his subordinates
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excesses, he was able to make judicious and effective use of
his subordinates.

Eisenhower was not only an active

participant at policy committee meetings, but he conducted
those meetings so that all points of views were considered
equally.

For example, at the National Security Council

meeting of April 29, 1954, Harold Stassen freely expressed
his view that the United States should intervene
unilaterally in Indochina.

Eisenhower responded that such a

move would open up the United States to charges of
imperialism, thereby undermining America's free world
support.

Stassen persisted, stating that now and in

Indochina were the time and place to take a stand.

Once

again, Eisenhower made known his contrary viewpoint.45 Nine
days later, on May 7, at a meeting with General Cutler,
Eisenhower expressed his view that positions such as the one
expressed by Stassen were not thoroughly thought out.46
This example reveals that Eisenhower's advisors clearly felt
comfortable enough to express points of view directly
opposed to those of the President, and that they felt free
to repeat those views even as Eisenhower disagreed.

In this

particular matter, Eisenhower listened to a firmly held view
by one of his advisors, let that view float for any other
advisor to support it, and followed a course of action
closer to his own firmly held beliefs.
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An analysis of two National Security Council meetings
which sandwiched the Dien Bien Phu crisis serve to highlight
Eisenhower's leadership ability with respect to the
effective use of advisors.
January 8, 1954.

The first meeting occurred on

Eisenhower wondered why France did not

allow the Associated States to bring their case before the
U.N., to which John Foster Dulles answered that France
feared the psychological effect of airing the independence
issue of one part of the French Union upon other parts of
the Union.

After disparaging French motives, Eisenhower

plainly stated his view "with great force" that he refused
to put ground troops in Asia.

Eisenhower felt that to do so

would transfer Vietnamese hatred of the French to hatred of
the United States.

Eisenhower then stated "with vehemence"

that he was bitterly opposed to sending troops to Indochina.
The President concluded by giving his military opinion that
"[t]his war in Indochina would absorb our troops by
divisions!"47
Even though the President spoke vehemently and with
great force, further debate ensued.

Nixon offered his

doubts on the ability to build a strong Vietnamese National
Army, to which Eisenhower stated his desire to have the
French allow United States training of Vietnamese troops.
At this point, Admiral Radford suggested sending an air
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craft carrier to help defend against a possible attack at
Dien Bien Phu.

George Humphrey announced his disagreement

with that idea for he felt that a possible loss at Dien Bien
Phu would not be costly enough to engage United States
forces.

Eisenhower thereupon followed with a middle

position of sending United States military equipment.

To

this proposal Radford agreed, but Humphrey, with Cutler's
concurrence, stated that such a commitment would lead to
greater commitments.
air strike.

Undaunted, Radford proposed a one day

While he agreed that American CIA pilots might

fly such a strike, Eisenhower closed the meeting charging
the CIA and Defense Department with the task of presenting
reports to the NSC on how best the United States could help
assure the success of the Navarre Plan.48
The second National Security Council meeting which shows
President Eisenhower's effective use of advisors occurred on
April 29, 1954.

Walter Bedell Smith reported on

negotiations then under way at Geneva where Secretary of
State Dulles reported that the United States had an
obligation to boldly assume the leadership of the free
world.

Eisenhower, fearing Dulles' implication, stated that

the United States would not use force in Indochina except
"in concert with some other nations and at the request of
the Associated States themselves."49 Even though Eisenhower
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stated his views clearly, the NSC debated a slew of policy
options.
After Radford ,informed the NSC of French efforts to save
the garrison at Dien Bien Phu, Stassen and Eisenhower
debated unilateral intervention in Indochina.

Understanding

that policy options ranged the gamut from world war to naked
appeasement, Smith suggested air strikes not to rescue the
garrison but to encourage France to continue fighting.

By

this stratagem, Smith felt France might allow the United
States a greater share in the training of indigenous forces
and keep American troops at home.

Smith believed his idea

had the further advantage of eliciting the support of Asian
allies, thereby breathing life into the united action
principle, despite British unwillingness to participate.
Nixon agreed with Smith stating that doing nothing was
tantamount to giving the British a veto over United States
freedom of action.50 Eisenhower agreed to present the idea
to Congress, but wished to withhold judgment until Secretary
of State Dulles reported from Geneva.

Nonetheless,

Eisenhower repeated his view that intervention with United
States ground forces was a politically unfeasible option.51

The National Security Council meetings of January 8 and
April 2 9 reveal that President Eisenhower encouraged his
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advisors to consider a wide range of policy options.

Even

though Eisenhower disagreed with some viewpoints, he
nevertheless allowed each member to express their opinions.
Collectively, the Council analyzed the implications of
following certain options and avoided choosing the
President's positions.

Alternatives were discussed and, as

could be expected, a middle position was found.

As

important a source as National Security Council meetings
were to Eisenhower for policy advice, the President relied
on other agencies as well.

Specifically, on January 16,

1954, Eisenhower created an ad hoc committee under the
direction of Walter Bedell Smith to study the Indochina
problem.
Called the Special Committee on Indochina, the Smith
Committee was a self-contained independent think-tank
personally accountable to Eisenhower.52 At the first
meeting of this Committee, Eisenhower requested that "an
area plan" be drawn up to discuss courses of action should
Indochina fall.53 The implication was that "part of
Indochina might be lost without losing the rest of Southeast
Asia."54 The Smith Committee also set-up a Committee of its
own called the Working Group headed by General G.B. Erskine.

During the course of the Dien Bien Phu crisis the Smith
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Committee and the Working Group discussed various policy
alternatives.

On January 29, the Committee decided to

recommend to Eisenhower that the United States send 200 and
not 400 technicians to Indochina.55 On March 11, Smith
submitted for Eisenhower's perusal, a report written by the
Working Group which stated that conditions in Indochina were
favorable to a Communist defeat but that success was
dependent on French willingness to inspire and utilize the
native potential and instill a sense of fighting for
freedom.

Based on this analysis, the report recommended

against direct United States intervention.56 Again, on
March 17, the Erskine Group sent another report to
Eisenhower which stated that active involvement in Indochina
should await developments at Geneva, in light of the
situation at Dien Bien Phu.57 On April 2, the Smith
Committee issued a report which favored a mutual defense
system for Southeast Asia.

The Committee felt that "the

major European powers with interests in the Pacific," should
subscribe and underwrite such a "regional and Asian mutual
defense arrangement."58 On April 5, the Committee issued
another report which urged attempts to keep France in the
war, and recommended against a negotiated settlement if the
French did not support the United States.

In that event,

the report recommended direct overtures to the Associated
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States and a variety of other measures to take over the
defense of Indochina.59
The range of alternatives discussed by the Smith
Committee and Working Group reveals a steadfast purpose to
arrive at the most efficacious policy.

Significantly, the

recommendations these committees presented accurately
reflected administration policy at the time of presentation.
Operation Vulture was one policy alternative debated by
Eisenhower's advisors.

Admiral Radford first mentioned the

possible use of air power at Dien Bien Phu at the January 8
NSC meeting.

At that time Radford suggested sending an

aircraft carrier to Indochina to help defend the garrison.
Radford believed that United States air power could destroy
Viet Minh anti-aircraft guns which the French felt incapable
of destroying on their own.

Radford pressed his point. He

recommended a one day air strike saying: " [w]e were already
in this thing in such a big way that it seemed foolish not
to make the one small extra move which might be essential to
success.1,60
Radford met opposition at the meeting from Humphrey and
Cutler who feared greater commitments following the use of
air power.

Their fears were reiterated several times during

the next few months.

General Ridgway wrote that his fears

of a larger entanglement dissuaded Eisenhower from putting
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Vulture into action.61 The better view on that score, is
that Ridgway's opposition merely reinforced Eisenhower's
personal reluctance to employ air strikes over Dien Bien
Phu.

Nonetheless, Eisenhower proceeded to lay the proper

groundwork should Operation Vulture ultimately prove viable.
On April 1, he informed the chairman and editor-in-chief of
the Scripps Howard Newspapers that the United States might
have to send air planes from two carriers lying off the
Indochina coast to bomb the Viet Minh at Dien Bien Phu.62
Eisenhower laid the military groundwork as evidenced by
General Caldara's dry-runs over the Dien Bien Phu valley on
the night of April 4 and his follow-up visit to Indochina on
April 2 6.63
Pursuit of Operation Vulture had become a side issue in
the United States intervention decision.

The April 3

meeting at which certain members of Congress told the
Eisenhower administration to shop for allies did not change
the administration's outlook.

According to Thruston Morton,

Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations,
the meeting did not change United States policy because
Eisenhower was against intervention from the beginning.64
Regardless of the accuracy of Morton's reasoning, the April
3 meeting did not change administration policy for the three
preconditions enunciated by the Congressional members were
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preconditions Eisenhower already had established for
himself.

As noted above, Eisenhower concurred with the

preconditions that France continue in the war, and pledge to
accelerate independence for the Associated States.
Eisenhower also believed in the need for allied support
before engaging United States military effort in Indochina.
Dulles' address in which he mentioned "massive
retaliatory power," on January 12, 1954, stressed a need for
"allies and collective security."65 Allies provided the
conventional force component of his strategy.

Indeed, every

developer of the containment doctrine recognized that allies
were needed to thwart Communism.' Eisenhower, like Kennan,
saw the East-West contest as essentially a political contest
and in that context he considered allies necessary to
support a favorable world public opinion which would
accelerate the Soviets decline.

The peoples of the world

would see the fruits of freedom offered by the United States
in juxtaposition to the shackles offered by the Soviet
Union.
Even though Eisenhower saw a need for allies in the
strategic sense, his administration pursued allies as an end
in itself in the tactical sense during the crisis engendered
by the battle at Dien Bien Phu.

On March 12, 1954, the

Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a Memorandum to Secretary of
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Defense Wilson in which they considered the implications of
a French defeat in Indochina.

The JCS believed that the

United States should prevent the loss of Indochina to
Communists either "in concert with the French; or in the
event the French elect to withdraw, in concert with other
allies or, if necessary, unilaterally."66 The first two
choices were in concert with allies;.while the latter was
explicitly ruled out by the President.
Indeed, the concept of defeating Communism in Indochina
in concert with allies permeated Eisenhower administration
policy formation.

In anticipation of an unfavorable

denouement at Geneva, the Working Group recommended that the
United States continue fighting without the French, yet in
concert with allies.67 The strategic and tactical need for
allies came together in Dulles' United Action Speech of
March 29.

The speech was a call to action for free world

nations to meet future aggression via some sort of
collective defense or united action.

But the real reason

the Eisenhower Administration sought allied support was
because allied support would conform with principles of
international law.

In Indochina, as noted above, Eisenhower

was acutely aware that intervention required certain
preconditions under principles of international law.

The

administration needed France and the Associated States to
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invite intervention.

This necessitated allies.

Additionally, allied support would have the further
advantage of creating favorable domestic opinion.

Eisenhower's foreign policy reflected his belief that
America's projection on world events must remain consistent
with America's traditions and values.

At a news conference

in November 1953, Eisenhower said: "anyone who doesn't
recognize that the great struggle of our time is an
ideological one,...[is] not looking this question squarely
in the face."68 A sense of idealism, steeped in the ethos
of American civilization— guided Eisenhower's foreign
policy.

America's mission was not just to show the peoples

of the world, and especially those behind the iron curtain,
what freedom and liberty could accomplish, but to offer the
fruits of that accomplishment to any who wanted it.

This

idea pervaded the ethos of American society after World war
II.

It was a sense of what America stood for to Americans.

A strong, vibrant America with total faith in her traditions
and morals had accepted her historically-mandated role to
secure world peace and elevate respect for the individual to
a higher plane.

This was what Eisenhower sought to achieve.
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